ERC Starting Grant 2020
Research proposal [Part B1]

The ‘de-party-politicization’ of Europe’s political elites
How the rise of technocrats and political outsiders transforms representative democracy

DEPART

PI: Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik
Host institution: University of Vienna
Duration: 60 months

How do people reach the highest echelons of politics? Traditionally, the answer has been through political parties. Yet recently, more and more politicians in Europe take office with little or no party socialization. Technocrats and political outsiders have assumed power across Europe. Even established parties appoint ever more nonpartisans as ministers. Yet we still know nothing about how this ‘de-party-politicization’ of our political elites affects – or even damages – representative democracy.

To address this gap, DEPART’s theoretical innovation is to re-conceptualize the idea of ‘party control of government’. Existing work views party control as established once parties appoint individuals to office. DEPART abandons this formalistic perspective and conceives of party control as a function of the socialization of political elites into parties. The weaker this socialization, the weaker the linkage that parties provide between voters and governments.

Empirically, DEPART breaks new ground by developing the first biography-based measures of party control, using the most comprehensive and most granular analysis of political careers in Europe to date (~10,000 ministers, 30 countries, 1945–2020). It also employs survey experiments to study voter responses to de-party-politicization.

With these unique data, DEPART addresses two hitherto overlooked questions. First, does de-party-politicization diminish the influence of the party composition of governments on policy outcomes? This would undermine the ability of voters to affect policy through their electoral choice. Second, do weak (or absent) partisan ties among political elites reduce the ability of voters to correctly assign blame for bad government performance? This would increase the chance that parties pay no electoral price for corruption, scandals and mismanagement.
Section a: Extended Synopsis of the scientific proposal

Mass democracy cannot function properly without political parties (Schattschneider 1942). Parties are the transmission system that connects the driver (voters) to the engine (government). If voters turn right (i.e. vote more for right-wing parties), so should public policy. If voters steer left, government action should follow. (In both cases within constitutional constraints, of course.) DEPART breaks new ground by examining for the first time a phenomenon that threatens to break this transmission system, yet has remained curiously neglected in the social sciences: the ‘de-party-politicization’ of political elites in Europe and its potential to harm representative democracy by de-coupling government actions from voter preferences. DEPART scrutinizes the rise of politicians with little or no anchoring and socialization in political parties and its capacity to undermine policy responsiveness and government accountability in European democracies.

To be sure, many citizens (and even some political elites) are deeply mistrustful of political parties – and with some reason. Parties are often unresponsive, put their self-interest ahead of the public interest, and try to escape responsibility for their actions. At times, they price party loyalty higher than competence or expertise. No wonder then, that a majority of voters in Europe considers government by independent experts a very or fairly good idea (EVS 2018). And political parties during the past decades seem to have taken note: As Figure 1 shows, the share of ministers in Europe without party affiliation has increased six-fold between the mid-1980s and the early 2010s (note that these figures are almost certainly an undercount, cf. note below the figure). Pinto et al. (2018) even report about 40% of ministers without party office or parliamentary background in their 14-country study. Thus, even among party-affiliated politicians, fewer and fewer are rising to the top through traditional party careers. They are ‘recruited by party, [but] less likely to be recruited through parties’ (Mair 2008: 227).

One reason for this development is greater demand for leaders from outside the traditional party cadres, as expressed by low trust in political parties (Brunclík & Parízek forthcoming) and rising anti-party sentiment (Poguntke 1996). Parties meet this demand by appointing people from non-traditional backgrounds: Political outsiders are usually selected for their celebrity (Street 2004), whereas technocrats are appointed because of their expertise (Camerlo & Pérez-Liñán 2015) or willingness to pursue unpopular reforms (McDonnell & Valbruzzi 2014; Alexiadou & Gunaydin 2019).

At the same time, there is a shrinking supply of potential leaders inside the parties, as party activism and membership have declined (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000; Whiteley 2011; Van Biezen et al. 2012). What is more, the power balance within many parties has shifted. The party leadership and rank-and-file members have been strengthened at the expense of mid-level elites – the group most likely to advance through traditional career trajectories (Katz & Mair 1993; Pilet & Cross 2014; Wauters 2014; Schumacher & Giger 2017). Finally, institutional factors (semi-presidentialism), crises, and scandals also drive nonpartisan appointments (Amorim Neto & Strøm 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones 2009; Wratil & Pastorella 2018).

While we thus have some idea about why political elites are becoming less rooted in parties, the consequences of this phenomenon have gone almost completely unexplored (for a rare exception, see Alexiadou & Gunaydin 2015). Outsiders may bring fresh perspectives, policy expertise, and greater diversity of life experiences, yet removing party politicians from government can have massive implications for two cornerstone principles of representative democracy: policy responsiveness and political accountability.

Policy responsiveness can only emerge when those in government feel bound to the programs and policies among which voters choose. Parties establish this link between electoral choice and government action. Political accountability depends on the same linkage in reverse: voters must be able to link government action to their electoral choice. Only then can elections function as mechanisms of retrospective reward or punishment, and thus produce accountability. DEPART will therefore examine whether the de-party-politicization of political elites impedes the translation of voter preferences into public policy, and whether and how the shrinking partisan allegiance of politicians makes it more likely for underperforming governments to go unpunished by voters. It is structured into three work packages to answer three broad questions:

1) To what extent has the socialization of Europe’s political elites in political parties declined? (WP1)
2) Does this decline in party socialization erode the policy responsiveness of governments? (WP2)
3) Does this decline in party socialization undermine the political accountability of governments? (WP3)
Theoretical innovation: re-conceptualizing ‘party control of government’. In Europe’s parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies, parties ensure that government action is anchored in, and accountable to, electoral choice. This entails, crucially, that individuals recruited by parties exercise control over government (Mair 2008). Earlier work on party democracy equated ‘party control of government’ with the appointment of party officials as ministers (Rose 1969, 1974; Katz 1986). Yet, given the more diverse recruitment patterns in recent decades, appointment by party leaders alone tells us little about how committed the appointees are to a party’s policy objectives. They may act as faithful agents of a party (Laver & Shepsle 1996), but they may also pursue their own preferences (Indridason & Kam 2008). DEPART therefore re-conceptualizes ‘party control of government’ by bringing in the biographies of office-holders. A large literature shows that socialization and personal background strongly affect policy-makers’ decisions (Carnes 2013; Alexiadou 2015; Gift & Krmaric 2017; Barceló forthcoming). For example, male legislators with more daughters vote more liberally on reproductive rights issues (Washington 2008), central bankers’ pre-appointment careers predict their decision-making on monetary policy (Adolph 2013), and working-class members of parliament are more likely to support generous welfare policies (O’Grady 2019). While this literature has examined the influence of gender, educational, professional, class, or interest group background, it has almost completely overlooked what is arguably the most politically salient socialization experience: membership and activism in a political party. Socialization in a party instills its members with its values and norms (van Haute & Carty 2012). Because the length and depth of this socialization experience are individual characteristics, the strength of party affiliation can vary between individuals in the same party. This idea constitutes a major advance over extant research that has (implicitly) assumed that ‘x percent left-party control’ of ministerial portfolios (a common measure of left-party influence) is the same in 1970s Sweden, 1990s Germany, or 2010s Romania. Once we understand party control as a function of the party socialization of ministers, we can account for how it varies across space and time – depending on the biographies of political elites. DEPART uses this variation as analytical leverage to learn how de-party-politicization affects governments’ policy responsiveness and political accountability.

Scientific relevance. DEPART’s most important contribution is to rectify a mismatch between today’s political reality and how we as scholars try to understand it. In terms of their background, recruitment and socialization, contemporary political elites often look very different from two generations ago. Career trajectories like those of Silvio Berlusconi, Andrej Babiš, or Emmanuel Macron would have seemed unlikely to most observers in the 1960s. Yet scholars still operate with traditional concepts of party careers and party control to understand the role of political elites in representative democracies.

To tackle this problem, DEPART first takes the study of political careers to the next level. It generates the hitherto most detailed and most comprehensive account of political careers in Europe, covering ~10,000 career trajectories in 30 democracies (EU-28 plus NO, CH) from 1945 to 2020 with unprecedented granularity (see WP1). As a result of DEPART, we will know much more about who the people are that govern us, how they have changed since 1945, and the consequences thereof.

Second, DEPART transforms the study of partisan effects on policy outcomes. It challenges a core premise of partisan theory (the idea that policy depends on which parties govern), namely that ‘party control of government’ is established once a party appoints individuals to government. By contrast, DEPART theorizes party control as a function of individuals’ socialization into political parties over the life course. Longer socialization experiences strengthen an individual’s commitment to party goals and ideology. DEPART develops the first biography-based measures of party control to examine whether politicians with weaker party socialization produce policy output that is less in line with a party’s ideological commitments.

Third, DEPART pioneers the scrutiny of a hitherto neglected problem of accountability. Based on the premise that accountability runs through parties, it examines for the first time what happens when voters find it difficult to link government actors and their performance to a party. It combines a macro (aggregate data) and a micro perspective (voter surveys & survey experiments) into a comprehensive analysis of this problem.

Finally, DEPART will publish all its data via the Austrian Social Science Data Archive (www.aussda.at). This will significantly expand scholars’ ability to study political elites and their role in elections, party competition, personalization, government formation/termination, policy-making, and more.

Work package 1: Using innovative methods to unlock the full potential of political career data. WP1 will record and analyze the career trajectories of all ministers in the governments of 30 European democracies (EU-28, NO, CH) between 1945 and 2020. This effort will generate a granular longitudinal record of ~10,000 careers in four arenas (party office, public office, interest group, professional) and thus dwarf all existing data sources on ministers in terms of coverage and biographical detail (e.g. Blondel & Thiébault 1991; Seki & Williams 2014). WP1 will use official CVs, biographical dictionaries, online archives, government documents,
encyclopedias, and other sources (see B2 for a preliminary list). Four trained MA students will do the heavy lifting for this massive data collection under the supervision of the PI and one pre-doctoral researcher.

Until recently, political scientists (including the PI) have used political career data in somewhat simplistic and thus superficial ways. Typical applications are the extraction of single attributes (e.g. union membership) or the examination of simple durations (e.g. time in office). Only very few single-country studies have even applied simple sequence analysis to political careers (Manow 2013; Ohmura et al. 2018; Binderkrantz et al. forthcoming). Yet political careers contain so much more information. DEPART therefore conceptualizes them not as mere collections of attributes, but as sequences of locally and temporally interdependent states across four arenas: public office, party office, interest group, professional life. We thus introduce a life course approach into political elite studies (Elder & Giele 2009; Mayer 2009). This requires recording careers with high granularity. For example, here is how we could code Angela Merkel’s career:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name</th>
<th>arena</th>
<th>organization</th>
<th>position</th>
<th>start</th>
<th>end</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, A.</td>
<td>party office</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>party member</td>
<td>12/1990</td>
<td>08/1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, A.</td>
<td>party office</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>party member</td>
<td>08/1993</td>
<td>09/1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, A.</td>
<td>party office</td>
<td>CDU (MV)</td>
<td>party leader</td>
<td>06/1993</td>
<td>03/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, A.</td>
<td>public office</td>
<td>parliament</td>
<td>member of parliament</td>
<td>12/1990</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, A.</td>
<td>public office</td>
<td>parliament</td>
<td>CDU group leader</td>
<td>06/2002</td>
<td>09/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, A.</td>
<td>public office</td>
<td>government</td>
<td>minister (women/youth)</td>
<td>03/1993</td>
<td>12/1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, A.</td>
<td>interest group</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High granularity allows for maximum flexibility in analyzing the data, e.g. via cluster analysis, event history analysis, and sequence analysis. In addition, DEPART will pioneer the use of multi-channel sequence analysis (MCSA) in political elite studies (Gauthier et al. 2010). MCSA relates events in one channel to events in another. A simple example shows why this is important. Traditionally, public office has followed party office. To become Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel first had to become party leader of the Christian Democratic Union and then secure the CDU’s nomination for Chancellor. Yet in other cases, party office follows public office. When the Austrian Social Democrats had to find a new head of government in 1986, they opted for finance minister Franz Vranitzky, a banker with no prior party career. Only two years later did they entrust him with the party leadership. The order of events is thus crucial to understanding whether holding public office is a cause or a consequence of holding party office. MCSA is the ideal technique to fully exploit DEPART’s rich data collection, as it accounts for the interdependence of career stages across arenas. Optimal matching algorithms originally used for DNA sequencing (Dlouhy & Biemann 2015) will produce clusters of careers for WP2/WP3 to build biography-based measures of party control (see B2 for details).

Work package 2: Does de-party-politicization of political elites diminish policy responsiveness? Representative democracy requires that (1) parties put forward distinct programmatic alternatives and (2) follow through on them when in office. If these conditions apply, we should observe ‘partisan effects’ on policy. Policy will thus move in different directions, depending on the partisan composition of government. A vast literature has examined – and often confirmed – this ‘partisan theory’. The traditional application has been to economic and social policy (Hibbs 1977; Stephens 1979; Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi & Palme 2003; Allan & Scruggs 2004), but more recently also to other areas such as environmental policy (Knill et al. 2010; Schulze 2014), morality policy (Budde et al. 2018), or immigration (Lutz forthcoming). The evidence that ‘parties matter’ has generally been welcomed, since it implies that voters have a meaningful choice at the ballot box, and that their choice has consequences for policy outcomes.

DEPART’s WP2 examines for the first time whether this optimistic conclusion must be revised in the face of rising de-party-politicization. Do partisan effects on policy weaken as the presence of ministers without (strong) party socialization increases? The less politicians were exposed to the socializing influence of parties, the less they have internalized party ideology and policy. They may therefore act as less reliable agents of the party in government, thus diluting the translation of party ideology into policy outcomes. These tendencies will, of course, be conditional on the strength of institutional factors such as ministerial autonomy, legislative oversight, and coalition agreements (Ström et al. 2010).

Operationally, WP2 will use WP1’s MCSA-generated clusters of career patterns to construct novel indices of party control of government (e.g. by calculating the share of ministers belonging to each career cluster per cabinet and year). WP2 will then link these indices to existing measures of policy outcomes across multiple areas, covering the traditional economic left–right dimension (e.g. the welfare state, taxation, liberalization) as well as cultural ‘second-dimension’ issues (e.g. migration, environmental, morality policy). DEPART will thus not only generate new measures of ‘party control of government’, but also use them to provide the most comprehensive evaluation of partisan theory across a vast array of policy areas to date.

DEPART’s conceptualization of party control as a function of elite socialization also generates new hypotheses to explain why partisan effects on policy have, in some cases, declined over time (Cusack 1999; Huber & Stephens 2001). While most scholars have attributed these findings to increasing external constraints
on governments (globalization, Europeanization, ‘permanent austerity’, central bank independence), DEPART theorizes that such changes can be endogenous, if parties (e.g. for electoral reasons) recruit less partisan elites.

Work package 3: Does de-party-politicization of political elites erode political accountability?
Representative democracy may not always produce outcomes in line with voter preferences, but it regularly presents voters with the opportunity to ‘throw the rascals out’. A large literature on performance-based voting shows that the economy (Van der Brug et al. 2007), subjective well-being (Ward forthcoming), or corruption (Bågenholm 2013) have a substantial impact on the electoral success of incumbents – even though incumbents do not necessarily have perfect control over all these factors. For instance, government parties tend to lose support during economic crises (Hernández & Kriesi 2016). Still, performance-based voting works if voters are able to attribute responsibility for good or bad outcomes to one or more specific parties. This is more difficult when power is dispersed, for example under coalition government, federalism, or ideologically diverse cabinets (Anderson 2006; Hobolt et al. 2013). Yet DEPART goes beyond these arguments to conjecture that waning partisan ties among political elites pose an even more fundamental problem. After all, the dispersion of power presents a ‘mere’ information problem for voters, in that it is difficult to know which parties to punish or reward on election day. By contrast, the de-party-politicization of political elites means that, in some cases, even well-informed voters cannot translate their dissatisfaction into a meaningful electoral choice, because there is simply no (strong) connection between those responsible for policy outcomes and the options on the ballot. This could not only reduce the electoral price of bad performance, but also depress turnout. DEPART will therefore analyze both, government party vote shares and electoral participation, as dependent variables.

WP3.1: The big picture. WP3.1 uses two study designs to identify the effect of de-party-politicization on accountability. First, it combines aggregate data on government performance with election data and WP1’s indices to test whether the relation between and performance and losses for government parties (or turnout) is varies with ministers’ partisan ties. Second, we will merge our party control indices to individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (www.cses.org) which currently features survey data from 85 elections in 27 of DEPART’s 30 countries between 1996 and 2016. Using multi-level models, we will thus not only investigate the effects of de-party-politicization on performance voting, but also probe some of the individual-level factors that condition this relationship (partisanship, political interest, or political knowledge).

Of course, de-party-politicization could also increase accountability. Underperforming ministers may be more likely to be replaced if they lack intra-party support (e.g. from a certain faction, wing, or ancillary organization). Party leaders are therefore more likely to get rid of ministers without strong party ties, and thus avoid voters’ wrath (Dewan & Dowding 2005). The hiring and firing of weakly partisan ministers can hence serve as a strategy to deflect blame from the party and its leadership. WP3.1 will account for this possibility.

WP3.2: The mechanism at the individual level. A key mechanism behind government accountability is that voters must hold a collective actor (the party) responsible for the performance of individuals (ministers). We use survey experiments to examine how ministers’ partisan ties influence whether voters can make this connection. Since there is no way of randomly assigning actual performance and biographies to ministers, our strategy is to randomly alter respondents’ level of information. For instance, highlighting the nonpartisan biography of a party-appointed minister may make voters discount the ministers’ performance in the evaluation of the party. Our central hypothesis is therefore that voters are more likely to hold parties accountable for ministerial performance when a minister’s party ties are strong.

Figure 2 sketches the experimental design used in WP3.2 (subject to adaptations to the specifics of the respective case). After a pre-treatment questionnaire that records characteristics relevant to blame attribution (interest, knowledge, partisanship), a brief description of the scandal, crisis, or policy failure is given. Respondents are then randomly divided into three groups. Group 1 receives no additional information, group 2 receives information about the responsibility of a minister, and group 3 receives information about the responsibility of a minister and about her party socialization. We examine how these treatments affect blame attribution (to the
government as a whole, a single party, the minister individually, or other actors) and vote intention. All experimental designs will be pre-registered (www.socialscienceregistry.org).

**Risks and feasibility.** Two parts of DEPART carry potential risks. First, the biographical data collection envisaged attempts to defy the usual trade-off between extensive and intensive research strategies by seeking to maximize both, comprehensiveness and granularity. Yet the availability of in-depth information on ministers is likely to vary systematically across countries, periods, portfolios (some being more important than others), and time spent in office. It is no doubt easier to find a detailed biography of a long-serving German finance minister in the 2000s than a short-lived Finnish transport minister in the 1950s. Therefore, data quality may be higher for certain countries, periods, or individuals. To mitigate this risk, DEPART will cultivate a network of country experts via the PI’s contacts from international collaboration (see section c). Team members can tap into this network in order to unearth a maximum level of biographical detail. DEPART will also have a small budget to pay students in other countries (recruited via the PI’s international contacts) for short research tasks, should sources only be available locally (e.g. library visits, scanning documents). If these measures fail to provide sufficient detail and thus force a choice, DEPART would pick granularity over comprehensiveness and thus discard individual countries for limited parts of the observation period.

Second, the experimental designs in WP3.2 face risks, as they require the availability of suitable cases, that is, countries with meaningful variation in the partisan attachment of ministers and the occurrence of performance-relevant events (a scandal, crisis, or policy failure). Also, the ministers and portfolios in question should have a minimum of political relevance, and the crisis/scandal/failure should be large enough to potentially affect public opinion. The availability of such suitable cases is likely, but not guaranteed. To mitigate this risk, we will, at project start, pre-select three to five ‘likely cases’ with a tradition of nonpartisan ministers (e.g. IT, FR, CZ), constantly monitor events in those countries, and have a pre-prepared questionnaire ready to go when a suitable situation arises (e.g. a scandal breaks). This will require early contact with local polling firms to make sure that survey space is available on relatively short notice. As a plan B, WP3.2 can resort to fictional experimental scenarios. However, this would come at the cost of lowering external validity.

**Dissemination.** DEPART’s dissemination strategy will be tailored to its structure. Whereas papers from all work packages will be targeted at leading political science journals (e.g. *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, *Am. J. of Pol. Sci.*, *Eur. J. of Pol. Res.*, *Brit. J. of Pol. Sci.*), there are also specific target audiences that we will address:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WP</th>
<th>Example topics</th>
<th>Target audience</th>
<th>Target journals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP1</td>
<td>leadership, elite recruitment, parties as recruitment channels</td>
<td>political scientists, public admin. &amp; management scholars</td>
<td>Leadership Qu, Pub Adm Rev, J Pub Adm Res &amp; Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3</td>
<td>accountability, corruption, voter responses to de-party-politicization</td>
<td>political scientists, scholars working on elections &amp; experiments</td>
<td>Elec Studies, J Exp Pol Sci</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Towards its conclusion, DEPART will produce a book manuscript on long-term changes in political careers and their consequences for a leading academic publisher (OUP, CUP). We will invest heavily in public outreach, targeting social science blogs (e.g. the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage, LSE blogs), social and general media (see section c on the PI’s media experience), as well as party academies and political foundations (interest groups, unions) with a natural interest in political elite formation.

**Personnel.** DEPART’s team will consist of the PI, three PhD and four MA students. The PI will devote 80% of his working time to the project. He will lead the team, coordinate tasks between WPs, and (with PhD1) oversee the coding work done by the MA students. He will also assist with WP3.1, thus allowing PhD3 to focus on the experiments. The PI will ensure that output from WP1 is properly integrated into WP2/WP3 and will act as the PhDs’ thesis supervisor. PhD1 will (with the PI) recruit and train coders, and oversee their work in WP1. PhD2 will be responsible for generating and applying the party control indices. PhD3 will design the survey experiments and manage their implementation with the polling firms. The MA students will work a total of 10,800 hours (20 hours × ~45 weeks × 12 coder-years), thus leaving ~1 hour coding time per biography.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WP</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP1</td>
<td>PhD1</td>
<td>Train &amp; oversee coders, start P3/P4</td>
<td>P5*</td>
<td>P6*, finish PhD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MA Student 1–4</td>
<td>Learn coding scheme, data collection &amp; coding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP2</td>
<td>PhD2</td>
<td>Develop indices (w/ PhD1), start P7/P8</td>
<td>P9*</td>
<td>P10*, finish PhD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3</td>
<td>PhD3</td>
<td>Design surveys, start P11/P12</td>
<td>P13*</td>
<td>P14*, finish PhD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *P* = paper, * = coauthored with other team members. The PI will be financed through the project at first. However, the host institution provides a fast tenure-track scheme for ERC grantees. Any freed-up funds will finance a post-doc for the project remainder.
References


Section b: Curriculum vitae

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Name: Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz
Unique ID: ORCID: 0000-0002-0107-5093 (linked site includes full list of publications)
Date of birth: May 9, 1982
Nationality: Austrian
Google Scholar: scholar.google.at/citations?user=-VnRx8AAAAJ&hl=de
Website: staatswissenschaft.univie.ac.at/team/wissenschaftliches-personal/laurenz-ennser-jedenastik/

- EDUCATION

2013 PhD, Political Science, University of Vienna, Austria
2010 Diploma (Magister), Political Science, University of Vienna, Austria
2006 Diploma (Magister), Composition and Music Theory, University of Music and Performing Arts Vienna, Austria

- CURRENT POSITION

2020– Assistant professor, Department of Government, University of Vienna, Austria

- PREVIOUS POSITIONS

2014–20 Assistant professor (non-tenured), Department of Government, University of Vienna, Austria
2013–14 Post-doctoral research fellow, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, Netherlands
2010–13 Pre-doctoral researcher, Department of Government, University of Vienna, Austria
2008–10 Student assistant, Dep. of Sociology & Dep. of Government, University of Vienna, Austria

- FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

2018 Gerhart Bruckmann Prize for promoting the value of statistics in the public sphere, awarded by the Austrian Statistical Society (ÖSG)
2014 Gordon Smith and Vincent Wright Memorial Prize 2014 (with Katrin Schermann) for best paper in West European Politics
2013–14 FWF Erwin Schrödinger Fellowship Abroad (awarded by the Austrian Science Fund)
Leiden University, Netherlands
2013 Dissertation prize, awarded by the Austrian Political Science Association (ÖGPW)
2013 Doc.award (dissertation prize), awarded by the University of Vienna and the City of Vienna
2013 Award of Excellence (dissertation prize), awarded by the Fed. Ministry of Science & Research
2012 Hans Daalder Prize (with Katrin Schermann) for best paper at the ECPR Grad. Conf. 2010
2010 Diploma thesis prize, awarded by the Austrian Political Science Association (ÖGPW)

- SUPERVISION OF GRADUATE STUDENTS

2019– Christina Gahn (MA student), Department of Government, University of Vienna
2019– Ingo Höllinger (MA student), Department of Government, University of Vienna
Please note that, according to the University of Vienna’s statutes, only tenured professors and habilitated persons can supervise PhD theses (an exception for ERC grantees exists).

- TEACHING ACTIVITIES

2019 Foundations of political science (University of Vienna)
2019 Political parties in Austria (University of Vienna)
2019 The welfare state in the age of migration (University of Vienna)
2018/19 Introduction to Austrian politics and the European Union (University of Vienna)
2018/19 Political parties and the party system in Austria (University of Innsbruck)
2017 Thesis seminar for BA students (University of Vienna)
2017 Welfare states and the challenge of diversity (University of Vienna)
2017 How political parties shape the welfare state (University of Vienna)
2012/5/7 Introduction to comparative politics (University of Vienna)
2014/16 Political parties between state and society (University of Vienna, Leiden University)
2010/12 Quantitative methods in empirical social research (University of Vienna)

- ORGANISATION OF SCIENTIFIC MEETINGS
  2020 Annual Conf. of the Austrian Political Science Association (organization committee)
  2019 Graduate Conference of the Austrian Political Science Association (program committee)

- INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
  2019– Board member, Austrian Political Science Association (ÖGPW)
  2018– Member of the political science study program conference, University of Vienna

- REVIEWING ACTIVITIES

- MEMBERSHIP IN SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES
  European Political Science Association (EPSA), Austrian Political Science Association (ÖGPW), ECPR Standing Group on Political Parties, ECPR Standing Group on Political Economy and Welfare State Politics, ECPR Standing Group on Gender and Politics

- MAJOR COLLABORATIONS
  Member COSPAL project (Comparative Study of Party Leaders), PIs: William Cross (Carleton University, CA), Jean-Benoit Pilet (Université Libre de Bruxelles, BE)
  Member Comparative Party Pledge Group (CPPG), PIs: Robert Thomson (Monash University, AU), Elin Naurin (University of Gothenburg, SE), Terry Royed (University of Alabama, US)
  Member Political Party Database Project, PIs: Thomas Poguntke (University of Düsseldorf, DE), Susan Scarrow (University of Houston, US), Paul Webb (University of Sussex, UK)

- CAREER BREAKS
  2017 Parental leave, 1st child (August to December)
  2019 Parental leave, 2nd child (August to December)
Appendix: All ongoing and submitted grants and funding of the PI (Funding ID)
Mandatory information (does not count towards page limits)

Ongoing Grants (Please indicate “No funding” when applicable):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Funding source</th>
<th>Amount (Euros)</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Role of the PI</th>
<th>Relation to current ERC proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declining membership, declining influence? (Trade union ministers in European governments)</td>
<td>Anniversary Fund of the Austrian National Bank (OeNB)</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>2019–22</td>
<td>Project PI</td>
<td>DEPART will re-use some of the primary sources on ministerial biographies collected in this project (CVs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grant applications (Please indicate "None" when applicable):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Funding source</th>
<th>Amount (Euros)</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Role of the PI</th>
<th>Relation to current ERC proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Describe clearly any scientific overlap between your ERC application and the current research grant or on-going grant application.
Section c: Early achievement track-record

I am an expert on political parties, with a special focus on the careers of political and politico-administrative elites. In my dissertation, I examined how parties use political appointments to maintain control over state-owned enterprises (e.g. Ennser-Jedenastik 2014a, 2014b). As a post-doctoral fellow at Leiden University, I conducted a project on how European governments use partisan appointees to enhance their governing capacities in formally independent regulatory agencies (e.g. Ennser-Jedenastik 2015, 2016). My current work examines the career trajectories of party leaders and the influence of trade unionist ministers on social policy in Europe. I have published over 30 articles in peer-reviewed journals (full list here), and eight book chapters. My work has been cited 1112 times (Google Scholar, 17 August 2020), yielding an h-index of 18. I have also gained experience as a project leader (see paragraph on grants below). In addition, I have recruited, trained, and supervised over 30 talented students as coders for the Austrian National Election Study (www.autnes.at).

Five most important publications (5-year JIF in parentheses, * = with PhD supervisor)


Invited talks:

* Regulatory agencies between formal independence & politicization. University of Gothenburg, 14 June 2017.
* The ideological foundations of the regulatory state. University of Mannheim, 30 September 2013.

Grants & awards. I have won an Erwin-Schrödinger-Fellowship from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF grant no. J 3409-G11, € 96,875) and a grant from the Anniversary Fund of the Austrian National Bank (OeNB grant no. 17886, € 117,000), both for doing research on the trajectories of political careers. In the latter project (started in July 2019), I will be supervising a pre-doctoral researcher and an MA student for the next 2.5 years. In addition, I have won space for two modules with survey experiments (in 2017 and 2018) on the PUMA online panel (see www.puma-plattform.at) and six different paper and thesis awards (see CV section above).

International collaborations. I am the current country coordinator for Austria in the Political Party Database Project (www.politicalpartydb.org), a 42-country effort at collecting detailed data on party organizations. I have also been a member in the Comparative Study of Party Leaders (COSPAL) project (Pilet & Cross 2014), covering party leader selection and party leader characteristics in 14 parliamentary democracies. Furthermore, I am part of the Comparative Party Pledge Group (CPPG), a network of scholars with an interest in pledge fulfillment and party mandates (Thomson et al. 2017). In addition, I have served as an expert for the Varieties of Democracy project (www.v-dem.net), the Chapel Hill Expert Survey on party positions (www.chesdata.eu), and the Rohrschneider and Whitefield expert surveys (Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2016), among others.

Conference participations (with paper, selection):

Public outreach. I am a board member for wahlkabine.at, Austria’s leading voting advice application (~1m users for the 2019 parliamentary election). During the past years, I have given half a dozen talks to non-scientific audiences about politics, parties, and elections. I have also been active on traditional and social media platforms to disseminate my own and others’ research. My data-driven blog Standardabweichung (‘standard deviation’) for the the Austrian daily Der Standard reaches over 10,000 readers every week (it is on hiatus until October 2019). In 2018, it was awarded the Austrian Statistical Society’s Gerhart Bruckmann Prize for promoting statistics in the public sphere. I have also been featured in national and international media (e.g. New York Times, The Economist, The London Times, Tagesschau, Die Zeit, El País, France 24, Libération), counting over 70 appearances in 2018 alone. Finally, I promote social science research on my Twitter account (>5,400 followers as of October 2019), regularly generating thousands of views for novel scholarly work.