I presented my latest preprint on minimal phenomenal experience (MPE) at Models of Consciousness meeting in Bamberg.
Models of Consciousness 2024, University of Bamberg, 30 September – 4 October, 2024
In the wake of the active inference framework two popular theories of consciousness highlight the relevance of insular cortex for interoceptive self modeling [Seth, 2021] and subcortical brain regions for qualitative experience [Solms, 2021]. Both provide a compelling ecological argument for integrated conscious experience, i.e., self organization of complex organisms with different parallel and hard to reconcile optimization goals. Computationally, both theories require some kind of self model as basis, which could contradict credible reports of MPE [Metzinger, 2024]. However, duality of conscious experience could be explained by a neuroscientific theory of two distinct brain networks emerging from different evolutionary history, leading to marked differences in cytoarchitecture and function [Sanides, 1962, Luu, Tucker, Friston, 2024]. Speculatively, System-I, originating from an olfactory system and amygdala-centered expansion gradient towards ventro/medial cortex, could enable interoceptive self modeling for everyday, habitual interactions with the body and the world. System-II, hippocampus-centered towards dorso/lateral cortex, could enable less egocentric forms of cognition and experience. In this sense, MPE could be a less salient/habitual form of experience, when neither interoceptive/exteroceptive prediction errors nor spontaneous episodic memory reactivation provide self-referential engagement of System-I. System-II, if not operating on content, could give rise to self-less experience of the world as such.
Link to the recording | Link to my slides | Link to my preprint