A Comparative Welfare Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout, published in The Economic Journal in 2015 (link to RES media briefing)

Laboratory Elections with Endogenous Turnout: Proportional Representation versus Majoritarian Rule, published in Experimental Economics in 2015 (online appendix)

Honest equilibria in reputation games: The role of time preferences, published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics in 2018 (online appendix)

An offer you can refuse: The effect of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest, published in Journal of Public Economics in 2018 (with James Tremewan)

Working Papers

A New Approach to the Analysis of Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Theory and Experimental Evidence, with Wieland Mueller (link)

Building Trust: The Costs and Benefits of Gradualism, with Wieland Mueller and James Tremewan (link)

Work in Progress

Subjective Beliefs and Information (mis)aggregation, with Jean-Robert Tyran

An Experimental Study of Lobbying and Electoral Systems, with James Tremewan