SE/AG Sexuelle Orientierung und Identität

Gender Studies aus Rechtsgeschichte und Rechtsphilosophie

Jutta Zalud

"Touch me, and you're dead!" says the "reasonable" man. "Understandable" says the High Court. (Greame Coss, 1998: 5)

 

Homosexual Advance Defence*

  

Homosexual Panic Defence und Homosexual Advance Defence im System der 'defences':

reasonable (ordinary) man/reasonable person:

Maßmensch nach § 76: 

Nicht Durchschnittsmensch, sondern rechtstreuer Mensch, aber sonst den geistigen und körperlichen Eigenschaften des Täters so weit wie möglich angenähert. 

Wann darf der 'reasonable man' durchdrehen? Wann ist eine Gemütserregung allgemein begreiflich?

Anm: Dieses Zitat stammt aus dem einzigen mir bekannten Fall in Österreich, in dem der Täter versucht hat, Notwehr u/o 'allgemein begreifliche Gemütsbewegung' (§ 76 StGB) wegen eines vorangegangenen homosexuellen Annäherungsversuches geltend zu machen. Allerdings erfolglos: er wurde wegen versuchten Mordes verurteilt.

Beispiele: Beziehungskrisen (in flagranti erwischen, verletzende Zurückweisung), Verlust des Arbeitsplatzes, Nachbarschaftskonflikte; meistens mit Vorgeschichte - der Anlaß allein macht den Affekt oft nicht allgemein verständlich (Moos in Wr. Kommentar)

 "Der Angeklagte beschrieb die tatauslösende Auseinandersetzung mit seiner Gattin im wesentlichen dahin, daß er (nach seiner verspäteten Heimkehr in schwer alkoholisiertem Zustand) wegen der Ankündigung der Christiane O*****, sie werde für den Fall, daß er "so weiter mache und so spät nach Hause komme auch länger ausbleiben", in Zorn geraten sei, er habe deshalb das Kleinkalibergewehr aus dem Wohnzimmer geholt, im Zuge des weiteren (ihm im einzelnen nicht mehr erinnerlichen) Streitgesprächs aus Zorn zunächst auf seine im Bett liegende Gattin geschossen und den zweiten (tödlichen) Schuß auf sie abgegeben, als sie nach dem Aufstehen das Fußende des Bettes erreicht hatte." ð "kann nach Lage des Falles auch davon nicht die Rede sein, daß die behauptete Gemütsbewegung aus der Sicht der zornauslösenden Begleitumstände allgemein begreiflich wäre." ð § 75. (12 Os 72/91)

"Der Angeklagte geriet seiner Verantwortung zufolge wegen einer beleidigenden Äußerung der Serfiras K***** ("Hurensohn") derart in Wut, daß er den Entschluß faßte, den von ihm aufgrund der Auflösung der Lebensgemeinschaft durch das Tatopfer erwogenen Racheakt durch die Schußabgabe sogleich auszuführen. Selbst unter dem Eindruck massiver, aus der Sicht (fremdartiger) familiärer Wertvorstellungen nicht hinzunehmender Beleidigungen ist eine Gemütsbewegung der in Rede stehenden Heftigkeit dem zurückgewiesenen Liebhaber in Gestalt des ehemaligen Lebensgefährten nach hierzulande herrschenden Maßstäben sittlich vorzuwerfen (vgl Leukauf/Steininger Komm3 § 76 RN 12) und solcherart nicht allgemein begreiflich. Die vom Gerichtspsychiater als psychogener Ausnahmezustand beurteilte Gemütsbewegung des Angeklagten stellt sich vielmehr als eine "übersteigerte" Reaktion dar, der eben deshalb das Moment der allgemeinen Begreiflichkeit fehlt." ð § 75 (14 Os 130/97)

Aus Masciantonio v. The Queen:

(25) The provocation must be such that it is capable of causing an ordinary person to lose self-control and to act in the way in which the accused did.

(27) ... the characteristics are merely those of a person with ordinary powers of self-control.

(31) There was clear evidence of provocation in this case. ... the deceased told the appellant to "piss off" and attempted to kick him. The deceased also pushed the appelant so that he fell to the ground injuring his elbow. .... Whilst anger is primaliry a feature of provocation and fear a feature of self-defence, loss of self-control may be due to a mixture of fear and anger.

(32) ... the very ferocity of his actions in stabbing the deceased repeatedly in the presence of a number of onlookers suggests a loss of self-control.

(Anm: Der Täter hat seinen Schwiegersohn in der Nähe seines Arbeitsplatzes aufgesucht, um ihn wegen eines Diebstahls im Familienkreis zur Rede zu stellen. Im Streit hat er ihn dann mit einem Messer erstochen, obwohl Zeugen versuchten, die beiden zu trennen.)

Aus Moffa v. The Queen:

(4) ... the intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm to the deceased was formed on the morning of her death. ... it was formed after and consequential upon the exchanges between the deceased and the applicant on that morning. .... There is nothing suggested about the applicant, his disposition or mental balance, which could be called in human terms extraordinary. That he was emotionally disturbed by his wife's disclosed attitude to him did not make him ... other than an ordinary man.**

(Anm: Der Täter hat die Ehefrau mit einem Rohr erschlagen, nachdem sie ihm gesagt hat, daß sie auf eine Fortsetzung der Beziehung keinen Wert mehr legt.)

 Aus Green v. The Queen:

(siehe dazu auch die Zusammenfassung von David Buchanan)

 "and he showed me to the bed I was sleeping in. After a while when I was fully unclothed Don entered the room I was in, slid in beside me in the bed and started talking to me how great person I was. Then he started touching me. I pushed him away. He asked what was wrong. I said, 'What do you think is wrong? I am not like this.' He started grabbing me with both hands around my lower back. I pushed him away. He started grabbing me harder I tried and forced him to the lower side of me. He still tried to grab me. I hit him again and again on top of the bed until he didn't look like Don to me. He still tried to grope and talk to me that's when I saw the scissors on the floor on the right side of the bed. When I saw the scissors he touched me around the waist shoulders area and said, 'Why'? I said to Don, 'Why, I didn't ask for this.' I grabbed the scissors and hit him again. He rolled off the bed as I struck him with the scissors. By the time I stopped I realised what had happened, I just stood at the foot of the bed with Don on the floor laying face down in blood." (Aussage des Angeklagten)

".... the touching was amorous, not forceful ... the sexual advances of Mr. Gillies up to the point where the appellant lost his self-control were not such as could have induced an ordinary person in the position of the appelant to have lost his self-control as to have formed an intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon Mr. Gillies. .... It is easy to see that many an ordinary person in the position in which the appellant was when Mr Gillies was making his amorous physical advances would have reacted indignantly, whit a physical throwing off the deceased, and perhaps with blows. I do not think however that the ordinary person could have been induced by the deceased's conduct so far to lose self-control as to have formed an intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon Mr. Gillies." (Priestley)

 "The real sting of the provocation could have been found not in the force used by the deceased but in the his attempt to violate the sexual integritiy of a man who had trusted him as a friend and father figure, ..."

"All this was bad enough but there were further factors, namely, the betrayal of the relationship of trust, dependency, friendship and his abuse of his hospitality. He was going to coerce the appelant into providing him (the deceased) with sexual gratification. ...

The provocation was of a very grave kind. It must have been a terrifiying experience for the appelant when the deceased persisted. The grabbing and the persistance are critical.

Some ordinary men would feel great revulsion at the homosexual advances being persisted with the circumstances and could be induced to so far lose their self control as to form the intention to and inflict grievous bodily harm. They would regard it as a serious and gross violation of their body and their person. I am not saying that most men would so react or that such reaction would be reasonable. However, some ordinary men could become enraged and feel that a strong physical reaction was called for. The deceased's actions had to be stopped." (Smart)

 "The deceased's actions, as so narrated, were revolting. It was unreal to suggest that in such a situation the appelant should have got up and walked away. ... the deceased's betrayal of the relationship of trust, dependency, friendship and his abuse of his [!] hospitality." (Smart)

(Anm: Der Ermordete hatte dem Täter erlaubt, in seiner Wohnung zu übernachten, weil es schon spät war und beide getrunken hatten.)

 "What had brought this friendship to an end was the conduct of the victim that night. The accused claims [the deceased] ... made sexual advances and sexual overtures to him - a person who was heterosexual, who had never been caught in a situation before. He says 'It is this conduct that caused me to lose my self-control'." (Verfahrensrichter im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren)

 "[T]he fact that the sexual advance was of a homosexual nature was only one factor in the case. What was more important from the accused's point of view was that a sexual advance, accompanied with some force, was made by a person whom the accused looked up to and trusted. The sexual, rather than homosexual, nature of the assault filtered through the memory of what the accused believed his father had done to his sisters, was the trigger that provoked the accused's violent response." (McHugh)

 "The accused was faced with, what for him in his situation, may be accepted to have been a provocation. It may be allowed that it was provocation of a sexual kind affecting deep feelings and affronting him. It intruded into his privacy in a way most unwelcome to him. It may even have suggested to him assumptions about his own sexuality which he found confronting or offensive. But he was a 22 year-old adult male living in contemporary Australia. He was at all times wearing at least his tracksuit pants and underwear. At no time were these garments removed or displaced. He was awake. He was aware of what the deceased was doing. He was also aware that the deceased was highly intoxicated. He was younger. He was physically fit. He was very soon able to achieve physical superiority over the deceased. His great physical power is indicated by the course which his violence took. He had relatives close at hand. He knew that they would answer a telephone call and come at once to collect him. His sister's home was within short walking distance. He could not explain in his evidence why he did not simply say "I am going". He agreed that there was nothing at all to prevent him from leaving. Following the killing of the deceased he was readily able to summon a motor vehicle and coolly to direct that he be taken to the police station there to assert that the deceased had done "worse" to him than he had done to the deceased." (Kirby)

Was an dem Fall beeindruckt, ist wie die Höchstrichter das Verhalten des Opfers schildern und qualifizieren: Er hat die Gastfreundschaft (seine eigene!) mißbraucht, er hat das Vertrauen seines langjährigen Freundes mißbraucht, er trägt Schuld daran, daß diese Freundschaft nun zu Ende ist... Daß der Täter - eben auch in Anbetracht der langjährigen Freundschaft - auch eine andere Lösung hätte finden können, wird ernsthaft nur von einem Richter der zweiten Instanz (Priestley) und von dem Höchstrichter Kirby erwogen. Die - doch schon etwas 'gesetzteren' - Herren (die einzige Frau im High Court war an der Entscheidung nicht beteiligt) können sich offenbar gut vorstellen, daß ein junger Mann, wenn er mit der Liebeserklärung und Berührungen eines anderen Mannes konfrontiert wird, nicht nur überrascht, irritiert oder ratlos ist, sondern aufs höchste schockiert.

Bei der Beurteilung der Provokation und ihrer Wirkung auf den "ordinary man" gehen Geschworene (und auch Berufsrichter/innen) notgedrungen von ihren eigenen Empfindungen, Erfahrungen, von ihrer Lebenseinstellung und ihren Moralvorstellungen aus. Homophobe Tendenzen in der Gesellschaft schlagen sich daher in Gerichtsentscheidungen nieder und diese Gerichtsentscheidungen tragen andererseits dazu bei, daß Homophobie weiterhin als akzeptabel oder zumindest 'verständlich' angesehen wird. Eine Arbeitsgruppe im Attorney General's Department in New South Wales (Working Party on the Review of the Homosexual Advance Defence) hat daher (unter anderem) vorgeschlagen, folgende Passagen in das Anleitungsmaterial für Geschworene aufzunehmen:

"However, in determining whether an ordinary person in the accused's situation might act from passion, rather than judgment, I instruct you that a person would not act as the result of prejudice toward, or fear of, homosexuals or homosexuality. In this regard, the law does not treat a homosexual advance if you find one was made by the deceased as an act of provocation to any lesser or greater degree than if he had made a comparable sexual advance upon a woman."

"You may conclude that the deceased's behaviour and sexual orientation do not accord with those which you regard as morally acceptable. It is therefore important that you remember that this is a Court of Law and not a court of morals. Prejudice and emotion must have no place in a court of law. Everyone is equal before the law. So, on the question of sexuality, I direct you that a person's background is not of the slightest relevance. There should be no prejudice against the deceased or the accused on the basis of sexual orientation. You should decide the matters on the issues without prejudice and without empathy to the deceased or the accused."

Die Passage über den Annäherungsversuch gegenüber einer Frau soll nach Meinung der Autor/inn/en dazu dienen, den Geschworenen den Unterschied zwischen (non-violent) 'sexual advance' und (violent) 'sexual attack' bewußt zu machen. Die Unterschiede im Verhalten von Frauen und Männern bei unerwünschten Annäherungsversuchen wurden unter anderem so kommentiert:

"If every heterosexual woman who had a sexual advance made to her by a male had the right to murder the man, the streets of this city would be littered with the bodies of heterosexual men." (David Wertheimer, zitiert bei Thomas Kendall, 1992: 1484, FN 188)

Ich frage mich allerdings, ob die vorgeschlagene Formulierung ausreichend auf die Reaktion der Frauen abstellt und nicht pauschal impliziert, daß unerwünschte Annäherungsversuche von Frauen als 'nicht so schlimm' empfunden werden.

Dean Kiley (1994:84) hat die Problematik von self-defence und provocation folgendermaßen zusammengefaßt: 

panic > self defence <=> acquital

rage > provocation <=> mitigation

Adrian Howe (1997: 337) tritt daher für die völlige Abschaffung der 'provocation' als Entschuldigungs- oder Milderungsgrund ein, denn "provocation operates as a deeply sexed excuse for murder". Das zeigt auch das eingangs erwähnte "Schulbeispiel" des Totschlages: der Ehemann erwischt die Frau beim Ehebruch. Untreue der Frau und Zärtlichkeit eines Mannes stellen offenbar gleichermaßen einen Angriff auf die Männlichkeit dar, der so schwer wiegt, daß der Betroffene außer sich gerät und für Gewalttaten nicht mehr voll verantwortlich ist. 

Der männliche Körper als unberührbare Zone:

"The person presupposed by the law of assault is a discrete, distinct, volitional subject for whom the skin of his body is considered to represent a boundary from other distinct subjects. Consent is required if that boundary skin is to be transgressed - if anyone is to touch or "meddle with" the person. The mere touching of the skin represents an encroachment, a violation of the person's person if the touching is not wanted. People are essentially separate, they come in closed body bags, it it is vital that one person not interfere with the body bag of another unless there is a positive agreement to make contact. The default position is isolation rather than physical community." (Ngaire Naffine, 1997: 85)