Believing When Credible: Talking About Future Intentions and Past Actions (joint with Peter Vida), International Journal of Game Theory, June 2021 (published online). Robust sequential search (joint with Andriy Zapechelnyuk), Theoretical Economics, December 2020 (forthcoming).

Simple Belief Elicitation: an experimental evaluation (joint with James Tremewan), forthcoming in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (2021). (link to data)DataInfo.txt

Split it up to Create Incentives: Investment, Public Goods and Crossing the River (joint with Simon Martin), Journal of Economic Theory, 189, September 2020, 105092.

Inequality Aversion Causes Equal or Unequal Division in Alternating-Offer Bargaining (joint with Stefan Kohler), Bulletin of Economic Research 71 (2018), 47-57.

Dynamic Benchmark Targeting (joint with Andriy Zapechelnyuk), Journal of Economic Theory 169 (2017), 145–169.

A Method to Elicit Beliefs as Most Likely Intervals (joint with Joël J. van der Weele), Judgement and Decision Making 10 (2015), 456–468.

A Penny for Your Thoughts: a Survey of Methods for Eliciting Beliefs (joint with James Tremewan and Joël J. van der Weele), Experimental Economics 18 (2015), 457-490.

Ordients: Optimization and Comparative Statics without Utility Functions (joint with Ludovic Renou), Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014), 612–632.

Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment (joint with Roberto Galbiati and Joel van der Weele), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 94 (2013), 34–51.

Finite-Sample Exact Tests for Linear Regressions with Bounded Dependent Variables (joint with Olivier Gossner), Journal of Econometrics 177 (2013), 75-94.

Eliciting Probabilities, Means, Medians, Variances and Covariances without assuming Risk Neutrality (joint with Joel van der Weele), Theoretical Economics Letters (2013), 38-42.

On the Impossibility of Achieving No Regrets in Repeated Games (joint with Andriy Zapechelnyuk), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 81 (2012), 153-158.

Robust monopoly pricing (joint with Dirk Bergemann), Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011), 2527–2543.

Implementation and Minimax Regret Equilibrium (joint with Ludovic Renou), Games and Economic Behavior (2011) 71(2), 527-533.

Similarities and Differences when Building Trust: the Role of Cultures (joint with Fabian Bornhorst, Andrea Ichino, Oliver Kirchkamp, Eyal Winter), Experimental Economics 13(3) (2010), 260-283.

Decision Makers Facing Uncertainty: Theory versus Evidence (joint with Paolo E. Giordani and Sanne Zwart), Journal of Economic Psychology 31(4) (2010), 659-675.

Minimax Regret and Strategic Uncertainty (joint with Ludovic Renou), Journal of Economic Theory 145(1) (2010), 264-286.

Pricing without Priors, (joint with Dirk Bergemann), Journal of the European Economic Association 6(2-3) (2008), 560-569.

Imitation and Social Learning (joint with Carlos Alos Ferrer), chapter 11 in The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, P. Anand, P. Pattanaik and C. Puppe (eds.), Oxford University Press (2009).

Choice under Complete Uncertainty when Outcome Spaces are State-Dependent (joint with Clemens Puppe), Theory and Decision 66 (2009), 1–16.

On the Evolutionary Selection of Sets of Nash Equilibria (joint with Dieter Balkenborg), Journal of Economic Theory 133(1) (2007), 295–315.

An Evolutionary Theory of Inflation Inertia, (joint with Omar Licandro, Alexis Anagnostopoulos, und Italo Bove), Journal of the European Economic Association 5(2-3) (2007), 433–443.

Evolutionäre Spieltheorie (Evolutionary Game Theory, text in German), chapter 2 in Handbuch Evolutorische Ökonomik (Handbook of Evolutionary Economics), C. Herrmann-Pillath and M. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (eds.), Band 2 (vol. 2), Berlin et al.: Springer. (2002).

Evolutionary Insights on the Willingness to Communicate (joint with Sjaak Hurkens), International Journal of Game Theory 31(4) (2003), 511–526.

Extensive Form Bandits (joint with Ross Cressman), The Dynamics of Extensive Form Evolutionary Games, Chapter 8.4, MIT Press, 2003.

Evolutionarily Stable Sets (joint with Dieter Balkenborg), International Journal of Game Theory 29(4) (2001), 571–595.

Group Report: Why and When Do Simple Heuristics Work? (joint with D. Goldstein, G. Gigerenzer, R. Hogarth, A. Kacelnik, Y. Kareev, G. Klein, L. Martignon und J. Payne), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, Gigerenzer, G. & Selten, R. (Eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.

Sophisticated Imitation in Cyclic Games (joint with Josef Hofbauer), Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 10(5) (2000), 523–543.

Does Noise Undermine the First-Mover Advantage? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example (joint with Jörg Oechsler), International Game Theory Review, 2(1) (2000), 83–96.

Social Roles as an Effective Learning Mechanism (joint with Gregory Pollock), Rationality and Society 11(4) (1999), 371–397.

Which One Should I Imitate? Journal of Mathematical Economics 31(4) (1999), 493–522.

The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction (joint with Ross Cressman), Journal of Economic Theory 83 (1998), 260–285.

Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits, Journal of Economic Theory 78(1) (1998), 130–156.

You Play (An Action) Only Once (joint with Aner Sela), Economics Letters 59(3) (1998), 299–303.

Book reviews, Samuelson, L.: Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1997, Journal of Economics / Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 68(1) (1998), 86–88.

Book reviews, Weibull, J.W.: Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., In: Journal of Economics / Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 64(1) (1996), 107–123.