Normalization and the balance of power in the Middle East

There is only one explanation for the normalization deals between Arab states and Israel: the geopolitical position of Iran.

The most remarkable event in the Middle East in 2020 was the “normalization” between some Arab states (so far the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco) and Israel. According to the so-called Abraham Accords, these states will resume diplomatic and economic relations with Israel. This rapprochement has been in the making for some time already. The Arab states started to warm up to the Middle East Plan of President Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner. This plan would acknowledge Israel’s permanent occupation of about one third of the West Bank and leave the Palestinians with a shattered territory without sovereignty over their own security. Attached to this would be an investment plan for not only the Palestinians but all Arab states. Before that, the Trump administration recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights and moved the US Embassy to Jerusalem. All this has been confirmed once more by Secretary of State Pompeo when he visited settlements in the West Bank and the Golan Heights in November 2020. “I am on Israel’s land” he stated.

Both the Trump/Kushner Plan and the Abraham Accords ignore the Palestinian aspiration for an independent state. They are a reversal of President Obama’s initial preference for the borders of 1967, which has been obstructed by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. It is also a turnaround of the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 that requires a recognition of Israel only within the borders of 1967 (this is the reason why Saudi Arabia is still hesitating over whether to join the Accords). The Accords abandon also a two-state solution as proposed by the European Union. For decades, the Palestinian issue has been key to Arab-Israeli-US-EU relations. It was also at the center of the Oslo Accords in the nineties. Why has it been abandoned?

Alliance building

The Abraham Accords are not a sudden love affair between Arab states and Israel. If one takes a realist stance, there is only one explanation: the geopolitical position of Iran. Global indices rank Iran’s geopolitical potential as fourteenth, well ahead of Saudi Arabia and Israel. The index includes over fifty factors, including population, size, coasts, land mass, resources, infrastructure, and discipline of the military; this is remarkable given that Iran’s military budget is seven times smaller than that of Saudi Arabia. Nuclear weapons are not included. What do neighboring states do if they fear such a prospect? According to the balance of power theory, they build an alliance. Although the Abraham Accords do not contain explicit defense provisions such as a collective defense clause, they speak of a common Strategic Agenda for the Middle East, “to advance regional security and stability” signed by the participating parties, including the United States. An alliance will increase the security dilemma and further incite a reaction from Iran; this will entail support for friendly militias as a second line of defense but also an enhancing of its nuclear program. Such a chain of reactions will increase instability in the region.

President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Crown Prince Bin Salman opposed the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) not so much because of Iran’s nuclear program but because it would have recognized and improved Iran’s geopolitical status. Saudi Arabia supported JCPOA in 2015 but in 2018 supported Trump leaving it because it would not cover Iran’s regional behavior. There is no arms control agreement in history, however, that includes behavior. Furthermore, since Israel is a nuclear weapons state, the Abraham Accords would become a nuclear coalition. They would blow up the concept of a “Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Middle East”, which the Arab states have at least rhetorically supported thus far.

Biden’s challenges

What will change under President Biden? He has alluded both to going back to the JCPOA if Iran meets certain conditions and also restoring diplomatic relations with the Palestinians. He will not, however, roll back the Abraham Accords. To avoid higher tensions in the region between Iran and its neighbors, Biden could take a bold decision and diplomatically recognize Iran. To forestall further isolation, Iran itself could try to get back into a regional dialogue on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative and indicate that it could recognize Israel in the borders of 1967. It would also take Arab states at their word and not abandon the Palestinians. The Palestinians cannot be left out of any regional dialogue; they have to be part of any further talks whether they are related to the Abraham Accords or to a revival of the Arab Peace Plan.

The Biden administration would do well to acknowledge that an isolated Iran would only embolden hardliners and encourage them to act more aggressively. To use a historical analogy, Germany’s isolation after 1918 strengthened the radical nationalists; conversely, its integration with the West after 1945, for example through Marshall Plan aid, led to a prosperous and democratic country.

(Mondoweiss, 29.12.2020)