

# **Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism**

## *Dilthey and Historicism*

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### 1. Introduction

The topic of this chapter is complex and problematic. With historicism we have a current of 19<sup>th</sup> century philosophy (I will call it “objectivist historicism” or “hermeneutics”) which was heavily distorted and finally extinguished in the context of major developments of 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy. There is one non-standard reading of this history, however, according to which a certain aspect of the 19<sup>th</sup> century original conception—which in (2017) I called “German Empiricism”—survived in the context of early Logical Empiricism. Obviously this is a complicated story because those early Logical Empiricists who fit our narrative (Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath) sometimes explicitly and polemically rejected hermeneutics and “Einfühlung”. It turns out, however, that what Carnap and (more importantly) Neurath criticized at the beginning of the 1930s were the then distorted varieties of the old 19<sup>th</sup> century conception, while they intended to uphold the original conception. The reason for this was simple. Objectivist 19<sup>th</sup> century hermeneutics, as developed by scholars such as Boeckh, Lazarus, Steinthal, Dilthey, was perfectly compatible with an empiricist world conception, whereas the then contemporary conceptions of Spengler, Heidegger, Spranger, Bollnow tended to be radically anti-empiricist, and even anti-scientific. In order to

unravel these complexities I first sketch the long-term development of historicism and hermeneutics during the last two centuries. Then I focus on the cases of Carnap and Neurath (and, briefly, Reichenbach). For reasons of space, I cannot take into account other Logical Empiricists such as Philipp Frank, Victor Kraft, Edgar Zilsel and Moritz Schlick, although they all also might have *some* historicist background: the hope is that the case studies of Carnap and Neurath illustrate the whole pattern.

## 2. Historicism and hermeneutics 1831-2017

19<sup>th</sup> century German historicism is characterized, first of all, by a double rejection: the rejection of crude historical speculations such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's idealistic reconstruction of world history and world spirit and the rejection of Henry Thomas Buckle's positivistic attempts to explain historical developments by means of a small number of "natural laws" of history. The key aspect of what we today call "historicism" in a somewhat sympathetic spirit—in the 19<sup>th</sup> century the term was mostly used in a pejorative way: there was hardly any "historicist" who identified herself in this fashion—was that the task of history was shifted from the mere description of *spatiotemporal* facts (as it was dominant in all varieties of historiography until the 18<sup>th</sup> century) toward the level of *mental* facts. Wilhelm Dilthey identified the task of the historian to develop a "critique of historical reason" where spatiotemporal facts only serve as the historian's sources being needed for a reconstruction of the historical changes in abstract categories and transcendental ideas. This new form of historical experience was also provocatively called "transcendental experience" by Dilthey. (Damböck 2017, ch. 3) Those abstract entities being historicized here comprised also sociological structures or what in the *Völkerpsychologie* of Moritz Lazarus and Chajim H. Steinthal was called "Volksgeist". Dilthey, Lazarus, and Steinthal

developed their empirical approaches toward the mental by means of a certain psychological method, called “descriptive psychology” (Dilthey) or “*Völkerpsychologie*” (Lazarus, Steinthal). This method remained important in later developments; on the one hand, as an empirical method with the inclusion of experimental approaches – here the thought psychology of the Würzburg school around Oswald Külpe and Karl Bühler as well as the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology around Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler and Kurt Lewin could be mentioned; on the other hand, at the extreme opposite side of the epistemic spectrum, as an entirely non-empirical and non-experimental method of “*geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie*” in the sense of Dilthey’s pupil Eduard Spranger. The empirically minded branch of these developments was also important for Carnap’s early intellectual development and served as a conceptual background to his *Aufbau*. (Feest 2007)

Historicism was partly an elaboration and partly a criticism of the age of enlightenment. It adopted the idea that what we call “reality” is partly composed of, if not entirely constructed by means of abstract notions being located in the human mind, i.e., what Immanuel Kant called the “Copernican turn” of philosophy. But historicism also criticized the Kantian idea that this human reality of mental facts might be something eternally fixed and unshakable: it also meant the historicization of the mental world. The mental world, for a historicist, is *a product* of history, rather than its unshakable background. In this form, historicism did not emerge earlier than 1860; previously, in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, historians did not question that history reflects either merely external spatiotemporal events or a reservoir of eternal ideas or an eternally fixed logic of spirit, in the sense of Hegel. But scholars such as Dilthey, Steinthal, Lazarus, rejected these ideas around 1860.

We can distinguish a number of different approaches that frame the history of historicism from the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century up to the present. The main distinction is that between *objective* approaches, for whom the historian merely reconstructs the mental constitution of a certain historical context, and all those approaches for whom the historian has to do significantly more. For the objectivist, different historical contexts *c* and *c'* require different representations *y* and *y'*. Objectivists split on how *y* and *y'* could be differentiated. On the one hand, there were those who merely replaced the idea of an eternally fixed representation of the world with the idea of representations that change through history. Given a certain *x*, we obtain a certain *y*, where the law of transition is fixed. The role of the historian was limited to getting *y* right, The context *c\** of the historical reconstruction remains irrelevant, only the historical context *c* itself matters. In sharp contrast to this *aprioricist* conception (as defended by Hermann Lotze and the Southwest-German School of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert), *empirically-minded* thinkers like Dilthey or Hermann Cohen were convinced that any representation *y*, being an abstract conceptual structure, is *a construction* that relies heavily on the respective context *c\** in which it is made. For them, *y* still can be *objective* because it is not *the taste* of the construer or her *emotional state* that furnishes the context *c\** but *the scientific perspective that is taken up* (the state of scientific knowledge plus the general scientific viewpoint as determined by the latter): *y* is *a result* of both *c* (the investigated context) *and* *c\** (the context of investigation). What empirically-minded thinkers like Dilthey and Cohen reject was the display of all kinds of emotional and moral skills: the historian was neither a politician nor the founder of a *Weltanschauung*. This latter conception, rather, was invented by *subjectivist* historicists such as Gustav Droysen and Heinrich Treitschke, who took the historian to be a scientific moralist, instructing the politicians. Droysen and Treitschke rejected the “eunuchoid objectivity” (Droysen) of the objectivist and (though still sharing some

ideas of objectivist historicism which was simply *not enough* for them) developed a decidedly *subjective* approach toward history. To overcome the idea of objectivism also was the ambition of large parts of 20<sup>th</sup> century continental philosophers (then in a setting that was no longer committed to objectivism at all), who took the task of the historian (or the interpreter, respectively) to “destroy” (Martin Heidegger) or to “deconstruct” (Jacques Derrida) history, rather than to *reconstruct* it.

Besides these programmatic aspects of historicism it also possessed an important *methodological* perspective. Each variety of historicism was closely tied to a certain variety of *hermeneutics*, the method of *understanding*. The formula is very simple: early objectivist historicists were strongly committed to objectivist hermeneutics, whereas later subjectivists developed more subjectivist conceptions (some of them being utterly at odds with the earlier varieties). Hermeneutics emerged as *the* methodology of the humanities in German-speaking Europe already in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century when historicism was not yet in play. Classical philologists like August Boeckh and “positivist” theologians like Friedrich Schleiermacher developed hermeneutics as a method to reconstruct the very meaning of remote sources such as the poetry of ancient Greek and the Bible. This method was based on the idea of *analogical conclusion*. We learn understanding in the course of private communication with others. These “elementary forms of understanding” (Dilthey) provide the main principles to decipher the utterances of others. We assume that people in different cultures behave similarly to some extent and try to figure out the differences, on a strictly empirical basis. Thus to understand the poem of an ancient lyricist we firstly have to study all kinds of sources that allow us to reconstruct ancient language, art, politics, economy, warfare, as well as all kinds of aspects of the ancients’ everyday life. On the basis of these comprehensive studies – indeed, the development of a universal *encyclopedia of the ancient*

*world* – we reread the poem and only then try to grasp the authors intention intuitively. Intuition (“Gefühl”) does play a role in the hermeneutics of Boeckh and Schleiermacher, but in a very restricted sense. It constitutes only the final step of the process of understanding, where the hermeneuticist has to trust her “intuition which bases itself on the [perceived] similarity with the explanandum” (Boeckh et al 1886: 86). This final step can be successful only because it is conditioned by the accumulated empirical knowledge of the subject matter. This process of accumulation is somewhat circular, to be sure, because most of the empirical sources in question are *historical texts* and therefore have to be rendered accessible by means of hermeneutics in themselves. This “hermeneutic circle” (the term was invented by Boeckh), however, does not hamper the possibility of understanding but rather is said to lead to a gradual sharpening of hermeneutic skills and a more holistic picture of historical knowledge (as in Otto Neurath’s boat or W.V.O. Quine’s web of belief). A consequence of this cumulative conception is that historians often know significantly more about the historical context than the historical actors and can exceed and correct their self-understanding for these actors are *limited* by the inaccessibility of numerous economical, political, etc. aspects of the historical context which become visible only afterwards. This is the core feature of the objectivist and “positivist” conception of hermeneutics. Not only is it possible to grasp the meaning of a historical utterance in the way it was intended by the utterer, but, under certain conditions, it is possible to grasp that meaning even more comprehensively than the utterer herself. The role of intuition is strictly limited insofar as empirical knowledge (i) allows distinguishing between good and bad intuition (the latter being based on insufficient knowledge) and (ii) restricts intuition to those intuitive scenarios of “elementary forms of understanding” familiar to the hermeneuticist from her everyday communication.

The limitation of Boeckh's objectivist conception of hermeneutics was, according to Dilthey and other historicists,<sup>1</sup> that the process of accumulation of historical knowledge was thought to terminate at some point. Then, our knowledge, according to Boeckh, would be complete and perfect and final understanding of historical sources would have been attained. Although the aprioricists (Lotze, Windelband, Rickert) held similar views, the empirically-minded historicists thought that different contexts of investigation may lead to different outcomes and therefore rejected the idea of complete knowledge. However, even Dilthey and his allies shared the hypotheses that objective understanding is possible and that a hermeneuticist is able to understand a historical figure even better than she understood herself. Understanding can never be *final*, for Dilthey, but it can be objective and so objectively true or false (viz. relative to a certain context of investigation c\*). Dilthey's hermeneutics reduce extremely complex and remote historical scenarios to situations accessible to simple intuitions about cases of everyday communication. The "eunochoid objectivity" mocked by Droysen is exactly what "positivist" hermeneuticists like Dilthey had in mind.

The later development of (post-objectivist) hermeneutics in the 20<sup>th</sup> century must be divided into at least two different currents. There is hermeneutics as developed by students and followers of Dilthey such as Eduard Spranger and Otto Friedrich Bollnow who rejected the strong connection Boeckh and Dilthey saw between the natural sciences and the human sciences (historical

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. (Dilthey 1996, 256): "Boeckh is correct in saying that philology is 'the knowledge of what has been produced by the human spirit.' When he paradoxically adds that this involves 'the knowledge of past knowledge,' then this paradox rests on the false presupposition that what is known and what is produced are the same. In reality, all human powers cooperate in productivity, and there is more than knowledge in a poem or in a letter by St. Paul."

encyclopaediae consist of empirical source studies and the collection of hard facts). For Spranger, the human sciences had to be developed in complete isolation from the natural sciences and the role of intuition was much enhanced (the term “Einfühlung”, crucial for Spranger, did not play any significant role in Boeckh or Dilthey<sup>2</sup>). Bollnow supplemented his radically subjective conception of understanding with a notion of “objectivity” that no longer meant intersubjectivity and general validity but “appropriateness”: there is true and objective knowledge which is not generally valid but restricted to a single knower (say, an epistemic “Führer”). Spranger and Bollnow took hermeneutics to form an exclusive alternative to the natural sciences and their epistemology of general validity. The second important current of 20<sup>th</sup> century hermeneutics is more explicitly directed against Dilthey. Philosophers like Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jürgen Habermas rejected Dilthey’s “positivist self-misunderstanding” (Habermas) and replaced Dilthey’s “sovereign” notion of understanding (Gadamer) with the romanticism of “encountering the incomprehensible”. The most radical forms of anti-objectivist hermeneutics represented Heidegger and Derrida for whom the subject and with it objectivity (in the sense of general validity of analogical conclusions between different minds) disappears: *reconstruction* becomes replaced with (arbitrary) *deconstruction*.

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<sup>2</sup> Dilthey, in particular, does not use the term “Einfühlung” at all. Rather, he talks about “Nachfühlen” which is decidedly different from “Einfühlung” insofar as “Einfühlung” is essentially subjective whereas “Nachfühlen” is essentially objective: “the entire science of philology and of history is based on the presupposition that such reunderstanding of what is singular [“Nachverständnis des Singulären”] can be raised to objectivity.” (Dilthey 1996, 235).

This historical development is, I believe, very important for gaining a proper assessment of the Logical Empiricists' stance toward hermeneutics and historicism, for some early Logical Empiricists (Carnap and Neurath) were deeply influenced by (and for some time even committed to) *objectivist* varieties of historicism and hermeneutics, whereas all Logical Empiricists always rejected all non-objectivist versions of historicism and hermeneutics. The logical empiricist reception of historicism and hermeneutic belongs to the rare but important cases of receptions of objectivism unshaken by 20<sup>th</sup> century trends of subjectivism, deconstructivism, postmodernism. Logical Empiricism appears to be compatible with only one of the various different appearances of hermeneutics and historicism, namely, empirically-minded objectivism.

		<b>Objectivism</b>	<b>Non-Objectivism</b>
<b>Analogical conclusion possible and crucial</b>	<i>Cumulative objective knowledge plus a limited amount of "Gefühl" (Boeckh)</i>	APRIORICISM Lotze, Windelband, Rickert	
		EMPIRICALLY-MINDED Steinthal, Lazarus, Cohen, Dilthey	EMOTIVISM Droysen, Treitschke
<b>Analogical conclusion possible though not crucial</b>	<i>Overwhelming importance of "Einfühlung",</i>		GENIUS- OR FÜHRER-OBJECTIVITY Spranger, Bollnow
<b>Analogical conclusion impossible</b>	<i>empirical knowledge relatively irrelevant</i>		ANTI-POSITIVIST HERMENEUTICS Gadamer, Habermas

<b>or irrelevant</b>	<i>Entire irrelevance of the “subject”</i>		DE(CON)STRUCTIVISM Heidegger, Derrida
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### 3. Carnap: hermeneutics in the *Aufbau*

Carnap’s *Der Logische Aufbau der Welt* (Carnap 1928, henceforth: *Aufbau*) has a complex history. The first version was written before Carnap came to Vienna in 1926: the bulk of it was submitted to the Viennese faculty of philosophy for his habilitation in December 1925. The published version of 1928 contains a foreword that was written under the direct influence of the Viennese discussions (and Otto Neurath, in particular) and also the final five paragraphs of the book seem to be heavily influenced by the Viennese discussions (and by Carnap’s reading of Wittgenstein). The major parts of the book, however, to the best of our knowledge, were hardly revised after 1925: it seems that Carnap made radical cuts (the first version consisted of 226 sections, the published version has only 183) but did not alter the existing text in any substantial way (Damböck 2017: §5.2). That the *Aufbau* was written mostly independently of the Viennese context is underscored by the fact that Carnap prepared important aspects of it already before 1925—and even before 1922/23 where he first got in touch with Hans Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, and Otto Neurath. The first sketches for the *Aufbau* date from 1920, written in the course of discussions Carnap had with his friends from the Jena Sera-Circle (a variety of the German Youth Movement) at his house in Buchenbach near Freiburg (Dahms 2016). All of these early discussion partners—the sociologist Hans Freyer, the art historian Franz Roh, the pedagogue Wilhelm Flitner—belonged to the Dilthey school. It is not surprising then that Diltheyian notions

dominate Carnap's early sketch of the "skeleton of the theory of knowledge" (ASP RC 081-05-04).

The "primary given", according to Carnap's 1920 sketch, are the "experiences" ("Erlebnisse") or "facts of consciousness" ("Bewusstseinstatsachen"). Like "elementary experiences" in the *Aufbau* these elementary phenomenal facts comprise all mental phenomena we could ever be party to. Some of these experiences are intentional: they have "objects" and are called "representations" ("Vorstellungen"); some representations, in turn, are sensory experiences ("Empfindungen"). The objects of representations are either (other) representations or physical objects. One distinguished physical object is "my body". "Others" have similarities with "my body": "Some sequences of physical events of my body are often simultaneous with certain sequences of experiences; if I find sequences of events in other bodies then I produce the fiction that even their 'experiences of another self' occur." (ASP RC 081-05-04)

Two aspects of this treatment are retained in the published version of *Aufbau*. First, the comprehensiveness of "experiences": the task is to distinguish and reconstruct those different modes of experience. Second, one crucial step in the course of these reconstructions is the step from one's own to other minds. What allows this step is the "fiction" of analogical inference. Thus the *Aufbau* can be regarded as a hermeneutic conception in a two ways. The entire group of so-called *higher spheres*—heteropsychological, intersubjective and scientific objects—are constituted by means of analogical inference. In other words, there is no behaviorism in the *Aufbau*: behavior is only *the bridge* that allows us to draw analogical conclusions *between different minds* (another option would be physiology § 140). The other hermeneutic aspect in the *Aufbau* is represented by the fundamental notion of *elementary experiences*. Crucially, the employment of elementary experiences lead to a more comprehensive notion of the empirical than is typically found in

classical British and French empiricism and includes not only sense-data but all kinds of mental phenomena. In this Carnap follows the empirically-minded objectivist hermeneuticists.

#### 4. Neurath's hermeneutic conception of history

Unlike Carnap, who implemented hermeneutics on a rather ahistorical level—the constitution of other minds via analogical conclusion—the hermeneutic aspects in Neurath's (early) philosophy also comprise the historical perspective. Neurath studied in Berlin in the early 1900s, among others, with Georg Simmel, and Friedrich Paulsen. His dissertation from 1906 was supervised by the ancient historian Eduard Meyer and the economist Gustav Schmoller (Sandner 2014, p. 34-48), both key representatives of hermeneutics and historicism of an objectivist fashion. In his dissertation, Neurath interprets a passage from Cicero in a typically historicist way, uncovering the various different historical perspectives on Cicero's text, being inevitably based on analogies between the recent world of the historian and the historical period in question (Neurath 1998: 109), i.e., Neurath defends objectivist hermeneutic, but one that covers the different perspectives that emerge from different historical contexts; he is by no means an aprioricist, in the sense of Rickert or Windelband but is empirically-minded. Early Neurath also refers to Boeckh, highlighting the importance of the latter's encyclopedic treatment of ancient history (Uebel unpublished manuscript), and he refers to other important representatives of an objectivist and encyclopedic treatment of philology and universal history such as Wolf, Niebuhr, Droysen (ibid.: 143).

Neurath's famous *Anti-Spengler* from 1921 is a powerful defense of an objectivist conception of hermeneutics, against Spengler's subjectivist approach (cf., in particular, the final passage Neurath 1981: 182-96). Neurath does not criticize the very idea of universal history as adopted by

Spengler, but his relativistic method. Whereas the *good* relativism of historicism assumes that historical understanding must be based on analogical conclusion (and therefore is always relative to some degree to the context where understanding takes place) the *bad* relativism (viz. Spengler's) rejects the idea of analogical conclusion as a whole and replaces it with an appeal to the power of the interpretive genius.

Subjectivist hermeneutics, for Neurath, does not only lead to fictitious results, it is self-contradictory. Neurath illustrates the latter by means of a brief dialogue from Tschuang-Tse that was chosen by Neurath as a motto of *Anti-Spengler*. The key idea of this motto is iterated in Neurath's work over and over again: understanding *presupposes* analogical conclusion. Both understanding *and* the claim of the impossibility of understanding are based on analogical conclusions: they both prove the possibility of understanding. "If Spengler knows that we always misunderstand, he must believe himself free of misunderstanding, because he does not keep silent about other cultures, but also talks about them." (Neurath 1981: 189) *q.e.d.*

Beside of its subjective nature, Spengler's account, according to Neurath, suffers from another typical failure of historical accounts being devoid of analogical conclusions, namely "pseudorationalism" (ibid.: 191). Spengler does not adopt intuition, in the good sense, as a "sober" attitude, a "clear and comprehensive *Anschauung* that lacks proofs or even provability". Rather, Spengler's "immoderateness" (ibid.: 188) leads to a conception where intuition becomes entirely nebulous, "clarity" becomes replaced with talk of "mysterious connections" (ibid.: 192).

Most importantly, Neurath's rejection of Spengler's subjectivist hermeneutics and historicism also converges with his famous "holism". The metaphor of Neurath's boat, which became famous as a key element of his later protocol sentence theory, already shows up in the just cited passage of *Anti-Spengler*. "We are like sailors, who have to rebuild their boat at the open sea

but cannot do it freshly, from the bottom up. Where a bar becomes removed, a new one immediately must supersede, and thereby the rest of the ship is used as support.” (ibid.: 184) Remarkably, the context of this early appearance of the boat metaphor is Spengler’s “immoderate” exaggeration of relativism. Our actions suffer from overestimations of commonalities between “people who communicate” but it is no less impaired by an *underestimation* of the possibility of understanding. Thus, the boat metaphor illustrates nothing else than the only possible encyclopedic (or holistic) solution to the hermeneutic circle: each single act of understanding has to be based on all of our knowledge and at the same time modifies and increases it (when a plank is replaced). Neurath mentions Duhem as his witness here but there can be no doubt that his own practice of objectivist hermeneutics forms the background of this key passage of *Anti-Spengler*. The subject is not the natural sciences but history, the human sciences, and the possibility of objective understanding; he is following Boeckh and his Berlin teachers here as much as Duhem.

##### 5. Logical Empiricism from 1929 onwards: empathy-skepticism

From the late 1920s onward, Neurath, Carnap and their followers (Hempel, in particular) became increasingly critical of hermeneutics and the possibility of an empathy-driven branch of science. Spengler was a main target here, but possibly even Neurath’s adored teacher Eduard Meyer, who became a strong advocate and defender of Spengler in the early 1920s (Meyer 1925). The discussions with Karl Bühler might also have played an important role here: Bühler was a strong defender of objectivist historicism and hermeneutics and he rejected Spranger’s tendencies to divide the human and the natural sciences (cf. Bühler 2000: §8). Bühler, Carnap, and Neurath had various discussions, on the topic of understanding and construction of other minds. Carnap mentions these discussions several times in his diary, between 1925 and 1934. For example, at June

4, 1930 he discussed with Bühler and Lazarfeld: “Possibility of a behavioristic and nevertheless intersubjectively verifiable psychology of experience” (ASP RC 025-73-04). One could also rephrase this topic as “possibility of an objectivist hermeneutics” (being affirmatively received by both Carnap and his discussion partners). Bühler, Carnap, and Neurath certainly diverged with respect to key elements of the Vienna Circles discussions such as the protocol sentence debate. But there is no indication that they diverged with respect to their shared objectivist attitude towards hermeneutics. Finally, Neurath’s criticism of Max Weber was also an important motive for his rejection of aspects of historicism. Here, however, the point of criticism was not subjectivism, though, but rather the opposite: Neurath accused Weber of being a representative of Rickert-style a prioricism (Platonism) (Uebel unpublished manuscript).

What Carnap and Neurath actually rejected when they rejected empathy after 1929 were autonomous subjective forms of understanding that were no longer based on analogical conclusion at all, i.e., those varieties of “anti-positivist” hermeneutics that became dominant in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, from Spengler, Spranger, Heidegger, Bollnow, until Gadamer, Habermas, and Derrida. Logical Empiricism is clearly incompatible with any understanding of understanding that is not basically identical with analogical conclusion. Because understanding and the humanities as a whole shifted away from the idea of analogical conclusion, during the 1920, and developed a “pseudorationalist” conception of empathy as a method of grasping the “unintelligible” (Gadamer) and the “mysterious” (Spengler), Logical Empiricism could not but demur. Their entirely critical reception of (pseudorationalist) empathy was formulated for the first time in the Vienna Circle’s manifesto (Verein Ernst Mach 1929), and then in various writings of Neurath and Carnap, from 1928 onward. However, close readings allow us to distinguish in all these cases between a negative attitude towards empathy (“Einfühlung”) that does not rely on analogical conclusion and a positive

reception of understanding and intuition as being based on analogical conclusion. After 1945, one can find two diverging developments. The orthodoxy of Logical Empiricism (Hempel, until the late 1950, and younger authors such as Theodore Abel and Richard Rudner) takes the hypothetico-deductive conception to be entirely incompatible with the method of understanding (in all its varieties). From the late 1950s onward, however, Hempel develops more careful analyses that pick up the notion of analogical conclusion in a positive way again and try to show that the latter could be very well compatible with the hypothetico-deductive conception (Uebel 2009).

## 6. The Argument from Analogy Revisited

Analogical inference allows us to talk about the mental states of others and to set up a framework that consistently allows us to distinguish between understanding and misunderstanding. Carnap's and Neurath's use of this form of reasoning makes clear that they were not possessed of eliminativist ambitions. But if, as has recently been argued, reading Carnap as a logical behaviourist who reductively defines mental states in terms of behavioral manifestations is mistaken (Crawford 2013), then question arises how he and Neurath could respond to criticism common since Ryle (1949) that analogical inference to other minds is fallacious. Would they have been happy to follow Ayer's defense of it (1956, 219-222) and able to improve upon it? Probably not, because neither Carnap and Neurath nor Dilthey used the argument from analogy for a (logical or ontological) *proof* of the existence of other minds. Rather, they used arguments from analogy because everything in the empirical world is *as if* other minds existed. Whether they *really* exist or not is something that these philosophers did not care about at all. They only needed a sound background for their framework that involves talk about other minds, understanding and misunderstanding. Here, arguments from analogy proved to be the best available framework.

## 7. Further Reading

On the history of historicism and objectivist hermeneutics as well as the Diltheyian and historicist background of Carnap see (Damböck 2017): all references to material discussed in sections 2 and 3 of this chapter can be found there. On Dilthey and Carnap see also (Dahms 2016; Damböck 2012; Gabriel 2004). On Neurath's conception of understanding see (Uebel unpublished manuscript); on later Logical Empiricist accounts of understanding see (Uebel 2009).

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