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Innocenzo XI Odescalchi

Papa, politico, committente

a cura di

*Richard Bösel, Antonio Menniti Ippolito, Andrea Spiriti,
Claudio Strinati e Maria Antonietta Visceglia*

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PETER RAUSCHER

Defence and Expansion.

Emperor Leopold I, Pope Innocent XI and Financing the Wars against the Ottoman Empire in the Late 17th Century*

1. Introduction

In his so-called «Vespers for Europe» celebrated on 10 September 1983 at the Heldenplatz¹ in Vienna, Karol Józef Wojtyła, Pope John Paul II commented on the siege of Vienna 300 years previously as follows:

A tutti noi è noto che 300 anni orsono le truppe dell'Impero ottomano cinsero d'assedio questa città, come già nel 1529, con grande superiorità di forze. Il percorso di queste armate era segnato dal terrore degli incendi, delle stragi e delle deportazioni; indicibili erano la miseria, i lamenti, la sofferenza, ammirevole il coraggio dei difensori di Vienna. Prendevano forza dalla loro fede, dalla preghiera e dalla convinzione di combattere non solo per il loro Paese, ma anche per l'Europa e per il cristianesimo. Al Papa spetta il compito di ricordare che il suo predecessore di allora, il beato Innocenzo XI, appoggiò efficacemente l'Austria e i suoi alleati con sovvenzioni, con aiuti diplomatici e con un appello alla preghiera rivolto alla cristianità. Anche al Papa polacco sia concesso di parlare con particolare commozione del re polacco Jan Sobieski alla guida delle truppe di soccorso alleate che liberarono Vienna, in un momento in cui gli eroici difensori della città, ormai soltanto con le loro ultime forze, potevano evitare l'occupazione.

È giusto ricordare con ammirazione i difensori e i liberatori di Vienna che hanno opposto resistenza all'attacco con una collaborazione esemplare. Ci sono stati tramandati appelli di predicatori che cercavano di spingere gli uomini di

*This article does not provide an extensive bibliography on the topic. For further information cf. the literature cited. I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Margarete Grandner (University of Vienna) for reading and commenting on this article.

1. E. Hanisch, *Wien, Heldenplatz*, in *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, ed. by E. François, H. Schulze, München 2001, vol. 1, pp. 105-121.

quel tempo non solo all'audacia, ma soprattutto ad un ritorno al cristianesimo. La storia ci impone di interpretare gli eventi di allora con lo spirito dell'epoca e non semplicemente di misurarli al nostro presente. Essa impone di evitare una condanna e un'esaltazione unilaterale. Noi sappiamo che orribili crudeltà venivano inflitte non solo dall'esercito osmanico, ma anche dall'armata dell'imperatore e dei suoi alleati. Per quanto possiamo essere contenti del successo nella difesa dell'Occidente cristiano, dobbiamo prendere coscienza con vergogna del fatto che la solidarietà cristiana allora non era né spontanea né europea.

Noi siamo soprattutto consapevoli del fatto che la lingua delle armi non è la lingua di Gesù Cristo e neppure la lingua di sua Madre, alla quale allora come oggi ci si appella come 'aiuto dei cristiani'. Ci sono casi in cui la lotta armata è una realtà inevitabile a cui in circostanze tragiche non possono sottrarsi neanche i cristiani. Ma anche in questo caso è vincolante l'imperativo cristiano dell'amore per il nemico, della misericordia: colui che è morto sulla Croce per i suoi carnefici trasforma ogni mio nemico in un fratello, cui spetta il mio amore, anche se mi difendo dal suo attacco.

Così questo Giubileo non sia il festeggiamento di una vittoria bellica bensì il festeggiamento di una pace donataci oggi in contrasto, annunciato con gratitudine, con un avvenimento che era legato a una così grande sofferenza. Dobbiamo dimostrarci degni della libertà che allora è stata difesa con così grande impegno.²

2. Giovanni Paolo II, *Visita pastorale in Austria, Celebrazione dei Vespri d'Europa nella Piazza degli eroi*, Vienna, 10 settembre 1983: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/homilies/1983/documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_19830910_celebrazione-vespri_it.html. German version: «Jedem von uns ist vertraut, wie vor dreihundert Jahren Truppen des osmanischen Reiches, wie schon 1529, bis vor diese Stadt gelangten und sie mit gewaltiger Übermacht belagerten. Der Zug der Armee war von Brandschatzung, Mord und Verschleppung gekennzeichnet; unsäglich war die Not, der Jammer, das Elend, bewundernswert war die Tapferkeit der Verteidiger Wiens. Sie schöpften Kraft aus ihrem Glauben, aus dem Gebet, aus ihrer Überzeugung, nicht nur für ihr Land, sondern für Europa und für die Christenheit zu streiten. Dem Papst steht es wohl zu, daran zu erinnern, daß sein damaliger Vorgänger, der selige Innozenz XI., Österreich und seine Verbündeten mit Subventionen [besser: Subsidien, P.R.], mit diplomatischer Hilfe und mit seinem Gebetsauftrag an die Christenheit wirksam unterstützt hat. Dem Papst aus Polen sei es auch gestattet, mit besonderer Bewegung davon zu sprechen, daß es der polnische König Jan Sobieski gewesen ist, unter dessen Oberbefehl die verbündeten Einsatztruppen Wien befreiten, zu einem Zeitpunkt, da sich die heldenhaften Verteidiger der Stadt nur noch mit letzter Kraft der Belagerung erwehren konnten. Es ist gerechtfertigt, mit Bewunderung der Verteidiger und Befreier Wiens zu gedenken, die in beispielhaftem Zusammenstehen dem Angriff Einhalt geboten. Uns sind die Aufrufe heiligmäßiger Prediger überliefert, welche die Menschen dieser Zeit nicht nur zu Tapferkeit, sondern vor allem zu christlicher Umkehr zu bewegen suchten. Die Geschichte gebietet uns, damaliges Geschehen aus dem Geist der damaligen Zeit zu verstehen und nicht einfach an unserer Gegenwart zu messen. Sie gebietet, einseitige Verurteilung und Verherrlichung

The wars against the Muslim Ottoman Empire undoubtedly played a significant role in the policies of the so-called "Türkenpapst" (i.e. Anti-Turkish Pope) Innocent XI. Soon after the victory against the Ottoman troops at Vienna in 1683 he declared the day of the battle a holiday for the entire Church, just like the anniversaries of the battles of Lepanto in 1571 and of the White Mountain near Prague in 1620.³ Marking a crucial year not only for Christian Europe but also for the Habsburg Monarchy,⁴ the Holy Roman Empire and especially the City of Vienna, the Ottoman siege of the city represents a complex site of memory or «lieu de mémoire».⁵ Many books and articles have been written about the alleged significance in world history of the allied Imperial-Christian army's victory over the forces of the Ottoman Sultan under the leadership of the grand vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha.⁶

zu vermeiden. Wir wissen, daß himmelschreiende Grausamkeiten nicht nur vom osmanischen Heer, sondern auch von der Armee des Kaisers und seiner Verbündeten begangen worden sind. Wir müssen, so sehr wir uns über den Verteidigungserfolg des christlichen Abendlandes freuen mögen, beschämt zur Kenntnis nehmen, daß die christliche Solidarität damals weder spontan noch europaweit war. Vor allem aber sind wir uns dessen bewußt, daß die Sprache der Waffen nicht die Sprache Jesu Christi ist und nicht die Sprache seiner Mutter, die man damals wie heute als die 'Hilfe der Christenheit' angerufen hat. Bewaffneter Kampf ist allenfalls ein unausweichliches Übel, dem sich auch Christen in tragischen Verwicklungen nicht entziehen können. Aber auch hierbei verpflichtet das christliche Gebot der Feindesliebe, der Barmherzigkeit: der für seine Henker am Kreuz gestorben ist, macht mir jeden Feind zum Bruder, dem meine Liebe gebührt, auch wenn ich mich seines Angriffs erwehre. So sei dieses Jubiläum nicht die Feier eines kriegerischen Sieges, sondern eine Feier des uns geschenkten Friedens im dankbar bekundeten Kontrast zu einem Ereignis, das mit so viel Leid verbunden war. Und wir wollen uns der Freiheit würdig erweisen, die damals mit so großem Einsatz verteidigt worden ist». In: *Johannes Paul II. in Österreich. Ein Buch zur Erinnerung*, ed. by F. Hummer, M. Gebhart, Wien-München 1983, pp. 26-29, cit. pp. 27-28; Österreichischer Katholikentag 1983. «*Hoffnung leben – Hoffnung geben*». *Besuch von Papst Johannes Paul II. in Österreich. Eine Dokumentation*, ed. by A. Kraxner, E. Ploier, W. Schaffelhofer, Graz-Wien-Köln 1984, pp. 212-217, pp. 214-215.

3. M. Mitterauer, *Anniversarium und Jubiläum. Zur Entstehung und Entwicklung öffentlicher Gedenktage*, in *Der Kampf um das Gedächtnis. Öffentliche Gedenktage in Mitteleuropa*, ed. by E. Brix, H. Stekl, Wien-Köln-Weimar 1997, pp. 23-89, p. 37.

4. «The ultimately successful Turkish War of 1683-1699 proved a decisive turning point in Austrian history. Once by necessity a thoroughly defensive power, the Habsburg Monarchy was only now beginning to assume true great power status». M. Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence. War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy 1683-1797*, London 2003, p. 153.

5. Cf. M. Lepetit, *Die Türken vor Wien*, in François, Schulze, *Erinnerungsorte*, pp. 391-406.

6. This literature is mentioned in P. Rauscher, *Die Erinnerung an den Erbfeind. Die „Zweite Türkenbelagerung“ Wiens 1683 im öffentlichen Bewusstsein Österreichs im 19. und*

Particularly on the occasion of the anniversaries in 1883 and 1933 the commemoration of the battle of Vienna and the attack from the "east" was used to defame ideological enemies of Catholicism such as liberalism or communism and the Soviet Union. In Vienna itself, commemoration of this 1683 threat was also used to foster a sense of identity among the city's inhabitants until the late 20th century. Nowadays, except in right-wing Austrian politics, Vienna has lost its status as the – so-called – «stronghold of Germany against the onslaught of Asian barbarity».⁷ The speech by John Paul II cited above and other official statements issued during the anniversary of 1983 show that more moderate positions have replaced the triumphalism of the past.⁸

This article does not discuss the commemoration of 1683 and the role of Pope Innocent XI (beatified in 1956). Instead I focus on the «sovvenzioni», the subsidies from the Holy See mentioned by John Paul II, and therefore on funding for the war, which marked both the end of the so-called «Turkish Threat» («Türkengefahr») and the emergence of the Habsburg Monarchy as a great power.

For the purposes of a structural analysis, concentrating solely on the 1680s does not appear very helpful. As such, I will attempt to contextualize the subsidies provided by Innocent XI for the war against the Ottomans within a survey of papal subsidies and Imperial finance over the long term.

20. Jahrhundert, in *Repräsentationen der islamischen Welt im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by G. Haug-Moritz, L. Pelizaeus, Münster 2010, pp. 278-305; M. Scheutz, 1683 – Zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens. Internationale Konflikte, beginnende Zentralisierung der zusammengesetzten Habsburgermonarchie und Konfessionalisierung, in *Von Lier nach Brüssel. Schlüsseljahre österreichischer Geschichte (1496-1995)*, ed. by M. Scheutz, A. Strohmeyer, Innsbruck-Wien-Bozen 2010, pp. 111-134. *Türkengedächtnis. Ein Projekt der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, <http://www.tuerkengedaechtnis.oeaw.ac.at/>.

7. V. von Renner, *Wien im Jahre 1683. Geschichte der zweiten Belagerung der Stadt durch die Türken im Rahmen der Zeitereignisse. Aus Anlaß der zweiten Säcularfeier verfaßt im Auftrage des Gemeinderates der k.k. Reichshaupt- und Residenzstadt Wien*, Wien 1883, pp. 5-6.

8. Cf. fn. 6 and M. Mitterauer, *Politischer Katholizismus, Österreichbewußtsein und Türkenfeindbild. Zur Aktualisierung von Geschichte bei Jubiläen*, in «Beiträge zur historischen Sozialkunde», 12 (1983), 4, pp. 111-120; K. Vocelka, *Die Zweite Wiener Türkenbelagerung von 1683 und ihr Reflex in der Wissenschaft, den Schulbüchern und Jubiläumsveranstaltungen*, in «Studia Austro-Polonica» (Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego DCLXXII, Prace Historyczne z. 75), 3 (1983), pp. 359-379.

2. Imperial war finance and papal financial aid against the «hereditary enemy of Christianity»

Papal financial aid for the Emperor against the «hereditary enemy of Christianity» – as the sultan was known in Christian propaganda – did not originate in the late 17th century. It depended not only on the state of relations between the Imperial court and the Holy See but also on those between the French crown («rex christianissimus») and the Habsburgs («Roman Emperor»), in Spain: «rex catholicus».⁹ From 1477 until at least 1756 the rivalry between these powers was a decisive factor in European politics.

For the Habsburgs, the 17th century ended in a war against the Ottoman Empire lasting from 1683 till 1699, just as it had begun with the so-called «Long» or «Thirteen Years' War» against the Sublime Porte from 1593 till 1606. This conflict under Emperor Rudolph II did not substantially modify the pre-war situation but it did lead to financial disaster and a dynastic crisis within the Habsburg family. Apart from this, the war of 1593 to 1606 is interesting in our context because we have comparatively good sources for Imperial war funding from this period. Annual expenses for warfare can be estimated at 5 million Florin,¹⁰ giving a total cost of about 65 million Florin. Financial aid from foreign powers during the entire conflict amounted to

9. Cf. M. Hochedlinger, *Die französisch-habsburgische "Erbfeindschaft". Geopolitische Aspekte einer zentralen Frage der europäischen Staatengeschichte in der Frühen Neuzeit*, in *Bericht über den einundzwanzigsten österreichischen Historikertag in Wien veranstaltet vom Verband Österreichischer Historiker und Geschichtsvereine in der Zeit vom 6. bis 10. Mai 1996*, Wien 1998, pp. 66-76; Id., *Die französisch-osmanische "Freundschaft" 1525-1792. Element antihabsburgischer Politik, Gleichgewichtsinstrument, Prestigeunternehmung – Abriß eines Problems*, in «Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung», 102 (1994), pp. 108-164.

10. I. Kenyeres, *Die Kriegsausgaben der Habsburgermonarchie von der Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts bis zum ersten Drittel des 17. Jahrhunderts*, in *Kriegführung und Staatsfinanzen. Die Habsburgermonarchie und das Heilige Römische Reich vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zum Ende des habsburgischen Kaisertums 1740*, ed. by P. Rauscher, Münster 2010, pp. 41-80, p. 72; Id., *Die Kosten der Türkenabwehr und des Langen Türkenkrieges (1593-1606) im Kontext der ungarischen Finanzen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts*, in *Das "Blut des Staatskörpers". Forschungen zur Finanzgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by P. Rauscher, A. Serles, T. Winkelbauer, München 2012, pp. 19-41, p. 31; R. Urbánek, *Češi a války turecké*, in *Co daly naše země Evropě a lidstou. Od slovanských věrosvěstů k národnímu obrození*, Praha 1939, pp. 117-123, p. 121, mentions 6 million Florin; cf. T. Winkelbauer, *Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht. Länder und Untertanen des Hauses Habsburg im konfessionellen Zeitalter*, part 1, Wien 2003, p. 482.

about 7.1 million Florin, or ten percent of the total costs of the war. The Holy See alone contributed about 2.85 million Florin during the conflict, a sum equivalent to the costs of the army for one year, including expenditure for provisions and the construction of border fortresses.¹¹ This financial aid was in no way insignificant, but compared to the monetary resources raised by the Kingdoms and lands of the Habsburg Empire the amount was fairly low: from 1592 till 1606 the Austrian lands and the lands of the Bohemian crown contributed 2.6 million Florin per annum, a total of 40 million Florin.¹²

Approximately half of this sum – about 1.4 million Florin per year or a total of 19 to 21 million Florin – were paid by the Holy Roman Empire.¹³ Despite these contributions from the Habsburg lands and the Estates of the Holy Roman Empire Rudolph II was – albeit unwillingly – forced to accept peace due to financial depletion.¹⁴ The growing instability of both rivals – both the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Empire – and wars on other fronts led to a phase of feuding or guerilla warfare in Hungary but without direct confrontation between larger armies. The various protestant Estates in the Bohemian lands, parts of the Austrian hereditary lands and the Holy Roman Empire, and – later – their European rivals Sweden and France became the main enemies of the Habsburgs. The leader of the Catholic military forces during the early years of the Thirty Years War was not Emperor Ferdinand II but his cousin Duke Maximilian of Bavaria. Papal subsidies were thus channelled into funding the troops of the Catholic League under his command. The Emperor himself received no more than 360,000 Florin from Rome between summer 1618 and spring 1621.¹⁵ Until 1634 the Holy See paid subsidies of less than 2

11. J.P. Niederkorn, *Die europäischen Mächte und der "Lange Türkenkrieg" Kaiser Rudolfs II. (1593-1606)*, Wien 1993, p. 499.

12. Winkelbauer, *Ständefreiheit*, p. 482.

13. W. Schulze estimated the contributions by the Estates of the Holy Roman Empire («Reichstürkenhilfen») between 1576 and 1603 (collected until 1630) at c. 18.6 million Florin. W. Schulze, *Reich und Türkengefahr im späten 16. Jahrhundert. Studien zu den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer äußeren Bedrohung*, München 1978, p. 362; Niederkorn puts the figure at 20 million Florin of imperial contributions and voluntary financial aid during the "Long Turkish War" (1593-1606). Niederkorn, *Die europäischen Mächte*, p. 499.

14. Cf. P. Rauscher, *Reiche Fürsten – armer Kaiser? Die finanziellen Grundlagen der Politik Habsburgs, Bayerns und Sachsens im Vorfeld des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, in Plus ultra. Die Welt der Neuzeit. Festschrift für Alfred Kohler zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. by F. Edelmayer, M. Fuchs, G. Heilingsetzer, P. Rauscher, Münster 2008, pp. 233-258.

15. Cf. D. Albrecht, *Maximilian I. von Bayern 1573-1651*, München 1998, p. 514 (Albrecht does not refer to the sources).

million Florin to the Imperial court.¹⁶ As in other previous conflicts the most important external financial supporter of the Emperor was the King of Spain. During the first years of the war until 1620 the Spanish crown contributed about 6 million Florin to Imperial warfare. More massive subsidies were to follow.¹⁷ Certainly, the Spanish Habsburgs supported their own dynasty and their own strategic objectives, and, unlike the Holy See, did not have to consider the interests of their rivals, the French crown.

3. *The new structure of Imperial warfare after 1648*

The Thirty Years War can be seen as a transitional period for Imperial warfare and war financing. At the beginning of the conflict with the Bohemian Estates Ferdinand II neither commanded a strong army nor sufficient liquid funds.¹⁸ He depended on assistance from the troops of the Duke of Bavaria, the Elector of Saxony and the Spanish crown¹⁹. To compensate for Bavarian and Saxonian war expenditure, Ferdinand could only offer some of his territories. Because of his lack of money the Emperor was forced to cede the two margraviates of Upper and Lower Lusatia to Saxony and – temporarily – Upper Austria (Austria above the Enns) and other sources of income to Bavaria.

Already during the Long Turkish War in around 1600²⁰ and again during the Thirty Years War, units were not disbanded throughout the winter months. After the latter conflict some regiments were kept under arms in peacetime.²¹ The number of Imperial soldiers declined until the middle of the decade from 37,000 to about 14,000 in 1655.²² The customary demobilization of some units after a peace settlement implied a significant fluctuation in the strength

16. Winkelbauer, *Ständefreiheit*, p. 487.

17. *Ibid.*

18. M. Ritter, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation und des Dreißigjährigen Krieges (1555-1648)*, III, *Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, Stuttgart-Berlin 1908, pp. 6-7.

19. Cf. Rauscher, *Reiche Fürsten*.

20. T. Winkelbauer, *Nervus rerum Austriacarum. Zur Finanzgeschichte der Habsburgermonarchie um 1700*, in *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620 bis 1740. Leistungen und Grenzen des Absolutismusparadigmas*, ed. by P. Mat'a, T. Winkelbauer, Stuttgart 2006, pp. 179-215, p. 194, fn. 69.

21. Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, pp. 98-99.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 101 and p. 104. On the strength of the Imperial army and problem of war finance cf. Id., "Onus militare". *Zum Problem der Kriegsfinanzierung in der frühneuzeit-*

of the army.²³ Nevertheless, the remaining standing army represented a new instrument of Imperial power but was also a heavy burden for the Habsburg state finances. The year 1683 marks a break in Habsburg military history: before the siege of Vienna an army numbering more than 30,000 men was exceptional whilst after 1683 Habsburg forces hardly decreased below the limit of 60,000 men until the end of the century.²⁴

Compared to the situation in around 1600, aid from the Holy Roman Empire in particular had changed fundamentally: the German Estates ceased to pay for Imperial warfare after 1648. In response to the French attacks on the Empire from the late 1660s and especially as a reaction to the occupation of Strasbourg, the Imperial Diet took action to reform the organization of Imperial warfare («Reichskriegsverfassung»). In fact, the levy of an Imperial army («Reichsarmee») based on Imperial circles («Reichskreise») failed. Only some Estates or Imperial circles supported the Emperor with troops. Due to this decentralised organization it is impossible to estimate the value of this aid in money. Moreover, Imperial aid was only available in wartime. Nevertheless, the support of several German Estates for the fight against the Ottomans remained high.²⁵

Funds for the Emperor's standing army in peace or wartime had to be organized by the various Habsburg lands and their subjects on the basis of the so-called «contribution». «The regiments were assigned to the Hereditary Lands according to the latter's financial capacities and had to be supplied in kind or paid in cash. [...] [A] whole bundle of services in cash and kind had to be rendered by the individual provinces to keep the military machine going».²⁶ Essential were taxes on land and buildings; in the event of war against the Ottoman Empire these were supplemented by a special «Turk

lichen Habsburgermonarchie 1500-1750, in Rauscher, *Kriegführung und Staatsfinanzen*, pp. 81-136.

23. Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, p. 103.

24. J. Bérenger, *Finances et absolutisme autrichien dans la seconde moitié du XVII^e siècle*, Paris 1975, pp. 275-276. Cf. Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, p. 102. On the problem of how to interpret the few available figures on the strength of the Imperial army cfr *ibid.* It is often hardly possible to distinguish between ordinary Imperial troops, irregular units (such as border garrisons, artillery or other special corps) and foreign auxiliary forces.

25. Cf. P. Rauscher, *Nach den Türkenreichstagen: Die Steuerbewilligungen des Heiligen Römischen Reichs im 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhundert*, in Rauscher, *Kriegführung und Staatsfinanzen*, pp. 433-485.

26. Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, p. 34.

tax» levied on real estate or capital.²⁷ In addition, the provinces had to provide «on a very large scale indeed, supply in kind: accommodation, rations, remounts, recruits, additional services».²⁸ Apart from the standing army the peasant militia and cavalrymen supplied by the nobility as compensation for their personal military service formed part of the Emperor's military force. However, these provincial levies could only be used for home defence.²⁹

As within the Holy Roman Empire, there were different options for supporting the Emperor on a European level: sending troops or giving money. Financial support traditionally came from Spain or from Italian princes.

4. 1663-1664: The first «Turkish War» of Emperor Leopold I

This was the case when a conflict in 1663 between the Emperor and the Sultan led to the first Ottoman attack since the peace of 1606. The reaction of the French crown in this situation was exceptional. In contrast to the Holy See, which was the «centre of gravity of the crusade»³⁰ against Islam, France usually tried to exploit Turkish pressure on the Habsburgs for its own interests.³¹ Due to the strained relations between France and the Ottoman Empire in the early 1660s Louis XIV sent an auxiliary corps of 6,000 men to Hungary at the Emperor's disposal which took part in the battle of Saint Gotthard/Mogersdorf in August 1664.³² Spanish and papal support followed traditional paths: Pope Alexander VII approved the sale of church properties within the Habsburg Empire and sent revenues from Italian tithes and considerable amounts of powder to Vienna.³³ Spain agreed to monthly payments of 20,000 Florin.³⁴ In fact, the Emperor received considerable financial aid from Italy and Spain for his Turkish War:

27. Cf. Bérenger, *Finances*, pp. 334-337.

28. Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, pp. 34-36, cit. P. 36.

29. On the composite Imperial army cf. *ibid.*, p. 100.

30. Hochedlinger, *Die französisch-osmanische "Freundschaft"*, p. 114 («Gravitationspunkt aller Kreuzzugsbemühungen»).

31. *Ibid.*

32. K. Peball, *Die Schlacht bei St. Gotthard-Mogersdorf 1664*, Wien 1997⁵, pp. 6-7.

33. Venetian sources mention the sum of 600,000 or 500,000 thaler. Cf. O. Redlich, *Weltmacht des Barock. Österreich in der Zeit Kaiser Leopolds I.*, Wien 1961⁴, p. 182; G. Wagner, *Das Türkenjahr 1664. Eine europäische Bewährung. Raimund Montecuccoli, die Schlacht von St. Gotthard-Mogersdorf und der Friede von Eisenburg (Vasvár)*, Eisenstadt 1964, p. 88 (600,000 thaler); Bérenger, *Finances*, pp. 410-411 (500,000 thaler).

34. Wagner, *Türkenjahr*, pp. 89-90; Bérenger, *Finances*, p. 406; A.J. Rodríguez Hernández, *Financial and Military Cooperation between the Spanish Crown and the Emperor*

Table 1: Italian and Spanish financial aid against the Ottoman Empire 1661-1664 (received by the paymaster of the Imperial court [«Hofzahlmeister»])³⁵

YEAR	REVENUE FROM	FLORIN (ROUND FIGURES)
1661	Pope (nuncio Carlo Caraffa)	93,000
1662	Pope (nuncio Carlo Caraffa)	45,000
1663	Viceroy of Naples	150,000
1663	King of Spain	76,000
1663	Pope (nuncio Carlo Caraffa)	36,000
1663	Tithe («geistliche Zehntgelder») from Naples	65,943
1663	Tithe («geistliche Zehntgelder») from Piedmont	1,833
1664	Tithe («geistliche Zehntgelder») from Italy	139,338
1664	King of Spain	15,000
1664	Republic of Lucca	20,000
1664	Republic of Genoa	40,000
Total		682,114

Between 1661 and 1664 the Holy See paid 174,000 Florin to the Emperor. A further 207,000 Florin came from tithes.³⁶ Spain and Naples provided 241,000 Florin³⁷ to the Imperial paymaster. Unfortunately we have no information on the annual expenditure for the Turkish War of 1663-1664. If we take the figures from the wars of the 1670s and 1680s we could estimate the cost of the war at 5 or 6 million Florin.³⁸ Italian and Spanish financial aid in 1663-1664 may have covered between 5 and at most 10 per cent of the total costs of the war.

in the *Seventeenth Century*, in Rauscher, *Kriegführung und Staatsfinanzen*, pp. 575-602, pp. 586-588.

35. P. Rauscher, *Die Finanzierung des Kaiserhofs von der Mitte des 16. bis zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts. Eine Analyse der Hofzahlamtsbücher*, in *Hofwirtschaft. Ein ökonomischer Blick auf Hof und Residenz in Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit*, ed. by G. Fouquet, J. Hirschbiegel, W. Paravicini, Ostfildern 2008, pp. 405-441, p. 431.

36. Cf. Bérenger, *Finances*, pp. 410-411.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 406.

38. For the figures cf. *ibid.*, p. 359, (estimated) expenses for warfare 1674: 5,592,618 Florin, 1675: 6,995,917 Florin, 1682: 5,863,243 Florin, 1683: 4,938,873 Florin, 1684: 7,900,000 Florin.

5. The Imperial finances

To estimate papal financial aid for the Turkish war since 1683 we must look at the financial system of the Habsburg Monarchy: the development of the Imperial finances fits perfectly into the explanatory model according to which warfare led to a vast demand for funds and – since this demand could not be met by regular income in the short term – to the growth of public debt. Between 1680 and 1684 expenditure on warfare doubled from c. 4 million to c. 8 million Florin and tripled in subsequent years. Due to the simultaneous wars against the Ottomans and France from 1689, war expenditure exceeded the threshold of 20 million Florin annually and accounted for over 90 per cent of total state expenditure from the mid-1690s. With the peace agreements of 1697 and 1699, military expenditure declined considerably.

From a territorial point of view the lands of the Bohemian crown contributed the lion's share of Imperial revenues. After 1682 it became customary for Bohemia, Slesia and Moravia to supply two thirds of the

Table 2: The Imperial Finances – Expenditure and Income 1680-1699³⁹

YEAR	CIVIL EXPENDITURE	MILITARY EXPENDITURE	TOTAL EXPENDITURE	INCOME	DEFICIT	%
1680	1,541,682	3,863,243	3,404,925	6,686,856	-	-
1682	1,500,000	5,863,243	7,363,243	6,798,750	564,493	7.5
1683	1,500,000	4,938,873	6,438,873	6,422,598	-	-
1684	1,500,000	7,900,000	9,400,000	7,498,750	1,901,250	20.0
1685	2,200,000	12,600,000	14,800,000	7,498,750	7,310,250	49.0
1690	2,402,770	12,000,000	14,402,770	10,503,536	3,899,234	27.0
1691	1,800,000	10,740,920	12,540,920	10,303,536	2,237,384	17.5
1693	1,800,000	16,272,140	18,072,140	11,798,350	6,273,790	34.5
1695	1,815,201	22,722,819	24,538,020	14,581,320	9,956,700	40.0
1698	2,200,000	14,185,000	16,385,000	14,710,930	1,674,070	10.0
1699	4,571,549	8,050,000	12,621,549	16,460,850	-	-

military expenditures, with the eastern and southern parts of the Austrian hereditary lands (except Tyrol and Vorarlberg) contributing one third.⁴⁰ The

39. Bérenger, *Finances*, p. 359.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 346; Winkelbauer, *Nervus rerum Austriacarum*, p. 206.

Kingdom of Bohemia alone (without Slesia and Moravia) had to pay between 1,170,000 and 2,284,721 Florin a year.⁴¹ Alongside these regular contributions the Bohemian and Austrian lands had to pay a special "Turk tax" from 1682 until 1696, fluctuating between 850,000 and 3.2 million Florin per year. Even the Kingdom of Hungary, which suffered from a series of rebellions, Habsburg-Transylvanian and Habsburg-Ottoman wars for decades had to contribute 800,000 Florin annually after the failed conspiracy of some Hungarian magnates in 1671. After the success of the Imperial army the Imperial court heavily increased the tax burden on the Kingdom. In 1690 – only a few years after the conquest of the Great Hungarian Plains («Nagy Magyar Alföld») and of Transylvania in 1687 – the Hungarian share of Habsburg war finance rose to 2 million Florin per year and doubled again in 1698 to 4 million Florin. However, due to the Rákóczi-uprising from 1703, the Imperial court was unable to implement the plan devised in 1697 to redistribute the burden of warfare between the Habsburg lands.⁴²

Table 3: The (never implemented) military quotas of the Habsburg Lands 1697 (except Tyrol and Further Austria [Vorderösterreich])⁴³

PROVINCE/MONARCHY, GROUP OF PROVINCES	AMOUNT IN FL.	%
Hungary	4,000,000	33.33
Transylvania	1,000,000	8.33
Kingdom of Hungary incl. Transylvania	5,000,000	41.67
Bohemia	2,284,722	19.04
Silesia	1,523,148	12.69
Moravia	761,574	6.35
Bohemian crown	4,569,447	38.08
Inner Austria	1,215,278	10.13
Austria below the Enns	810,185	6.75
Austria above the Enns	405,093	3.38
Lower and Inner Austria	2,430,556	20.25
Total	12,000,000	100.00

41. For the following figures cf. Bérenger, *Finances*, p. 349.

42. *Ibid.*; Winkelbauer, *Nervus rerum Austriacarum*, pp. 206-207.

43. Winkelbauer, *Ständefreiheit*, pp. 493-500; P. Rauscher, *Comparative Evolution of the Tax Systems in the Habsburg Monarchy, c. 1526-1740: The Austrian and the Bohemian Lands*, in *La Fiscalità nell'Economia Europea. Secc. XIII-XVIII * Fiscal Systems in the European Economy from the 13th to the 18th Centuries*, Atti della Trentanovesima Settimana di Studi (22-26 aprile 2007), a cura di S. Cavaciocchi, Firenze 2008, pp. 291-320, p. 300.

6. Alliances and papal financial aid. The siege of Vienna 1683

In autumn 1683 the army despatched to relieve the besieged city of Vienna totalled about 75,000 men. It consisted of 20,000 men of the Imperial troops, almost 40,000 troops from the Holy Roman Empire, namely Bavaria, Saxony, and the Imperial circles of Swabia and Franconia, and about 15,000 to 20,000 Polish troops under King Jan Sobieski.⁴⁴

The traditional ally of the Emperor, the King of Spain, lost his hegemonic position in Europe during the Thirty Years War, the war against France lasting until 1659 and the international conflicts of the late 1660s and the 1670s⁴⁵. Due to secret agreements between the courts of Versailles and Vienna, especially during the years around 1670, relations between the two branches of the Habsburg family lost their former intensity. Spanish efforts to muster Imperial support against France failed.⁴⁶ On the other hand Spain was probably unable to send substantial amounts of money to the Imperial court.⁴⁷

Unlike Spain, the Holy See did not play a major role within the European power system. But as the spiritual leader of Catholic Christianity and as an Italian prince, the Pope had high stakes in the struggle against the Ottoman Empire which mainly took place on the border with the Habsburg Empire. Since the fall of Vienna would have enabled the Ottomans to attack the Italian peninsula, the Holy See was forced to support the Emperor. On the one hand Innocent XI tried to encourage the alliance between Emperor Leopold I and King Jan III Sobieski of Poland; on the other he provided direct financial aid for the Emperor.

44. Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, p. 157.

45. M. Fernández Álvarez, *El fracaso de la hegemonía española en Europa (Guerra y diplomacia en la época de Felipe IV)*, in *Historia de España, XXV: La España de Felipe IV. El gobierno de la Monarquía, la crisis de 1640 y el fracaso de la hegemonía europea*, ed. by R. Menéndez Pidal, J.M. Jover Zamora, Madrid 1982, pp. 635-789; H. Pietschmann, *Von der Gründung der spanischen Monarchie bis zum Ausgang des Ancien Régime*, in W.L. Bernecker, H. Pietschmann, *Geschichte Spaniens. Von der frühen Neuzeit bis zur Gegenwart*, Stuttgart 2005⁴, pp. 13-237, p. 168; F. Edelmayer, *Die spanische Monarchie der Katholischen Könige und der Habsburger (1474-1700)*, in *Kleine Geschichte Spaniens*, ed. by P. Schmidt, Stuttgart 2002, pp. 123-207, p. 198.

46. For the Imperial policy cf. Redlich, *Weltmacht*, pp. 86-105; A.F. Pribram, *Franz Paul Freiherr von Lisola – 1613-1674 – und die Politik seiner Zeit*, Leipzig 1894, pp. 255-530; J. Bérenger, *Une tentative de rapprochement entre la France et l'Empereur: le traité de partage secret de la Succession d'Espagne du 19 janvier 1668*, in «Revue d'Histoire diplomatique», 79 (1965), pp. 291-314.

47. Rodríguez Hernández, *Financial and Military Cooperation*, pp. 589-591.

Table 4: The financial (and political) aid of Innocent XI for the Imperial war against the Ottoman Empire (1682-1683)⁴⁸

PERIOD	PAPAL FINANCIAL AID FOR THE EMPEROR	VALUE IN FLORIN
Autumn 1682	Papal approval for taxing the clergy of the Austrian and Bohemian lands (1% of property)	
	Contribution of the Austrian clergy	50,000
Spring 1683	Financial assistance from Queen Christine of Sweden	12,000 Scudi
	Approval to sell the Bohemian manor of Janowitz/Janovice nad Úhlavou (belonging to the archdiocese of Prague) ⁴⁹	
	Financial aid for the Emperor from Tuscany, Genoa, Lucca, Massa (Italy) and Portugal through papal intercession	
July 1683	Approval to sell the treasures of the churches («Kirchensilber» except for chalices)	
August 1683	Direct financial aid	500,000

During the siege of Vienna in August 1683, Pope Innocent XI paid 500,000 Florin to Emperor Leopold I and another 200,000 Florin to the King of Poland. The historian of the imperial finances during the reign of Leopold, Jean Bérenger, commented on these payment as follows:

C'était vraiment une aide généreuse et efficace au moment où l'Empereur était dans le dénuement et avait besoin d'argent comptant pour faire face à des dépenses militaires de première nécessité.⁵⁰

According to Bérenger, up to the end of his papacy in 1689, Innocent XI granted another 2 million Florin from Italian tithes and 500,000 Florin⁵¹ annually in 1683 and 1684 from special taxes on the clergy of the Habsburg Monarchy. In 1685 Rome ordered the sale of one third of the church properties accumulated over the past 60 years.⁵²

48. A.M. Trivellini, *Il Cardinale Francesco Buonvisi Nunzio a Vienna (1675-1689)*, Firenze 1958, pp. 60-61; Bérenger, *Finances*, p. 336, p. 412.

49. *Handbuch der Historischen Stätten: Böhmen und Mähren*, ed. by J. Bahlcke, W. Eberhard, M. Polívka, Stuttgart 1998, p. 228.

50. Bérenger, *Finances*, p. 412.

51. Cf. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, HKA, HF, Protokolle 955 (1683), fol. 667v.

52. Bérenger, *Finances*, p. 413; L. Freiherr von Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste im Zeitalter des fürstlichen Absolutismus von der Wahl Innozenz' X. bis zum Tode Innozenz'*

All in all, from a Viennese point of view, if we look at the Imperial finances, it is hardly possible to calculate the financial aid from the Holy See for the war against the Ottoman Empire during the 1680s. One problem is that the ledgers of the Imperial paymaster of war are missing. Unlike the papal payments for the Turkish war in the early 1660s, the financial aid provided by the Holy See in 1683 and the subsequent years is not registered in the existing account ledgers of the Court («Hofzahlamtsbücher»). It might be possible to reconstruct the efforts of the Imperial financial administration to obtain papal financial aid based on the minute books («Protokollbücher») of the Imperial Court Chamber. Unfortunately, historians of the Imperial finances have not analysed these sources in any detail.⁵³ Examining these minute books we see that the so-called «papal subsidies» occupied the Imperial Court Chamber especially during the years 1683 and 1684.⁵⁴ The correspondence of the Imperial Chamber, however, does not enable us to quantify the total amount of papal donations. In March 1684 the Chamber mentioned some 430,000 Florin transferred by the nuncio Francesco Buonvisi to Vienna in 1683.⁵⁵ But how was the money sent to Vienna? The papal bills of exchange were transferred to Italian companies in Vienna such as Geronimo Joannelli⁵⁶, Verena and Caresana, Bartholotti and Bellini⁵⁷ or Cavia and Bonduri.⁵⁸ Some of these Italian merchants in the Imperial city held privileges as so-called «merchants of the Imperial court» («Hofhandelsmänner»). The Bartholotti banking family in particular was closely connected to the Imperial financial administration, because some of its members, such as John Paul Bartholotti, John Charles Bartholotti or John Baptist Bartholotti, were members of the Imperial Court Chamber, Imperial paymasters of war or held other offices within the Imperial administration.⁵⁹ Papal

XII. (1644-1700), 2. Abteilung: Innozenz XI., Alexander VIII., Innozenz XII. (1676-1700), Freiburg 1930, p. 825.

53. Bérenger, *Finances*, pp. 411-412.

54. Cf. HKA, HF Protokolle 955 (1683), 959 (1684), 963 (1685).

55. HKA, HF Protokolle 959 (1683), fol. 180v.

56. Bérenger, *Finances*, pp. 246-247.

57. Die Wiener Hofgesellschaft während der Regierungszeit Kaiser Leopolds I. (1657-1705): <http://www.oesta.gv.at/site/6662/default.aspx> (06.11.2012), Hofzahlamtsbücher: <http://www.oesta.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=33984> (06.11.2012), n. 710-713.

58. HKA, HF Protokolle 959 (1684), f. 342r, f. 371r; *ibid.*, 955 (1683), ff. 530v-531r.

59. Cf. Bérenger, *Finances*, p. 249; F.K. Wißgrill, *Schauplatz des landsässigen Nieder-Oesterreichischen Adels vom Herren- und Ritterstande von dem XI. Jahrhundert an, bis auf jetzige Zeiten*, vol. 1, Wien 1794, p. 304; cf. also E. Ortlieb (red.), *Die Akten des*

subsidies in cash or bills of exchange were obviously sent via Venice or Milan to Vienna.⁶⁰

What was this money used to pay for? Unsurprisingly, papal subsidies were used to pay various Imperial warfare expenses: in 1683 Samuel Oppenheimer, a Jewish merchant who had been providing the Imperial army with commodities like provisions or ammunition since the 1670s⁶¹, received at least 50,000 Florin, and probably much more, for his supplies. Some of the monies were spent to buy powder from Bohemia or flour from Bavaria, some were transferred to the paymaster of the troops («Feldkriegszahlmeister») fighting against the Turks or the insurgents in Upper Hungary led by Imre Thököly.⁶²

Other sources may elucidate the use of papal subsidies in more detail but it hardly seems possible to specify the total amount of aid provided by the Holy See. Even Bérenger does not provide an estimate of the total papal financial aid under Innocent XI. On the basis of earlier studies, Anna Maria Trivellini stated in 1958, as Ludwig von Pastor had done before her in 1930, that the Holy See paid at least 5 million Florin to the Emperor during the reign of Innocent XI.⁶³ Another 1 or 2 million Florin were paid to the King of Poland and the Republic of Venice.⁶⁴ Especially during the early years of the conflict the amount of financial aid granted by the Pope seems to have been large. According to the Venetian ambassador to the Imperial court, Contarini, papal payments to Emperor Leopold I amounted to 1.2 million Florin until the battle of Vienna in October 1683.⁶⁵ For 1684 he mentioned the sum of 1.3 million.⁶⁶

Kaiserlichen Reichshofrats, Serie I: *Alte Prager Akten*, vol. 1: A-D, n. 156, pp. 106-107; Die Wiener Hofgesellschaft während der Regierungszeit Kaiser Leopolds I. (1657-1705): <http://www.oesta.gv.at/site/6662/default.aspx> (06.11.2012), Hofzahlamtsbücher: [oesta.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=33984](http://www.oesta.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=33984) (06.11.2012), n. 590-598.

60. On Venice: HKA, HF Protokolle 955 (1683), fol. 603r-v, on Milan: *ibid.*, fol. 672r-v.

61. M. Grunwald, *Samuel Oppenheimer und sein Kreis (Ein Kapitel aus der Finanzgeschichte Österreichs)*, Wien-Leipzig 1913.

62. HKA, HF Protokolle 959 (1684), fol. 342r and fol. 371r.

63. Trivellini, *Il cardinale Francesco Buonvisi*, pp. 61-62; Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste*, p. 786.

64. *Ibid.*, on the papal subsidies cf. pp. 813-830.

65. O. Klopp, *Das Jahr 1683 und der folgende große Türkenkrieg bis zum Frieden von Carlowitz 1699*, Graz 1882, p. 280.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 390; *Die Relationen der Botschafter Venedigs über Deutschland und Österreich im siebzehnten Jahrhundert*, II, K. Leopold I., ed. J. Fiedler, Wien 1867, p. 253.

7. Conclusion

If we compare financial aid during the reign of Innocent XI with that of his predecessors we can state the following: for the Long Turkish War of Emperor Rudolph II, subsidies from the Holy See equalled approximately sixty per cent of the total costs of warfare for a single year. Papal subsidies represented less than five per cent of the total costs of this war. During the short war of 1663/64 the share contributed by the Holy See may have reached this level again. The Great Turkish War (1683-1699) initially cost 5 million annually and more than 10 million Florin per year from the mid-1680s. Since papal financial aid came from different sources (direct payments, permission to tax the property of the church or income from tithe in Italy or Spain), the exact amount is difficult to calculate. Even if we assume a low figure like one million Florin contributed by the church, the papal share of Imperial war funding amounted to 15 or 25 percent during the first two years of the conflict 1683 and 1684. This seems extremely high. Considering that papal aid for the Emperor hurt French interests, the politics of Innocent XI seem even more remarkable. For these reasons several historians have emphasized the financial and political contributions by the Pope at the beginning of the Great Turkish War.⁶⁷

Peace with France was of vital importance for the Emperor to be successful in his war in Hungary. When Innocent XI died in 1689 this peace was history. During the following decade the Austrian Empire waged war on two fronts. Jean Bérenger stated: «La mort d'Innocent XI marqua la fin brutale de l'aide pontificale».⁶⁸ This turnaround in papal policy resulted from the growing influence of the French party at the papal court which tried to avoid indirect papal subsidies for Leopold I in his struggle against Louis XIV.

However, despite all the papal subsidies it is obvious that the wars against the Ottoman Empire, even that of 1683, were predominantly paid for by the subjects of the Bohemian and Austrian territories as well as by the people of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Holy Roman Empire.

67. Cf. e.g. Klopp, *Das Jahr 1683*, p. 261; Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste*, p. 807; E. Zöllner, *Geschichte Österreichs. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Wien-München 1990, p. 252.

68. Bérenger, *Finances*, p. 413.

ILBER ORTAYLI

Le condizioni economiche e amministrative dell'Impero ottomano dopo il secondo assedio di Vienna

L'assedio di Vienna del 1683 diede inizio ad avvenimenti che condizionarono l'Europa barocca e specialmente l'Impero ottomano. Non dimentichiamo che le lunghe guerre tra la Lega Santa degli stati cristiani e l'Impero orientale che cominciarono appunto con questo assedio ebbero fine nel 1699 con il trattato di Karlowitz. Il secondo assedio di Vienna portò sulla scena politica nuovi personaggi storici. Questi avevano un carattere e un volto diverso, perché il mondo in cui vivevano era cambiato.

Il papa Innocenzo XI nonostante cercasse di resistere in maniera inflessibile alla politica interna ed estera di Luigi XIV, non riusciva a tenerle testa; ebbe tuttavia incredibilmente successo contro i Turchi nella costruzione dell'alleanza formata da Luigi XIV, Jan Sobieski III e Leopoldo I. Questa alleanza si allargò e vi entrarono a far parte addirittura due forze come la Russia e la Repubblica veneziana che erano state rivali tra loro. Durante il trattato di Karlowitz tuttavia, accanto agli Stati della Lega Santa c'era anche un altro stato, l'Iran. Alleato dell'impero ottomano invece era la Svezia. Il mondo stava cambiando. Tutto era stato voluto da Papa Innocenzo XI che si adeguava in un certo senso ai cambiamenti che avvenivano nel mondo. Comunque c'erano altri punti da considerare. Papa Innocenzo era il capo religioso del mondo cattolico dell'età barocca. Era un giurista che nel contempo aveva confidenza col mondo bancario per l'attività della sua famiglia ed era un devoto, una persona molto umile e veemente contro il nepotismo imperante nella Chiesa. Era un uomo all'antica: quando si muoveva contro le prerogative regie di Luigi XIV non otteneva alcun successo, ma era molto influente sul piano dell'alleanza degli europei contro i Turchi. Si potrebbe dire che l'Europa odierna in un certo senso sia l'Europa di Papa Innocenzo. Anche il vescovo di Vienna, il cardinale Leopold Karl von Kollonitsch era