



Geschichte der Philosophie III

Neuzeit bis Kant XI



Zeittafel zur Philosophie der Neuzeit I



Europa um 1750





David Hume

(26. April/ 7. Mai 1711 – 25. Aug. 1776)

1711 geb. in Edinburgh

ab 1726 Studium der Rechtswiss. in Edinburgh

1734-37 in La Flèche/Frankreich

1763-65 in Paris

1767/68 Unterstaatssekretär im Auswärtigen Amt

1769 Rückkehr nach Edinburgh

1776 gest. Edinburgh

A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (1739/40)


An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779)

David Hume (1711-1776)

Allen Ramsay (1766), *National Gallery of Scotland, Edinburgh*



A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)

David Hume (1711 – 1776)

A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (1739/40)

Book 1 – Of the Understanding

Book 2 – Of the Passions

Book 3 – Of Morals

Since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer, that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion. [...] Thus it appears, that the principle, which opposes our passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only called so in an improper sense. We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. **Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.**


(*Treatise* II, iii, 3)

David Hume (1711 – 1776)

A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (1739/40)

Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen ist die Grundlage aller Wissenschaften

If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of *Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics*, is comprehended almost everything, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind. [...] And as **the science of man is the-only solid foundation for the other sciences**, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation. It is no astonishing reflection to consider, that the **application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects** should come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and that reckoning from Thales to Socrates, the space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt, my Lord Bacon and some late philosophers [Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutcheson, Dr. Butler, etc.] in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. (*Treatise*, Introduction)



An Enquiry [Essays] concerning Human Understanding (1748)

David Hume (1711 – 1776)

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

- I. Of the Different Species of Philosophy.
- II. Of the Origin of Ideas
- III. Of the Association of Ideas
- IV. Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding
- V. Sceptical Solution of These Doubts
- VI. Of Probability
- VII. Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion
- VIII. Of Liberty and Necessity
- IX. Of the Reason of Animals
- X. Of Miracles
- XI. Of A Particular Providence and of A Future State
- XII. Of the Academical Or Sceptical Philosophy

David Hume (1711 – 1776)

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

Humes skeptischer Naturalismus

The passion for philosophy, like that for religion, seems liable to this inconvenience, that, though it aims at the correction of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only serve, by imprudent management, to foster a predominant inclination, and push the mind, with more determined resolution, towards that side which already draws too much, by the bias and propensity of the natural temper. [...] There is, however, one species of philosophy which seems little liable to this inconvenience, and that because it strikes in with no disorderly passion of the human mind, nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or propensity; and that is the Academic or Sceptical philosophy. [...] By flattering no irregular passion, it gains few partizans: By opposing so many vices and follies, it raises to itself abundance of enemies, who stigmatize it as libertine, profane, and irreligious. Nor need we fear that this philosophy, while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as speculation. **Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever.**

(*Enquiry*, Sec. V 1)

David Hume (1711 – 1776)

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

Vorstellungen und Eindrücke

Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated **Thoughts or Ideas**. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them Impressions; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.

[...]

But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that **all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience.** [...] In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: the mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.

(Enquiry, Sec. II)

David Hume (1711 – 1776)

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

Beziehungen zwischen Vorstellungen und Tatsachen

All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, **Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact**. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.

(Enquiry, Sec. IV 1)

David Hume (1711 – 1776)

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

Die Beziehung von Ursache und Wirkung

It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns; and therefore our doubts and errors, in the prosecution of so important an enquiry, may be the more excusable; while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction. They may even prove useful, by exciting curiosity, and destroying that implicit faith and security, which is the bane of all reasoning and free enquiry. The discovery of defects in the common philosophy, if any such there be, will not, I presume, be a discouragement, but rather an incitement, as is usual, to attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public.

All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By

means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. [...]

If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of that evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect.

I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that **the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience,** when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other.

(*Enquiry*, Sec. IV 1)

David Hume (1711 – 1776)

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

Das Humesche Problem: Der Grund unserer Schlußfolgerungen aus der Erfahrung ist uns unbekannt

When it is asked, What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact? the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation? it may be replied in one word, Experience. But if we still carry on our sifting humour, and ask, What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution and explication. [...] I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy task, and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I say then, that, **even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding.** This answer we must endeavour both to explain and to defend.

It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body. [...] As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist.

(Enquiry, Sec. IV 2)

David Hume (1711 – 1776)

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

Skeptische=naturalistische Lösung des *Humeschen Problems*

Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever.

Though we should conclude, for instance, as in the foregoing section, that, in all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding; there is no danger that these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same. What that principle is may well be worth the pains of enquiry. [...]

This principle is Custom or Habit. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects. Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther, or pretend to give the cause of this cause; but must rest contented with it as the ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions from experience. [...] **All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning.**

(Enquiry, Sec. V 1)

David Hume (1711 – 1776)

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

Skeptische=naturalistische Lösung des *Humeschen Problems*

Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation. [...]

What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple one; though, it must be confessed, pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object. Or in other words; having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects — flame and heat, snow and cold — have always been conjoined together; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. **All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.**

(Enquiry, Sec. V 1)

David Hume (1711 – 1776)

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

Skeptische=naturalistische Lösung des Humeschen Problems

This **transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience.** And as it first begins from an object, present to the senses, it renders the idea or conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose, floating reverie of the imagination. That idea arises immediately. The thought moves instantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of conception, which is derived from the impression present to the senses. [...]

I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, that, as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like causes, and vice versa, is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its operations; appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake. **It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency,** which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be **independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding.** As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends.

(*Enquiry*, Sec. V 2)

David Hume (1711 – 1776)

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)

Selbstliebe und soziales Interesse

Self-love is a principle in human nature of such extensive energy, and the interest of each individual is, in general, so closely connected with that of the community, that those philosophers were excusable, who fancied that all our concern for the public might be resolved into a concern for our own happiness and preservation. [...] We have found instances, in which private interest was separate from public; in which it was even contrary: And yet we observed the moral sentiment to continue, notwithstanding this disjunction of interests. [...] Compelled by these instances, **we must renounce the theory, which accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love. We must adopt a more public affection, and allow, that the interests of society are not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to us.** Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; and it is a contradiction in terms, that anything pleases as means to an end, where the end itself no wise affects us. If usefulness, therefore, be a source of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not always considered with a reference to self; it follows, that **everything, which contributes to the happiness of society, recommends itself directly to our approbation and good-will. Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part, for the origin of morality:** And what need we seek for abstruse and remote systems, when there occurs one so obvious and natural? (*Principles of Morals*, Sec. V 2)



Maurice Ashley-Cooper und Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury. John Closterman (1702),
National Portrait Gallery, London

Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (1671 – 1713)

1671 geb. in London

Im Haus des Großvaters (1st Earl of Shaftesbury) von John Locke erzogen

1695-98 Parlamentsabgeordneter

1698/99 und 1703/04 aus gesundheitlichen Gründen in den Niederlanden und ab 1711 in Italien

1713 gest. in Neapel

Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. 3 vols. (1711)

To *philosophize*, in a just Signification, is but to carry *Good-breeding* a step higher. For the Accomplishment of Breeding is, To learn whatever is *decent* in Company, or *beautiful* in Arts; and **the Sum of Philosophy is, To learn what is *just* in Society, and *beautiful* in Nature, and the Order of the World.** 'Tis not *Wit* merely, but a *Temper* which must form the Well-bred Man. In the same manner, 'tis not a *Head* merely, but a *Heart* and *Resolution* which must compleat the *real* Philosopher. Both *Characters* aim at what is excellent, aspire to a *just Taste*, and carry in view the Model of what is *beautiful* and *becoming*. (*Characteristics* III, iii 1, S. 161)



Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746)
The Hunterian Museum and Art Gallery, Glasgow

Francis Hutcheson (1694 – 1746)

1694 geb. in Drumalig/Irland

1711-12 Studien (Philosophie, Literatur, Theologie) in Glasgow

1730 Prof. für Moralphilosophie an der Univ. Glasgow


1746 gest. in Glasgow

An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725)

An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations upon the Moral Sense (1728)

System of Moral Philosophy (1755)

OUR *moral Sense* shews this calm extensive Affection to be the highest Perfection of our Nature; what we may see to be the *End* or *Design* of such a Structure, and consequently what is requir'd of us by the Author of our Nature: and therefore if any one like these Descriptions better, he may call Virtue, with many of the Antients, "*Vita secundum naturam*;" or "acting according to what we may see from the Constitution of our Nature, we were intended for by our Creator." (*An Essay*, Preface, S. xvi f.)



The Fable of the Bees (1714)

Bernard Mandeville (1670 – 1733)

1670 geb. in Rotterdam

1685-91 Studien (Philosophie, Medizin) in Leiden

ab 1693 Arzt in London

1733 gest. in Hackney/London

The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits (1714)

Laftly, by fetting forth what of neceffity muft be the confequence of general Honefty and Virtue and National Temperance, Innocence and Content, I demonftrate that if Mankind could be cured of the Failings they are Naturally guilty of, they would ceafe to be capable of being rais'd into fuch vast, potent and polite Societies, as they have been under the feveral great Commonwealths and Monarchies that have flourish'd fince the Creation.

(Fable of the Bees, Preface)

Adam Smith (1723 – 1790)

1723 geb. in Kirkcaldy/Schottland

1737-40 Studium in Glasgow (F. Hutcheson)

1740-46 Balliol College/Oxford

1753-63 Prof. für Moralphilos. an der Univ. Glasgow

1764-66 Bildungsreise (Frankreich/Schweiz)

1778 Zollkommissar von Schottland

1790 gest. in Edinburgh


The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)

An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776)



Adam Smith (1723-1790)

John Kay (1790)



Thomas Reid (1710-1796)
Sir Henry Raeburn (1796)

Thomas Reid (1710 – 1796)

1710 geb. in Strachan/Schottland

1752 Prof. am King's College, Aberdeen

1764-81 Prof. für Moralphilos. an der Univ. Glasgow

1796 gest. in Glasgow

*An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of
Common Sense* (1764)

Descartes, Malebranche and Locke have all used their talents and skill to prove the existence of a material world; and with very little success! Poor uneducated folk believe unquestioningly that there is a sun, moon and stars; an earth that we inhabit; country, friends and relations that we enjoy; land, houses and furniture that we possess. But philosophers, pitying the credulity of the vulgar, resolve not to trust anything that isn't founded on reason. These philosophers ask philosophy to supply them with reasons for believing things that all mankind have believed without being able to give any reasons for doing so. One might expect that in matters of such importance the proof would be easy; but in fact it is the most difficult thing in the world. For these three great men, with the best good will, have not been able to draw from all the treasures of philosophy one argument that is fit to convince a thinking man of the existence of anything other than himself.

(An Inquiry I 3)

Schottische Schule (Common Sense Realism)

Thomas Reid (1710 – 1796)
Adam Ferguson (1723 – 1816)
Dugald Stewart (1753 – 1828)
Thomas Brown (1778 – 1820)

Kants Kritik an der Common-Sense Philosophie

Man kann es, ohne eine gewisse Pein zu empfinden, nicht ansehen, wie so ganz und gar seine [sc. Humes] Gegner Reid, Oswald, Beattie und zuletzt noch Priestley den Punkt seiner Aufgabe verfehlten und, indem sie immer das als zugestanden annahmen, was er eben bezweifelte, dagegen aber mit Heftigkeit und mehrentheils mit großer Unbescheidenheit dasjenige bewiesen, was ihm niemals zu bezweifeln in den Sinn gekommen war, seinen Wink zur Verbesserung so verkannten, daß alles in dem alten Zustande blieb, als ob nichts geschehen wäre. Es war nicht die Frage, ob der Begriff der Ursache richtig, brauchbar und in Ansehung der ganzen Naturerkenntniß unentbehrlich sei, denn dieses hatte Hume niemals in Zweifel gezogen; sondern ob er durch die Vernunft *a priori*, gedacht werde und auf solche Weise eine von aller Erfahrung unabhängige innre Wahrheit und daher auch wohl weiter ausgedehnte Brauchbarkeit habe, die nicht blos auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung eingeschränkt sei: hierüber erwartete Hume Eröffnung. Es war ja nur die Rede von dem Ursprunge dieses Begriffs, nicht von der Unentbehrlichkeit desselben im Gebrauche: wäre jener nur ausgemittelt, so würde es sich wegen der Bedingungen seines Gebrauches und des Umfangs, in welchem er gültig sein kann, schon von selbst gegeben haben.

Die Gegner des berühmten Mannes hätten aber, um der Aufgabe ein Gnüge zu thun, sehr tief in die Natur der Vernunft, so fern sie blos mit reinem Denken beschäftigt ist, hineindringen müssen, welches ihnen ungelegen war. Sie erfanden daher ein bequemerer Mittel, ohne alle Einsicht trotzig zu thun, nämlich die Berufung auf den **gemeinen Menschenverstand**. In der That ist eine große Gabe des Himmels, einen geraden (oder, wie man es neuerlich benannt hat, schlichten) Menschenverstand zu besitzen. Aber man muß ihn durch Thaten beweisen, durch das Überlegte und Vernünftige, was man denkt und sagt, nicht aber dadurch, daß, wenn man nichts Kluges zu seiner Rechtfertigung vorzubringen weiß, man sich auf ihn als ein Orakel beruft. Wenn Einsicht und Wissenschaft auf die Neige gehen, alsdann und nicht eher sich auf den gemeinen Menschenverstand zu berufen, das ist eine von den subtilen Erfindungen neuerer Zeiten, dabei es der schalste Schwätzer mit dem gründlichsten Kopfe getrost aufnehmen und es mit ihm aushalten kann. So lange aber noch ein kleiner Rest von Einsicht da ist, wird man sich wohl hüten, diese Nothhülfe zu ergreifen. (Kant, *Prolegomena*, Vorwort, AA IV, 259)