Evolution and Imitation
I have worked on selection of outcomes and equilibria under evolution. You may be interested in my 2007 paper with Dieter Balkenborg in which we develop a setwise solution concept. Note also connection to research on imitation ("Why Imitate?") and in the 2000 paper with Josef Hofbauer.
I have worked on justifying different types of imitative behavior. "Why Imitate?" (published) is the first paper that shows that a particular form of imitation can efficienty aggregate information. "Which one?" and "Imitate Best vs" show what to do when more than one are observed.
Publications:
Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits, Journal of Economic Theory 78(1) (1998), 130–156. Among the 50 most influential papers published in Journal of Economic Theory, selected by Shell, Börgers and Pavan (2020).
Imitation and Social Learning (joint with Carlos Allos Ferrer), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, P. Anand, P. Pattanaik and C. Puppe (eds.), Oxford University Press (2009), chapter 11, 271-297.
On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria (joint with Dieter Balkenborg), Journal of Economic Theory 133(1) (2007), 295 – 315.
An Evolutionary Theory of Inflation Inertia,(joint with Omar Licandro, Alexis Anagnostopoulos, und Italo Bove), Journal of the European Economic Association 5(2-3) (2007), 433 – 443.
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie (Evolutionary Game Theory, text in German), Handbook of Evolutionary Economics Vol. II Chapter 2, forthcoming.
Evolutionary Insights on the Willingness to Communicate (joint with Sjaak Hurkens), International Journal of Game Theory 31(4) (2003), 511–526.
Extensive Form Bandits (joint with Ross Cressman), The Dynamics of Extensive Form Evolutionary Games Chapter 8.4, MIT Press, 2003.
Evolutionarily Stable Sets (joint with Dieter Balkenborg), International Journal of Game Theory 29(4) (2001), 571–595.
Sophisticated Imitation in Cyclic Games (joint with Josef Hofbauer), Journal of Evolutionary Economics 10(5) (2000), 523–543.
Does Noise Undermine the First-Mover Advantage? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example (joint with Jörg Oechsler), International Game Theory Review 2(1) (2000), 83–96.
Social Roles as an Effective Learning Mechanism (joint with Gregory Pollock), Rationality and Society 11(4) (1999), 371–397.
Which One Should I Imitate? Journal of Mathematical Economics 31(4) (1999), 493–522.
On the Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction (joint with Ross Cressman), Journal of Economic Theory 83 (1998), 260–285.
Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits, Journal of Economic Theory 78(1) (1998), 130–156.
Book review, Samuelson, L.: Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection , MIT Press, Cambridge , Mass. , 1997, Journal of Economics / Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 68(1) (1998), 86–88.
Book review, Weibull, J.W.: Evolutionary Game Theory , MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., In: Journal of Economics / Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 64(1) (1996), 113–115.
Working Papers:
Imitation and Social Learning, May 2011
Social Learning Between Groups: Imitation and the Role of Experience (Papier zur Antrittsvorlesung), 2011
Imitation and Minimax Regret, Mimeo, 2004.
Updating Strategies Through Observed Play - Optimization Under Bounded Rationality (joint with C. Cressman), April 1998
On the Evolution of Imitative Behavior (joint with Jonas Björnerstedt), Discussion Paper No. B–-378, Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, 1996.
Imitate Best ’vs ‘Imitate Best Average’, University of Bonn, 1996.
Dynamic Stability in Perturbed Games (joint with Ross Cressman), Discussion Paper No. B–321,
Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, 1994.
When does Evolution lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?, Discussion Paper No. B–299,
Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, 1994.
Evolution in Partnership Games, an Equivalence Result, Discussion Paper No. B–298,
Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, 1994.
Dynamic Stability in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Played by Finite Automata, Discussion Paper No. B–243, Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, 1993.
Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics, Discussion Paper No. B–242,
Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, 1993.
Evolutionary Stability in Games with Equivalent Strategies, Mixed Strategy Types and Asymmetries, Discussion Paper No. 912, The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1990.