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Employment
  Assitant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Vienna, 2013- present.

Education
PhD. In Economics, New York University, 2007-2013
        Thesis Title: Financial Contracts and Bargaining.
    B.S. in Mathematics and Economics, Hebrew University, 2002-2006.

Publications
Tsur, Matan (2008)," Selectivity Effect of Past Experience on Purchasing Decisions: Implications for the WTA–WTP Disparity," Journal of Economic Psychology, 29, 5, 739–746.

Begum Guney, Michael Richter and Matan Tsur (2018), "Aspiration-based Choice," Journal of Economic Theory, 176, 935-956,

Working Papers

Security Design and Bargaining

This paper analyzes the problem of designing securities backed by the proceeds of bargaining games. We consider a firm that raises capital for multiple projects. The proceeds of each project will be determined in later negotiations with a buyer of the output. Thus, a security backed by the proceeds of the sales affects the feasible payoffs in the bargaining game and thereby the outcomes. We characterize the securities that achieve the firm's maximal equilibrium payoff in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In a large class of securities, the optimal contract is remarkably simple. The firm finances each project with debt separately.

Information Design in Competitive Insurance Markets (with Daniel Garcia)

This paper characterizes the optimal information structure in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. A regulator assigns ratings to individuals according to their risk characteristics, insurers offer fixed insurance contracts to each rating group, and the market clears as in Akerlof (1970). The optimal rating system minimizes ex-ante risk subject to participation constraints. We prove that in any such market there exists a unique optimal system under which all individuals trade and the ratings match low risk types with high risk types negative assortatively. A simple algorithm yields the optimal system. We examine implications for government regulations of insurance markets.

Investment and Search in Matching Markets (with Michael Richter)

This paper studies a model of matching markets where agents make pre-match investments and must search for compatible partners. If matching is frictionless, there exists a competitive equilibrium with efficient investment and matches. However, the first-best outcome is not attainable in the presence of search costs. We characterize the steady states of a search and bargaining process under the assumptions of transferable utility and fixed per-period search costs. If the production function is supermodular, there exists a unique steady state in which the matches and investments are constrained efficient. If the production function is submodular, there are multiple steady states some of which are not constrained efficient. The tradeoff between investment costs ex-ante identical populations of men and women optimally adopt an asymmetric distribution of skills.

Research In Progress
Dynamic Insurance Contracts Under Adverse Selection and One Sided Commitment (with Tomasz Sadzik)

Seminar Presentations and Conferences
2014- Paris School of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv University, Humboldt University (Berlin), European Meetings of the Econometric Society, SAET (Tokyo).
2015- ECARES (Brussles), CORE (Brussles).
2016- UCSD, UCSB, UC Riverside, Max Planck (Bonn).
2017- NYU alumni conference.
2018- Royal Holoway

Refereeing
American Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Teaching and Research Fields
Primary fields: Microeconomic Theory and Contract Theory
Secondary field: Financial Economics and Behavioral Economics

Teaching Experience
Principles of Economics, Intermediate Microeconomics,