Personifying the Radical
How News Framing Polarizes Security Concerns and Tolerance Judgments

HEEJO KEUM
University of Texas at San Antonio

ELLIOTT D. HILLBACK

HERNANDO ROJAS

HOMERO GIL DE ZUNIGA

DHAVAN V. SHAH

DOUGLAS M. MCLEOD
University of Wisconsin-Madison

This study examines relationships among individual dispositions, news framing of civil liberties restrictions, security concerns, and political tolerance. We theorize that news frames condition the effects of individual dispositions on security and tolerance attitudes. To explore these relationships, an online-survey experiment was conducted with 650 respondents. This experiment presented alternative versions of news stories about domestic security policies following September 11, and the policies’ implications for a fringe activist group. One factor was whether the activists targeted by the government advocated for a cause supported or opposed by the respondent; another factor was whether the story framed government actions against the activists at the individual or group level. Findings show that individual framing—as opposed to group framing—made participants less tolerant of radicals they opposed and more tolerant of radicals they supported. Similar effects were observed for political ideology. Implications of personification as a framing device are discussed.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, heightened a long-standing clash between two fundamental democratic values: the protection of public safety and the preservation of civil liberties. In the wake of these events, the U.S. Congress passed the USA PATRIOT

Heejo Keum (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison) is an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Texas at San Antonio. Elliott Hillback (M.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison) and Homero Gil de Zuniga (M.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison) are doctoral students in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Hernando Rojas (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison) is an assistant professor in the Department of Life Sciences Communication at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Dhavan V. Shah (Ph.D., University of Minnesota) is a professor in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication and the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Douglas M. McLeod (Ph.D., University of Minnesota) is a professor and head of graduate studies in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Heejo Keum, Department of Communication, University of Texas at San Antonio, 6900 N. Loop 1604 W., San Antonio, TX 78249–0643; email: hkeum@utsa.edu.

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(Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act. Some people welcomed its passage as a deterrent to future threats. The vague language and considerable reach of this act, however, has generated concern that it could be used to infringe on privacy and due process rights of political radicals—activists who may stake out extreme, often unpopular, positions on issues but are not suspected of criminal activities. These fears have been realized, with the U.S. Justice Department acknowledging that the act has been used to infiltrate and investigate nonviolent protest groups (Goldberg, 2004).

We argue that the nature of news coverage about civil liberties controversies has the potential to sway individuals’ security concerns and social tolerance judgments. Our theory builds on past research that finds contemporary information works in combination with citizens’ political predispositions to shape the level of support for civil liberties (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995). This research attempts to explain how individuals respond when confronted with disliked groups; we argue that it is under these conditions that the limits of tolerance are best understood (Sullivan & Marcus, 1988; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979). An unintended consequence of this focus on least-liked groups has been a dearth of research on how individuals make these judgments when they confront efforts to restrict the civil liberties of groups whose causes they are predisposed to support—but whose tactics they may oppose. The decision to defend civil liberties of radicals, even if only for targets towards which one feels some latent sympathy, is a meaningful test of tolerance in the current political climate.

More important, previous empirical research has studied tolerance toward groups, even though the individual is the traditional center of democratic governance stressing civil liberties (Golebiowska, 1996). Indeed, individual liberties are privileged in the Bill of Rights and other constitutional systems. The need to consider how a focus on individuals rather than groups shapes tolerance judgments is further highlighted by reporters’ tendency to personalize press reports through episodic story frames (Iyengar, 1991). This journalistic propensity to personify the news has been found to condition media effects and shape cognitive processes (Shah, Kwak, Schmierbach, & Zubric, 2004). Building upon these insights, this study expands the study of framing effects on support for civil liberties. We consider whether news framing in individual and groups terms differentially shapes security concerns and tolerance judgments when people encounter restrictions on fringe activists they are predisposed to support or oppose.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Insight into the influence of contemporary information on tolerance judgments may be gained from three domains of scholarship: (a) political theory and research on the democratic foundations of political tolerance; (b) work on the causes and consequences of support for civil liberties; and (c) research on news framing as it relates to biases in social attribution and impression formation processes. We integrate these literatures for our theory of how individual news frames polarize security concerns and tolerance judgments.

Political Tolerance in Democratic Context

In the United States, the preservation of civil liberties and the tolerance of differences have historically been favored over public safety and national security. The ideology of “classic” liberalism encouraged the framers of the Constitution to privilege individual rights, and to guard against the state’s potential power to infringe on them. Even with this emphasis on the rights-bearing individual, concerns about safety and the potential for harm have been cited to justify policies that run counter to these guarantees. Indeed, security concerns have sometimes trumped civil rights during periods of crisis, most notably in the McCarthy Era. During that time, apprehension about a fifth column of internal threats was used to justify incursions into the private sphere. Some observers have compared the current “War on Terror” to these Cold War practices, noting that concerns about security and liberty once again define citizens’ tolerance judgments in the face of growing incursions by government into the private sphere.

Since Samuel Stouffer’s (1955/1963) classic analysis of attitudes toward nonconformists, numerous studies in political science have examined how citizens navigate this value conflict and form tolerance judgments. In the 1950s, Stouffer was concerned with two threats to American democracy: a “communist conspiracy” and “those who in thwarting the conspiracy would sacrifice some of the very liberties which the enemy would destroy” (p. 13). Stouffer’s research tried to establish empirically how liberties could be preserved, despite the presence of perceived threats. To him, intolerance was a function of lower levels of education and higher levels of perceived threat. Ideology was indirectly implicated in this dynamic.

Other research has related tolerance to liberal ideology (Bobo & Licari, 1989; Green & Guth, 1991; Lipset & Raab, 1970). The concept of political ideology assumes polarization of opinions along the liberal–conservative
continuum, with liberals more likely to be tolerant and conservatives more wary of nonconformists (Lipset & Raab, 1970; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Piereson, 1981). Political ideology must be conceptualized with care, however, making special effort to "distinguish between economic and non-economic issues, where the former refers to questions of the distribution of wealth and the latter to those of cultural conformity and nonconformity" (Sullivan et al., 1981, p. 97). That is, social ideology shapes tolerance.

This research defined tolerance as an attitude "that allows people to have freedom of expression even though one may feel their ideas are incorrect or even immoral" (Nunn, Crockett, & Williams, 1978, p. 12). Even though support for such freedoms rose in the wake of the McCarthy Era, Nunn and colleagues (1978) cautioned against being overly optimistic: "Given a realistic menace to domestic tranquility enduring over a length of time, the swelling upward trend in support of civil liberties toward which most signs now point might well subside" (p. 95). Their data show that intolerance rose for select groups even as it was declining toward communists.

Reconceptualizing Political Tolerance

Expanding upon these insights, Sullivan and colleagues (Sullivan, et al., 1981; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979) responded to the fact that previous studies typically measured intolerance toward leftist groups, not general intolerance. They conceived of tolerance as "a willingness to 'put up with' groups that people may oppose or dislike" (p. 249) and considered people to be tolerant only if they extend civil liberties to groups they were predisposed to dislike. Testing this conceptualization, Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) found that the educated were not much more tolerant than the uneducated, largely eliminating the apparent gains in support for civil liberties. The overestimation of education's impact on tolerance stemmed from the fact that the least-liked groups of educated people tend to be on the political right, whereas leftist groups were typically least liked by less educated people.

Marcus et al. (1995) found that when people were exposed to disliked groups in experimental settings, three sets of factors shaped their tolerance judgments: predispositions (threat predisposition, neuroticism, and gender); standing decisions (tolerance of least-liked groups, support for democratic principles, and political knowledge); and contemporary influences (appraisals of threat and their impact on processing strategies). In line with their conceptualization, they tested the limits of tolerance by gauging subjects' predispositions and then presenting them with information about groups they were liable to find objectionable. This research
technique has considerably expanded the range of targets examined by scholars interested in public support for civil liberties and the factors underlying tolerance judgments.

The focus on least-liked groups, however, has also limited understanding of public responses to incursions on the civil liberties of radicals and nonconformists who advocate in behalf of supported causes. As a result, an important question remains unanswered: How do citizens respond to threats against the civil liberties of radical groups that endorse causes they favor rather than oppose? As Chong (1994) noted, a focus on oppositional groups has limited the scope of research on civil liberties judgments and the understanding of processes underlying these evaluations and decisions. Measures of tolerance, he argued, should not concentrate exclusively on disliked groups; they should also “discover the range of groups, ideas, and activities that people will allow to go uncensored in society, and the circumstances in which such tolerance will be given” (p. 27). Research on tolerance has benefited from a focus on disliked groups; however, it needs to consider how citizens respond to government efforts to restrict the speech freedoms and privacy of less oppositional, but nonetheless controversial, targets.

This is particularly true in the wake of the September 11 attacks and the start of the War on Terrorism—for, as we contend, concern about the effect of a realistic, long-term threat to domestic security is again acutely relevant. Given the current policy and opinion climate, it becomes necessary to consider not only tolerance for disliked radicals, but also the willingness of individuals to defend the civil liberties of political radicals with whom they share a common cause. This orientation toward a broader range of civil liberties targets reflects the belief that the degree to which people are willing to extend civil liberties to disliked social groups is only one point on a continuum of tolerance judgments.

Further, the decision to defend civil liberties, if even only for selected radicals, is a particularly meaningful test of the trade off between civil liberties and national security in the current policy and opinion climate. A willingness to restrict the liberties of extremist activists whose ideology one is predisposed to support may reflect a more general orientation toward supporting government efforts to combat terrorism, broadly defined. Conversely, opposition to these efforts suggests that security concerns may be trumped by the desire to protect the civil liberties of certain types of radical elements. By examining respondents’ attitudes toward militant activists that they are predisposed to support or oppose, it is possible to see how orientations toward targeted groups affect judgments about civil liberties and security. In other words, tolerance judgments that balance civil liberties and national security concerns are likely to vary according to an individual’s orientation toward the tar-
geted group. As a result, in addition to Sullivan and colleagues’ focus on disliked groups, an examination of citizens’ security concerns and tolerance judgments in contemporary America necessitates some consideration of how people respond to restrictions on the civic liberties of radicals, whose cause they may be predisposed to support but whose tactics they may find distasteful.

News Framing and Impression Formation

Another deficiency of contemporary research is its inattention to individuals as the object of tolerance judgments. This is particularly troubling given the focus on the individual in classical democratic theory. Consistent with this concern, Golebiowska (1996) found that information about the object of toleration influenced public evaluations, underlining the need to understand how evaluations of individuals and groups shape these judgments. Research on perceptions of individuals and perceptions of groups has generally followed separate lines, with few direct comparisons being made between them (see Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). The effects of framing styles on social judgments can be better understood by juxtaposing the two.

One domain of inquiry that does consider how people respond differently to comparable information about individuals and groups is research on news framing, social attribution, and impression formation. This work begins with the assumption that by framing social and political issues in specific ways, media imply the underlying causes and consequences of a problem and provide standards on which evaluations and judgments can be based (Iyengar, 1991; Shah, Domke, & Wackman, 1996). Most studies assert that frames trigger a set of mental processes (i.e., the application of certain heuristics or the exploitation of cognitive biases) and thereby encourage ways of understanding and shape judgments about issues (Price & Tewksbury, 1997).

Research examining framing effects on tolerance judgments has found that, when news coverage highlights civil liberties over safety risks, those exposed to it are more socially tolerant (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). Journalistic norms and news standards nonetheless dictate that press reports rarely feature a single organizing value; instead, they tend to present controversial issues as “value-choices,” stressing the conflict between contending positions (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1996; Shah et al., 1996). Examples of this may be found in news coverage of protestors and radicals, where stories often highlight the confrontation between their positions and the status quo. Research on the journalistic “protest paradigm” indicates that radical groups are rarely treated as equal partners in such conflicts. Through various conventions such as focusing on events
rather than underlying issues, and featuring the most radical individuals in representations of protest groups, journalists tend to marginalize protest groups (McLeod & Hertog, 1999).

Similar observations have been recognized in the news framing literature, which notes that journalists tend to frame their reports around particular instances and individual exemplars (Iyengar, 1991). The news media’s tendency to favor episodic frames (typically focused on discrete events and their influence on individuals) over thematic frames (typically focused on social trends and their effects on communities) significantly affects how viewers attribute responsibility for solving social problems. Episodic framing is thought to foster “attributions of responsibility both for the creation of problems or situations (causal responsibility) and for the resolution of these problems or situations (treatment responsibility)” (Iyengar, 1991, p. 3). By contrast, framing the issue in more general terms is theorized to encourage a sense of shared responsibility for addressing the social issue. Experimental studies involving crime, poverty, and unemployment provide limited, largely nonsignificant, support for these claims.

These weak findings may be explained, in part, by recent work that asserts Iyengar’s distinction between episodic and thematic framing may confound two frame dimensions (Shah et al., 2004). Episodic coverage not only favors specific instances over enduring problems (i.e., time span), it also emphasizes individual situations over societal conditions (i.e., social level). This second factor, the distinction between individuals and collectives, is particularly relevant for tolerance judgments given what we know about the social cognitive processes. In particular, research on impression formation draws a distinction between judgments about individuals and groups that is directly relevant to this journalistic norm.

This work emphasizes the significance of a continuum of perceived entitativity in making social judgments (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Entitativity—the degree to which social units are perceived as being cohesive and consistent—ranges from very high in individuals, to less so in groups, to lowest in population aggregates. When subjects perceive a high degree of entitativity, as when perceiving an individual, they expect a greater degree of consistency in attitude and behavior. As such, subjects feel more comfortable in making trait inferences. When making judgments about a group, however, a lower perceived entitativity makes subjects less likely to make such inferences, instead basing their perceptions on a wider range of criteria.

The overall result, note Hamilton and Sherman (1996), is that subjects are quicker to make trait inferences about individuals than about groups, and that these inferences are more pronounced. Consistent with this work, Susskind et al. empirically find that “in comparison with those
forming impressions of a group or an aggregate, participants in individual target conditions made stronger (more extreme) trait judgments, they made those judgments faster, and they made them with greater confidence” (Susskind, Maurer, Thakkar, Hamilton, & Sherman, 1999, p.190).

HYPOTHESES

Role of Cause Predisposition

Scholars agree that negative evaluations of a group play a significant role in tolerance judgments (Kuklinski, Riggle, Ottati, Schwarz, & Wyer, 1991; Marcus et al., 1995; Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002). If individuals dislike a category of radicals or nonconformists, they will judge the actions of those people to be undesirable, threatening, and therefore less worthy of toleration (Marcus et al., 1995; Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002). If, however, individuals encounter government efforts to infringe the liberties of radicals with whom they share support for a cause, they are likely to form tolerant attitudes and maintain members’ civil liberties. Under the current political context, both of these evaluations are important for generating a broader understanding of the processes underlying judgments that force trade-offs between civil liberties and national security.

Our research manipulated whether respondents were exposed to a socially radical target of civil liberties restrictions that either aligned or did not align with the respondents’ political predispositions. Even though research subjects had not encountered this specific target before, the political cause the target represented was familiar to them in that subjects previously indicated that they supported or opposed this cause. We predicted that, even when people encounter an unfamiliar group that advocates for a supported cause, they identify with the group and feel motivated to support its civil liberties. Even when a specific allegiance does not exist, the mere knowledge of a group’s political orientation is enough to produce a sense of affiliation or opposition (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flarnent, 1971; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This work, under the rubric of the minimal group paradigm, relates this difference to social identity needs (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and reciprocity expectations (Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989; Ng, 1981; Gaertner & Insko, 2001). Thus, support for expressive rights should be reduced and security concerns heightened when people encounter radicals who espouse opposed views. These effects should be reduced, though not necessarily reversed, when people encounter radicals who endorse supported views. Accordingly, we hypothesized:
H1a: People who encounter civil liberties restrictions on radicals they are predisposed to oppose will have greater security concerns than people who encounter civil liberties restrictions on radicals they are predisposed to support.

H1b: People who encounter civil liberties restrictions on radicals they are predisposed to oppose will be less tolerant of expressive rights than people who encounter civil liberties restrictions on radicals they are predisposed to support, even after controlling for security concerns.

Role of Political Ideology

We also hypothesized concerning the effects of political ideology (i.e., liberal versus conservative) on security concerns and tolerance judgments. Many scholars assert that the public’s attitude toward these issues stems from fundamental ideological beliefs. Marcus, Sullivan and colleagues question whether liberals are more tolerant than conservatives when confronted with disliked groups, although others have shown that certain features of liberal ideology promote tolerance and openness toward diverse beliefs (Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, Armor & Peterson, 1994). In fact, empirical studies have confirmed a relationship between liberal social ideology and tolerance (Lipset & Raab, 1970). Thus, we predicted that people who endorse a liberal social ideology will show greater support for civil liberties and hold fewer security concerns. We hypothesized:

H2a: People who are ideologically liberal will have lower security concerns than people who are ideologically conservative.

H2b: People who are ideologically liberal will be more tolerant of expressive rights than people who are ideologically conservative, even after controlling for security concerns.

Role of News Framing

Further, we expected that the main effects of support for or opposition to a cause on these judgments will be different, depending on the social level at which the news story is framed. Work on social perception provides a basis for this expectation. Research on social attributions and impression formation finds that perceivers make more extreme judgments for an individual than for a group, because they view an individual as a coherent and unified psychological unit (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Susskind et al., 1999). In social judgments about individuals under government scrutiny, perceivers assume great consistency between beliefs and actions, therefore assuming the best or the worst about these individuals (Susskind et al., 1999). By contrast, social judgments are less likely to depend on such extreme inferences when the target is a group,
because evaluations of collectives are tempered (Iyengar, 1991; Shah et al., 2004).

Relying on this argument, we hypothesized that the individual versus group framing conditions will amplify or attenuate, respectively, the effects of cause predisposition. We hypothesized that stories focusing on an individual rather than a group will enhance the influence of predisposition to oppose or support a cause on security concerns and tolerance judgments. Those who encounter the group framing of this controversy are expected to form evaluations that are less extreme—whether favorable or unfavorable—with regard to concerns about public safety or civil liberties. Supporting this view, Susskind et al. (1999) observe that tolerance judgments about individual targets would be more extreme than the judgments about group targets. Thus, we predicted that the individual story frame will be more likely to polarize security concerns and tolerance judgments between those who support and those who oppose the cause.

Likewise, attribution theory suggests that news consumers who receive a story about an individual targeted by the government are more prone to dismiss these civil liberties encroachments and become increasingly intolerant, attributing responsibility for the problem to the individual (see Iyengar, 1991). Conversely, when people encounter a story about an individual engaged in behavior they deem positive or favorable, they are likely to empathize with the subject of the story, perceive less of a threat, and be more supportive of civil liberties. Thus, we expected that the individual story frame will condition the effects of cause predisposition, such that security concerns and tolerance judgments are polarized under this condition.

H3a: The influence of cause predisposition (an individual’s predisposition to support or oppose the radicals’ cause) on security concerns will be amplified when participants encounter a news story framed around restrictions of an individual’s civil liberties, as opposed to one that is framed around restrictions of a group’s civil liberties. That is, news framing will moderate the effects of cause predisposition on security judgments.

H3b: The influence of cause predisposition (an individual’s predisposition to support or oppose the radicals’ cause) on tolerance judgments will be amplified when participants encounter a news story framed around restrictions of an individual’s civil liberties as opposed to one that is framed around restrictions of a group’s civil liberties. That is, news framing will moderate the effects of cause predisposition on tolerance judgments.

Finally, to test further the interplay of frames with political predispositions known to influence judgments about safety and liberty, we hypothesized that political ideology interacts with individual and group framing
of this controversy to shape tolerance and security judgments. Just as individual and group frames are expected to amplify or attenuate the effects of cause predispositions, we believed the same underlying process of entitativity should condition the effects of political ideology on these political evaluations. That is, individual framing is expected to amplify individuals preexisting political leanings such that liberals become less concerned about security issues and more likely to support civil liberties when they encounter individually framed news accounts of government restrictions. Likewise, conservatives become more concerned about security and less likely to support civil liberties when they encounter such news accounts. Thus, we posed the following hypotheses:

H4a: The influence of political ideology on security concerns will be amplified when participants encounter a news story framed around restrictions of an individual’s civil liberties as opposed to one that is framed around restrictions of a group’s civil liberties. That is, news framing will moderate the effects of political ideology on security judgments.

H4b: The influence of political ideology on tolerance judgments will be amplified when participants encounter a news story framed around restrictions of an individual’s civil liberties as opposed to one that is framed around restrictions of a group’s civil liberties. That is, news framing will moderate the effects of political ideology on tolerance judgments.

METHODS

Design

This study employs a 2 X 2 X 2 experiment embedded within a Web-based survey. Respondents for the survey were drawn from two populations. The first was a group of students enrolled in courses at a large midwestern U.S. university; they were offered extra credit by their instructors for participating in this research experience. The second group of subjects was recruited from Dane County, Wisconsin residents using a probability sampling variation of random-digit dialing; they were offered a chance to win one of five $50 cash prizes in exchange for their involvement in the study. The second group of subjects was recruited from Dane County, Wisconsin residents using a probability sampling variation of random-digit dialing; they were offered a chance to win one of five $50 cash prizes in exchange for their involvement in the study. Students in an upper-division research methods course contacted sampled households and spoke to a randomly selected adult within each household. Notably, 37.2 percent of the eligible adults who were contacted provided an email address.

All potential participants were contacted by email and given the Web site of the online survey. Nonstudent participants who provided an invalid email were recontacted by telephone, and every effort was made to obtain a legitimate email address to use for recruitment. In order to receive extra credit or be included in the prize drawing, participants were
required to provide their email at the start of the survey. Individuals who failed to respond to our initial email contact received an email reminder. Approximately 65% of recruited students completed the survey \((N = 413)\). In addition, 51% of nonstudent respondents who provided email addresses took the survey \((N = 237)\). The combined \(N\) was 650.

In addition to a standard battery of pretest and posttest questions, the respondents read and responded to an experimentally manipulated, fictional news story about potential civil liberties restrictions following September 11, 2001. This story appeared in several sections. The main section introduced an individual or group targeted by the FBI for monitoring because of an unspecified possible threat. At the end of this brief story, respondents had four choices. They could continue with the survey, or they could read more information in one of three categories: tracking and monitoring, search and seizure, or restrictions on speech and assembly. Each section contained information about additional FBI efforts regarding the target individual or group. At the end of each section, individuals could either read more about that topic or switch to a different topic. Each topic had three levels of content, meaning that respondents could read up to nine additional story segments (beyond the main section) if they chose to do so.

Embedded within these stories were two manipulations that are the focus of this study, as well as a third that is not central to our analysis. The first concerned whether the radical activist targeted by the government represented a cause that the respondent supported or opposed. This was determined by previously stated preferences to a list of established special interest groups. Early in the survey, respondents were presented with six mainstream special interest groups and were asked toward which one they felt most negative (see Appendix A for the exact question wording and the names of the six groups). A second question asked respondents toward which group they felt the most positive. The answers to these questions were used to generate the cause for which the individual or group featured in the news story was advocating, with respondents randomly assigned to read about a target that they were predisposed to support or oppose. To minimize the influence of existing knowledge about real groups and to help mask this manipulation, the group mentioned in the story was an “extremist” offshoot group with similar beliefs to the existing special interest group. For example, if respondents listed Greenpeace as their most-liked group and were assigned to the predisposition-to-support condition, they would read a story that mentioned the more radical “Earth Defense Front.”

The second experimental factor dealt with how the story was framed. In the group condition, respondents read a story in which the selected radical activist group was the subject of FBI scrutiny. The group was discussed as a unit, and any quotes came from an anonymous spokesperson
for the group. Where possible, the story made reference to “groups” rather than “individuals.” In the individual condition, subjects read about a particular member of the selected group, Greg Anderson. Anderson was quoted and the story made frequent reference to “individuals” rather than “groups.”

A third experimental factor concerned the ideological cue attached to a fictional think tank, the Liberty Institute. Throughout the story the institute was used to provide a counter to FBI claims, discussing the merits of civil liberties protections and the need for government restraint. As a cue to subjects, the institute was described at multiple points in the story as “liberal” for one condition and “conservative” for the other condition. This manipulation is not the focus of this study and was therefore controlled in all tests of hypothesized relationships. Also, to ensure that it did not condition the effects of either of the other two experimental factors, tests were run to confirm an absence of interactions. Notably, no interactions were observed between this factor and the other two manipulations, so it was simply included as a covariate.

Measures

Criterion Variables

After reading the manipulation stories, subjects answered questions focusing on the criterion variables: security concerns and tolerance for the targeted group. For security concerns, an index was created by averaging the scores from two items asking subjects how concerned they are about their own safety and the safety of other people in the U.S. from violent acts by extremists (see Appendix A). Subjects rated their agreement with the statements using a 10-point scale, ranging from not at all concerned to extremely concerned (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .80; M = 5.16; SD = 2.42$).

Tolerance for the targeted group was operationalized with an additive index of four statements taken from Marcus et al. (1995) but modified to fit the current social context. Subjects were asked how they felt about a set of statements regarding the treatment of the hypothetical group that had appeared on the manipulation stories: Group members should be allowed to work as a teacher in public schools, hold public rallies, broadcast public access cable programs, and share their views over the Internet. Items were measured on 10-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. We used responses to create an index averaging the scores from these items (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .77; M = 7.12; SD = 1.86$).

Between-Subjects Factor

In addition to the experimental factors—cause predisposition and group framing—we included individual ideology as a between-subjects
factor. Consistent with past research, ideology was tapped using a 7-point scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative. Subjects were asked to locate themselves in terms of their position on social issues and people’s behavior ($M = 3.08; SD = 1.60$).

**Blocking Variables**

Even in an experimental design, controls help ensure that an experimental condition is not confounded with other factors in accounting for criterion variables (Keppel, 1991; Kirk, 1995). To exclude potential confounds, we blocked a range of potential influences on tolerance: demographics, orientational–attitudinal variables, communication patterns, and the other experimental condition.

Previous researchers have found that political tolerance tends to be associated with basic demographic variables (Marcus et al., 1995; Stouffer, 1955, 1963; Sullivan et al., 1981). They demonstrated that female gender, younger age, and high social status were likely to be linked to increased tolerance. In this paper, a standard set of four basic demographic variables was included: gender (female = 63.1%), age ($M = 27.33; SD = 12.69$), household income ($Md = $30,000–50,000), and education ($M = 14.80; SD = 3.54$). Household income was assessed on a six-point scale (see Appendix A) and education was measured by asking respondents the highest year of school completed. In addition to the demographic controls, this study includes orientation variables tapping materialism and interpersonal trust related to different levels of tolerance. As dispositional factors, values constitute a basis for political thinking and attitudes (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1994; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Krosnick, Berent, & Boninger, 1994; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). In particular, recent research has highlighted the connection between nurturing maternalism and social tolerance (Lakoff, 2004). Sullivan and colleagues (1981) demonstrated that people who trust others displayed higher levels of political tolerance. In this study, maternalism was measured with two items on a 10-point scale asking the respondent a sense of superiority and beneficence (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .76; M = 7.65; SD = 1.74$). Interpersonal trust was also assessed with two items (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .54; M = 5.74; SD = 1.66$).

Three communication variables—newspaper hard news use, television hard news use, and interpersonal discussion of political issues—were also considered to be potential confounds for our study of political tolerance. Even though there has not been much research directly addressing the relationship between communication and tolerance, news consumption and interpersonal discussion are thought to promote political tolerance (Sullivan et al., 1981). Through various communication channels, citizens can be exposed to diverse people and learn the democratic
principle that “free exchange of ideas is necessary and that to be different is not necessarily to be dangerous” (Sullivan et al., 1981, p. 94).

Our measure of newspaper hard news use consists of four measures of attention and exposure to hard news content about international affairs, national politics, local government, and community issues (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .79; M = 5.79; SD = 2.27$). Television hard news use was also constructed from four measures of exposure and attention to content about international affairs, national politics, local government, and community issues (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .86; M = 5.67; SD = 2.12$). Exposure and attention were measured on 11-point scales ranging from never to frequently, and from none to very close attention, respectively. Interpersonal discussion is summed from four measures of frequency of discussion about politics and current affairs (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .77; M = 5.72; SD = 1.96$). The groups are family members, friends, neighbors, and co-workers. We measured frequency of discussion on a 10-point scale.

Finally, we accounted for the source cue that the subject encountered in the manipulation story and the number of manipulation pages they visited during the experiment. As we noted above, in our experiment, subjects could choose to read up to nine additional story segments (beyond the main section). The focus of this study is on framing and group like–dislike; accordingly, these study design factors were used as control variables.

RESULTS

To test the hypothesized relationships—the main effects of cause predisposition and ideology, as well as their interactions with the news frame—we conducted analyses of covariance (ANCOVA). Demographics (gender, age, income, and education), orientations (maternalism and interpersonal trust), communication (newspaper hard news, television hard news, and interpersonal discussion), and study design elements (source cue and number of pages visited) were included as covariates in the analyses, functioning as blocking variables.

Security Concerns

To simultaneously examine hypotheses related to security concerns, we ran an ANCOVA with the main effects, interactions, and covariates noted above (see Appendix B for full table). This ANCOVA included specified contrast tests in which critical differences between different individual and group frame conditions were gauged. Main effects of cause predisposition and ideology on security concerns were found to be significant (cause predisposition: $F(1, 576) = 11.76, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .02$; ideology: $F(1, 576) = 6.03, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .01$). As indicated in Table 1, nonliberals
and respondents who encountered activists they were predisposed to oppose were more likely to be concerned about security. Thus, H1a and H2a were supported.

H3a and H4a posited that an individual news frame would amplify the effects of cause predisposition and political ideology, respectively, on security concerns. As expected, cause predisposition interacted with the news frame on security concerns, $F(1, 576) = 5.23, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .01$. In contrast, ideology did not have significant interactive effects with the news frame on security concerns, $F(1, 576) = .12, n.s., \eta^2_p = .006$. These findings provide some preliminary support for H3a, yet offer little support for H4a.

To decompose the news frame–cause predisposition interaction, we ran two sets of contrast tests: (a) one set to examine whether there were significant differences between the predisposed-to-oppose condition and the predisposed-to-support condition among respondents receiving the same news frame and (b) another set to examine whether there were significant differences between the individual and group frame conditions among respondents sharing the same cause predisposition. The first set provides a limited test of whether the effects of cause predispositions are amplified under the individual frame condition and attenuated

![Table 1](image-url)
under the group frame condition. The second, more conservative, set of analyses provide a test of whether the effects of individual and group news frames are significantly different from one another within cause predisposition conditions and if these differences are in the expected direction.

Consistent with expectations, there was a significant difference in the security concerns of respondents in the predisposed-to-support and the predisposed-to-oppose conditions among respondents receiving the individual news frame (contrast estimate = -1.093; s.e. = .264; \( p = .000 \)), but not among those receiving the group news frame (contrast estimate = -.214; s.e. = .275; \( p = .436 \)). This set of findings confirms that it is under the individual frame condition that the effects of cause predispositions on security concerns are heightened, whereas these same differences are attenuated under the group frame condition. Further, among those who were predisposed to support the target, respondents receiving the individual frame condition had significantly lower security concerns than people receiving the group frame condition (contrast estimate = -.538; s.e. = .269; \( p = .046 \)). Even though the general pattern of amplification was maintained among those predisposed to oppose the target, with the individual news frame condition generating more security concerns than people receiving the group frame, the difference was not statistically significant (contrast estimate = .341; s.e. = .269; \( p = .207 \)). Thus, while the effects of cause predispositions on security concerns were more polarized among those receiving the individual frame than the group frame, this effect was not symmetrical. The interaction is concentrated among those predisposed to support the cause, providing some support for H3a.

Tolerance Judgments

A separate ANCOVA tested the effects of these variables on tolerance of the targeted group after adding security concerns to the list of covariates (see Appendix B for full table). Even with the effects of covariates removed, the main effects of cause predisposition and ideology were found to be significant predictors of tolerance toward the targeted group. People were most likely to be tolerant when they encountered the story about activists for a cause they supported, \( F(1, 572) = 22.10, p < .001, \eta^2 = .04 \), and when they were more liberal, \( F(1, 572) = 14.28, p < .001, \eta^2 = .02 \) (see Table 1). Thus, H1b and H2b received support.

H3b and H4b predicted that the news frame that subjects encountered would moderate the effects of cause predisposition and political ideology, respectively, on tolerance toward the target, with individual frames amplifying the effects of these dispositional factors. As expected, cause predisposition had a significant interactive effect with the news frames, \( F(1, 572) = 8.61, p < .01, \eta^2 = .02 \). Likewise, ideology and news frames
were found to interact to shape tolerance toward the targeted-group, \( F(1, 572) = 3.69, p < .05, \eta^2 = .01 \). These findings provide some preliminary support for H3b and H4b. To decompose these interactions, we ran additional contrast tests that parallel the analyses for security concerns.

We first tested whether there was a significant difference in the group tolerance of respondents in the predisposed-to-support and the predisposed-to-oppose conditions within news frame conditions. This difference was statistically significant among respondents receiving the individual news frame (contrast estimate = 1.034; s.e. = .192; \( p = .000 \)) but not among those receiving the group news frame (contrast estimate = -.249; s.e. = .198; \( p = .210 \)). This set of findings confirms that it is under the individual frame condition that the effects of cause predispositions on group tolerance are heightened, whereas these same differences are lessened under the group frame condition. In addition, among those who were predisposed to support the target, respondents receiving the individual frame condition displayed greater tolerance toward the target than people receiving the group frame condition—even though this relationship fell short of the threshold for statistical significance (contrast estimate = .353; s.e. = .194; \( p = .069 \)). This difference, however, was significant and in the expected direction among those predisposed to oppose the target (contrast estimate = .432; s.e. = .193; \( p = .026 \)). Thus, while the effects of cause predispositions on group tolerance were more polarized among those receiving the individual frame than the group frame, once again this effect was not perfectly symmetrical. That is, the difference between frame conditions was statistically significant only among those predisposed to oppose the cause, providing some support for H3b.

We then tested whether there was a significant difference in tolerance for the target within news frame conditions between respondents with a liberal ideology and those with a more conservative outlook. Once more, this difference was statistically significant among respondents receiving the individual news frame (contrast estimate = 801; s.e. = .204; \( p = .000 \)) but not among those receiving the group news frame (contrast estimate = -.285; s.e. = .209; \( p = .173 \)). Thus, it is under the individual frame condition that the effects of ideology on group tolerance are heightened, whereas these same differences are reduced to nonsignificance under the group frame condition. Contrast tests comparing levels of tolerance between frame conditions, however, did not produce meaningful differences. Among political liberals, respondents encountering individual news frames were not significantly different in their levels of tolerance than respondents encountering group frames (contrast estimate = .128; s.e. = .172; \( p = .458 \)). The same was true among more conservative respondents, with differences between those encountering individual frames and group frames in the expected direction but short of the threshold for statistical significance (contrast estimate = -.388; s.e. = .229; \( p = .091 \)).
Thus, the effects of ideology on group tolerance may be heightened among those receiving the individual frame, but the differences between frame conditions were not statistically significant, providing limited support for H4b.

In sum, our results indicate that news frames do condition the effects of cause predispositions to shape evaluations of security concerns and tolerance judgments. When compared to the group frame, the individual frame polarized security concerns and tolerance judgments according to support for or opposition to a cause. Individual ideology does not have a significant interactive effect with news frames on security concerns; however, a similar interaction with cause predisposition was found for social tolerance. Contrast testing yielded insight into the nature of these interactions and allowed closer examination of hypothesized effects. These results generally provide support for H1a, H1b, H2a, H2b, H3a, and H3b, with limited support for H4b. H4a, however, did not receive empirical support.

DISCUSSION

These findings suggest that story frames and individual political dispositions, particularly cause predispositions, work jointly to influence public reactions toward political radicals and restrictions of their civil liberties. At the most basic level, the results of this study indicate that when respondents were exposed to an extremist activist that they were predisposed to support, they expressed fewer security concerns and greater support for civil liberties. Similar patterns were observed for political ideology, with liberals more tolerant and conservatives less so. That is, when confronted with news about surveillance and profiling of political radicals, political liberals and cause supporters back Constitutional rights. This is not particularly surprising in light of past research (Lipset & Raab, 1970; Sullivan et al., 1981).

What is new and most intriguing here is that individual framing amplifies these effects, whereas group framing attenuates them. As a result, individual framing leads to the polarization of opinions about security and civil liberties between cause supporters and cause opponents, with these two groups of respondents making opposing judgments about the same targets of civil liberties restrictions. Likewise, individual story frames made conservatives somewhat more intolerant and liberals somewhat more tolerant than they would have been had they encountered the group frame. These findings are particularly noteworthy in light of the dynamic online design of our study, which gauged political preferences in advance of presenting respondents with the radical targets they would be inclined to support or oppose. As a result, the groups for which some
respondents favored restrictions were the same ones for which others favored protection, potentially exacerbating the conflict that this polarization of attitudes may produce.

This pattern of results highlights inherent biases in cognitive processing of information about individuals and groups. As social psychologists have noted, the perceived entitativity of social units, the degree to which they are understood as being cohesive and consistent, influences the extremity of social judgments (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Individuals are thought to have greater consistency between attitudes and behaviors because they are self-contained; thus, they are less likely to be constrained from acting on their beliefs, leading to more extreme judgments. The opposite is true of groups, mitigating security concerns and social tolerance judgments.

Implications for Communication Research

The journalistic tendency to focus on individuals in the construction of news stories appears to encourage audience members to make faster, more confident, and more extreme trait inferences (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Susskind et al., 1999). This propensity may provide a broader explanation for Iyengar’s (1991) provisional findings concerning attributions of responsibility for solving social problems. From our perspective, more extreme judgments of episodically—or individually—framed content produces less sympathetic responses about providing for the needy. In the case of civil liberties issues, the tendency of individual framing to amplify citizens’ deeper convictions, both their cause predispositions and political ideologies, may contribute to the polarization of public opinion around “fighting terrorism.”

Given the classic liberal emphasis on the rights-bearing individual, news stories will frame civil liberties controversies around the individuals under government scrutiny, leading audience members who are so disposed to become even more likely to stand up for activists’ free expression, privacy, and autonomy. People who oppose the activists’ cause, however, should be that much less likely to extend these democratic rights when the target of government inquiries is an individual. As a result, individual framing of PATRIOT Act investigations and prosecutions may deepen the schism over civil liberties—with those who are predisposed to support the cause least likely to sense security concerns and most steadfast in sustaining Constitutional rights while those who oppose the cause holding equally strong, yet sharply divergent positions.

This observation is not just some experimental contrivance, but an actual feature of the current political landscape given the application of the PATRIOT Act. Recent reports confirm that the Bush administration has used the PATRIOT Act to investigate, infiltrate, and surreptitiously
monitor the activities of antiwar protesters (Goldberg, 2004). Similar to the COINTELPRO programs of the 1970s, which empowered the FBI to engage in surveillance and sabotage of political dissidents, these investigations have fostered the sentiment that “civil disobedience, seen during peaceful times as the honorable legacy of heroes like Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., is being treated as terrorism’s cousin” (Goldberg, 2004, p. 2).

If the results of this study are any indication, political predispositions such as support for the war may have largely shaped whether audience members saw the targets of government surveillance as participants in democracy or threats to it. More important, however, individual framing of this news (i.e., the norm for such coverage) likely polarized opinion about these targets; evaluations that would have been tempered had the activists been presented as a group. Given the journalistic tendency to personalize news, the clash of values between those supporting the administration and those opposing their efforts was probably substantially sharpened, diminishing the likelihood of thoughtful debate and deliberation. In more general terms, the polarizing effects of the individual frames may explain why disagreements over values and ideology increasingly define our political culture.

In addition to this insight into the polarization of contemporary political discourse, a theoretical contribution of this study is to advance research on news framing by exploring the moderating influences of frames on other variables. Even though we did not find the direct effects of story frames on safety concerns and tolerance judgments, the frames produced conditional effects in relation to group affect and political ideology. This study extends recent framing research on the interactions among frame elements and individual predispositions (Shah, 2001; Shah et al., 2004). We advanced this line of inquiry by examining frames as moderators in the influences of core beliefs (i.e., cause predispositions and ideology) that would not be apparent without attention to the conditional nature of these news influences.

Finally, because of the recent focus on national security, Americans have heightened concerns about public safety. Like tolerance judgments, these concerns could be exacerbated or downplayed by framing issues in different ways. Hinting at the perils of exacerbated effects, many leftist critics have expressed fears that security concerns are being used to manipulate the public. If one believes that tolerant moderation is desirable in judgments about extending civil liberties to disliked groups, then the press should make an effort to focus less on individuals and more on groups when covering these conflicts. Such a balance could foster the preservation of civil liberties from unjust or inappropriate infringements. It could also temper the threats people perceive in politically or culturally different groups, as well as increase general tolerance among the American public. The classic liberal marketplace of ideas may always
remain an unattainable in the realities of political power struggle; nevertheless, journalism still plays a key role in determining how close we might get to that ideal.

APPENDIX A

Question Wording

Age
What is your Age? [ ]

Gender
What is your Sex? 1. Male 0. female

Income
I would like an estimate of your total 2001 household income. Please estimate the combined income for all household members from all sources. Was your household income in 2001:
1. Less than $10,000
2. Between $10,000 and $30,000
3. Between $30,000 and $50,000
4. Between $50,000 and $70,000
5. Between $70,000 and $90,000
6. More than $90,000
7. Don’t Know

Education
How many years of school have you completed? (We want a number here, not a degree. Remember to include elementary school). [ ]

Security Concerns
In thinking about the issues raised in the news story, how concerned are you about . . .
a. Your own safety from violent acts by extremists groups.
b. The safety of other people in the United States from violent acts by extremists groups.

Tolerance for the Targeted Group
Here is a list of statements that people have made regarding treatment of the [targeted group name]. Please indicate how you feel about each of these statements.
Members of this group should be . . .
a. Allowed to work as a teacher in public schools
b. Allowed to hold public rallies
c. Allowed to broadcast public access cable programs
d. Prevented from sharing their views over the Internet
Cause Support

Below is a list of special interest groups that are politically active in the United States. Toward which of these groups do you feel most negative?
   a. The Christian Coalition, a group that seeks to bring a faith-based agenda to politics
   b. Greenpeace, a group that seeks to prevent environmental degradation
   c. National Rifle Association, a group that seeks to protect the rights of gun owners
   d. National Right to Life, a group that seeks to end the practice of abortion
   e. Outproud, a group that seeks to advance the rights of gay and lesbian individuals
   f. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, a group that seeks to promote the humane treatment of animals.

Now, toward which of these groups do you feel most positive?

Ideology

Now thinking in terms of social issues and people’s behavior, would you say you are:
   1. Very liberal
   2. Liberal
   3. Somewhat liberal
   4. Moderate
   5. Somewhat conservative
   6. Conservative
   7. Very conservative

Maternalism

Here is a list of statements that people have made about their social interactions and trust in various groups. Tell us how you feel about each statement:
   a. I worry about what happens to other people, even total strangers.
   b. It bothers me greatly to see other people get hurt.

Interpersonal Trust

Here is a list of statements that people have made about their social interactions and trust in various groups. Tell us how you feel about each statement:
   a. If they got the chance, most people would try to take advantage of you.
   b. Most people are honest.

Interpersonal Discussion

Here is a list of statements that people have made about their social interactions and trust in various groups. Tell us how you feel about each statement:
   a. I often talk to my family members about politics and current affairs.
   b. I often talk to my neighbors about politics and current affairs.
   c. I often talk to my friends about politics and current affairs.
   d. I often talk to my co-workers about politics and current affairs.

Newspaper Hard News Use

How often do you consume each of the following types of media content?
   a. Newspaper stories about national politics and international affairs
   b. Newspaper stories about local government and community issues

Apart from how often you consume these types of content, how much attention do you pay to them? How much attention do you pay to:
a. Newspaper stories about national politics and international affairs  
b. Newspaper stories about local government and community issues

**TV Hard News Use**

How often do you consume each of the following types of media content?

a. National television news programs  
b. Local television news programs  

Apart from how often you consume these types of content, how much attention do you pay to them? How much attention do you pay to:

a. Television stories about national politics and international affairs  
b. Television stories about local government and community issues

### APPENDIX B

**ANCOVAs with the Main Effects, Interactions, and Covariates for Security Concerns**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariates</th>
<th>$F(1, 576)$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$\eta^2_p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>6.78</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paternalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td>16.74</td>
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<td>.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newspaper hard news use</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<td>Television hard news use</td>
<td>16.34</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interpersonal discussion</td>
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<td>.29</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source cue manipulation</td>
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<td>.89</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of visited manipulation pages</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Effects</th>
<th>$F(1, 576)$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$\eta^2_p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cause predisposition</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political ideology</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frame manipulation</td>
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<td>.67</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interactions</th>
<th>$F(1, 576)$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$\eta^2_p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frame * Predisposition</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frame * Ideology</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### ANCOVAs with the Main Effects, Interactions, and Covariates for Group Tolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariates</th>
<th>F(1, 572)</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>η²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.55</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>.38</td>
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<td>Paternalism</td>
<td>2.56</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td>4.25</td>
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<td>Newspaper hard news use</td>
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<td>Television hard news use</td>
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<td>Interpersonal discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of visited manipulation pages</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security concerns</td>
<td>39.25</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Main Effects

- **Cause predisposition**
  - $F(1, 572) = 22.10$, $p = .00$, $\eta^2 = .04$
- **Political ideology**
  - $F(1, 572) = 14.28$, $p = .00$, $\eta^2 = .02$
- **Frame manipulation**
  - $F(1, 572) = .60$, $p = .44$, $\eta^2 = .00$

### Interactions

- **Frame * Predisposition**
  - $F(1, 572) = 8.61$, $p = .00$, $\eta^2 = .02$
- **Frame * Ideology**
  - $F(1, 572) = 3.69$, $p = .05$, $\eta^2 = .01$

### NOTES

1. Here and throughout the manuscript we refer to individual frames as amplifying the effects of cause predispositions and groups frames as attenuating the effects of cause predispositions. We recognize that there is no formal control group for the news framing manipulations. Of course, to create a news story without an orienting frame would be impossible, as would asking respondents questions about a hypothetical target without a news story presenting the target as some social level—either individual or group. As such, we use the terms “amplify” and “attenuate” as linguistic conveniences rather than specific theoretical claims.

2. Many participants were legitimately unable to participate because they lacked internet access; therefore, we report this figure instead of a traditionally calculated response rate. Even given this more generous method of calculation, final participation rates are
quite low, and the results provided here should be viewed in terms of experimental findings that show strong internal validity, rather than as an externally valid assessment of the feelings of the Dane County, Wisconsin community.

3. The names of the six groups and their fictional counterparts: (a) the Christian Coalition–United Christian Front, (b) Greenpeace–Earth Defense Front, (c) National Rifle Association–Arm America Front, (d) National Right to Life–Unborn Defense Front, (e) Outproud–United Queer Front, and (f) People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals–Animal Liberation Front.

4. Below the accepted threshold of .70, the Cronbach’s alpha yielded by the interpersonal trust index nonetheless was not regarded as a threat to the validity of the measure. As Carmines and Zeller (1979) point out, a two-item scale with an interitem correlation of .4 would fall shy of standards for alpha reliability (.57), but a six-item index with the same average interitem correlation would easily exceed standards (.80). We argue that a robust association alongside clear face validity implies that items are effectively measuring an underlying concept.

5. For the ANCOVA, we created a dummy variable for ideology by dichotomizing the continuous variable (Liberal = 1; Conservative = 0). We combined moderate and conservative respondents into one group labeled “conservative” when creating this dummy variable. This was done to avoid creating vastly different case counts in the dummy variable because 64.5% of the total sample was liberal.

6. A power analysis that was conducted for the main and the interactive effects assuming two-tailed alpha of .5 revealed powers of .93, .69 and .63 for small effect size (respectively 0.2, 0.1 and .01) and 0.6 for no effect (0.0).

7. A power analysis that was conducted for the main and the interactive effects assuming two-tailed alpha of .5 revealed a power of 1.00 for medium effect size (0.4) and powers of .97, .83 and .48 for small effect size (respectively 0.2, 0.2 and 0.1).

REFERENCES


