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Menschliche Fähigkeiten und komplexe Behinderungen

Philosophie und
Sonderpädagogik
im Gespräch mit
Martha Nussbaum

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Unterstützt durch das Human Dynamics Centre
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Complex Disabilities Caused by the Enemy: Martha Nussbaum's Theory of Anger as a Contribution to War Ethics

Angela Kallhoff

The number of people who have been mutilated and who have been harmed severely and irreversibly in wars is breathtaking. Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International) provides frequent reports on disabilities and severe impairments resulting from war.¹ This non-governmental organization produces frequent reports on war zones. It also supports people with disabilities and other vulnerable populations living in conflict and disaster zones and in situations of exclusion and extreme poverty. In a recent report, *Syria, a mutilated future*, it documents physical and mental injuries in the Syrian war. The data was collected by Humanity & Inclusion and Partners through direct interviews with internally displaced persons² and refugees in hospitals and rehabilitation centers, in camps and communities in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon between June 2013 and December 2015.³ An overview states:

- Among 25,000 persons with injuries assessed by Humanity & Inclusion teams, 67 % sustained injuries directly related to the crises; among them, 20 % are women, 16 % are children and 8 % are elderly.

1 For information on this organization and its activities, see [<http://www.hi-us.org/>].

2 By Internally Displaced Person (IDP), we refer to "people or groups of people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border". See report Humanity & Inclusion, "Syria, a mutilated future", p. 12.

3 As for the methods, limitations have also been taken into account: "The analysis is based on a total of 68,049 beneficiaries assessed by Humanity & Inclusion teams. Among them, 25,097 are people with injuries: 14,471 in Syria, 7,823 in Jordan, and 2,803 in Lebanon." (ibid. p. 10) Limitations have also been recognized: "Information used for this factsheet was found through Humanity & Inclusion's identification mechanisms that focus on the most vulnerable, including people with injuries and people with disabilities, and on the areas where Humanity & Inclusion is active. Therefore it should not be considered as a comprehensive picture of the situation of the whole Syrian population. For the same reason, the findings presented cannot be extrapolated from the sample of assessed people to the wider refugee and IDPs population. The data provided on psychological impact should be handled with care since the sample chosen for the analysis is small compared to the total number of beneficiaries." (ibid., p. 11).

- Among the injuries sustained as a result of the crisis, 53 % are due to the use of explosive weapons. This large number is particularly appalling.
- 89 % of people with injuries due to the use of explosive weapons have permanent or temporary physical impairments.
- In Syria, more than 50 % of public hospitals and health centers are only either partially functioning or closed (World Health Organization, December 2015). This lack of access to health services multiplies the impact of explosive weapons.
- 80 % of people injured by explosive weapons expressed signs of high psychological distress.
- 66 % of them were unable to carry out essential daily activities because of their feelings of fear, anger, fatigue, disinterest and hopelessness. As for the Syrian war, the suffering from the effects of war is particularly deep.

In a section entitled “A Toll on the Mental Health and Wellbeing that Cannot be Ignored”, the same report states:⁴

- 75 % of children under 5 assessed felt so afraid that nothing could calm them down, 66 % of adults felt so angry that they felt out of control and so afraid that nothing could calm them down;
- More than 50 % of the people with injuries due to explosive weapons felt uninterested in things that they used to like, and 66 % were unable to carry out essential daily activities because of their feelings of fear, anger, fatigue, disinterest and hopelessness;
- 65 % were so upset that they tried to avoid places, people, conversations or activities that reminded them of the traumatic event.

In short, the suffering of civil victims in war is horrifying.

This article focuses on one aspect of recent debates of war in philosophy and ethics. War ethics has traditionally focused on debates about just and unjust causes of war, i.e., the rules of a fair fight in war.⁵ Recently, this already rich debate has been supplemented by a variety of new elements, including a discussion on combatants and the assessment of soldiers’ actions in war.⁶ In that context, disabilities of veterans have – with some exceptions – not been discussed. But in order to discuss post-

4 Ibid , p. 7.

5 For an overview of the debates in ethics since ancient philosophy, see Bellamy 2006; an introduction to the most important pieces of current and orthodox war theory is delivered by Frowe 2011.

6 This discussion is broad. It includes an examination of the legitimization of killing in war (Rodin 2002; 2008; Lazar 2009; McMahan 2011) and a focus on issues of moral fault, justified excuses and moral obligations of soldiers (Rodin/Shue 2010).

war scenarios that contribute to healing the wounds of war, this needs to be done. This article tries to build a bridge between an assessment of these particular types of disabilities, summarized in the title as “complex disabilities caused by the enemy”, and recent philosophical insights of Martha C. Nussbaum. Nussbaum not only theorizes an approach to ethics that takes the “human condition” including impairments and disabilities seriously. She also develops an ethics which is rich in proposals for transcending the gulf between a “normal life” and situations characterized by severe limitations (see Nussbaum 2002; 2006). In particular, she develops a theory of emotions which helps to interpret the feelings of persons and the reactions to impediments accordingly. The main source for starting this discussion is her recent book on *Anger and Forgiveness* (Nussbaum 2016). In this article I shall test and apply some of her insights on the emotion of anger to the experiences of war victims.

I have three aims: *Firstly*, I wish to remind us in the context of this volume and in the context of debates on disabilities that a huge number of disabilities result from the intent and actions of actors in the context of military and paramilitary action. People are constantly wounded and inflicted with severe disabilities in war all over the world. The Syrian war is just one example of this situation. Unfortunately, there are many more examples.

Secondly, I think that Martha Nussbaum’s exploration of emotions has much to say about injuries of warfare. Even though she herself does not – to the best of my knowledge – relate her studies of the emotions explicitly to war, many of her insights should be heard in that context. Nussbaum explores emotions and presents new insights in the ethics of emotions, particularly on anger, which help to frame both the emotions and the effects of war on victims of war. In this paper, I shall try to develop a correspondence between wounds inflicted in war scenarios and Nussbaum’s proposals and insights in her theory of anger and forgiveness. This is not a conclusive approach but an attempt to start a conversation between two strands of thought which are usually not related to each other.

Thirdly, I wish to connect this discussion with a theoretical claim. Today, war ethics is an expanding field of discussion. Yet, it is not enough to discuss the issues of “just war” vs. “unjust war” anew. Instead, it is also important to reassess the effects of war on combatants and civilians. And in this regard, the implications and ideas of Martha Nussbaum’s recent approach on anger (Nussbaum 2016) are particularly instructive. Whereas Nussbaum’s proposals for framing and rethinking inclusion are usually related to discussions of her capabilities-approach, I wish to highlight another possible line of thought. Disabilities that result from sources

other than destiny arouse emotions, including feelings of anger and possibly also of revenge. Nussbaum's approach might help survivors of war to find a way to get beyond these reactions and feelings. On the level of theory, this discussion also supports philosophers in rethinking policies in post-war ethics.

This paper has four sections. The first section explains one way to interpret how injuries in war and their assessment in war ethics cling together. Whereas war ethics usually has a much more specific scope, including the important issues of just causes and rules of fair fighting in war, I wish to defend another claim. Today, war ethics has already become a field that discusses many different issues, including the ethical implication of killing in war (McMahan 2011), non-state elements of war practices, such as torture and terror (Shue 1978; Sussman 2005; Kamm 2011), and what might be called the exceptional morality in warfare (French 2011). War ethics already transcends the themes of a classical just war theory in many respects. In exploring the relationship between war injuries and morality, this paper adds another aspect in a quickly developing field of research. Section two portrays some of the key insights of Martha Nussbaum on anger. Whereas the emotions have recently gained much attention in philosophy, Nussbaum's recent book opens a new field in focusing on anger. It is not my goal to recite Nussbaum's insights on anger, but to highlight elements that might be helpful in war ethics that is a broad field of research. Section three builds the bridge between anger and war injuries. It argues that anger needs to be discussed as an important element of the emotions of war victims. Section four gives the conclusion and argues why and how the insights of Martha Nussbaum on anger and forgiveness in particular may contribute to rethinking the suffering of war victims. Possibly, Nussbaum's approach to anger can offer ways of how to heal the emotional wounds of war victims.

1. Bridging the Gap: War Injuries and War Ethics

Since ancient times, war and war-like events have been debated in philosophy (see Bellamy 2006). In this context, moral implications of warfare have been explored. War is of course related to claims of guilt and moral fault, to debates about human nature and to the deep question of its necessity. In the 20th century, war ethics has received a new foundation. In what Michael Walzer calls a "war convention" (Walzer 2006, 44; 127–222), central claims have been argued in a moral and legal framing. Among the most important claims is that war is forbidden except for wars that are fought for reasons of self-defense. A "legalist paradigm" (see *ibid.*, 61–63) out-

lines the international rules of a war ethics that was elaborated by the international community before and in the aftermath of WWII.

Recently, this panorama has been enriched in many ways. Researchers in ethics have developed what might be called a new war ethics. As a response to the fact that recent wars need to be distinguished from former national wars, scholars now explore the so-called “new wars” (Münkler 2015). In particular, the legalist paradigm in war ethics has also been called into question. Even though criteria for framing war by legal and moral rules are still the backbone of war ethics, many more elements have been added (Frowe 2011). In the context of new war ethics, researchers have also focused on the actions of combatants. Instead of limiting war ethics to rules that help to frame military conflicts in a legal and moral way – which is still the most important part of war ethics –, issues of guilt, remorse, commitment etc. have become part of the discussion.⁷

One specific trait of this recent turn in the discussion of war ethics is also the debate on the role and the purposes of soldiers in war, including their obligation to kill in specific situations (Kallhoff and Schulte-Umberg 2015; Rodin 2008; Rodin and Shue 2010). Even though many aspects of this latest discussion are new, they do not aim at providing a new theory of war ethics. Instead, they serve as supplements of the war convention that also provides the baseline of international law. In particular, more attention has been paid to the soldiers’ obligations in war. Whereas the legalist paradigm focuses on the military and on nations fighting a war against each other, recent discussion in war ethics tries to develop a fair approach to the actions of soldiers in war.

In addition, a new understanding of the impact of war injuries on the life of combatants might be helpful in supporting another recent focus in war ethics. Even though it is difficult to argue an approach to international ethics that denies the reality of wars, authors in war ethics have started to develop arguments for an approach that rejects military violence altogether, at least as part of a post-war scenario (Fabre 2016; Holmes 2016). In order to overcome the effects of war, it is important not only to discuss institutional arrangements for post-war scenarios, but also the emotional wounds of persons who are victims of war.

It is also important to shape the scope of this exploration in another respect. Obviously, war is not only bad in many respects, but war is “hell”. Besides the com-

⁷ For examples of what I have termed new war ethics, see Holmes 2016; French 2011; Kamm 2011; McMahan 2011; Fabre 2012. This list is far from exhaustive but is intended to give an idea of this new discussion.

pletely unjustified hurting and killing of civil victims, which is indeed condemned by war ethics and international law in particular, soldiers and combatants also suffer severe harm in war.⁸ However, their role differs in many respects from the situation of civilians. In focusing on this group, three recent strands of thought in war ethics can be distinguished.

Firstly, it has been debated how the acts of soldiers in war need to be assessed in moral terms. In particular, rules of fair fight which are classically argued in the “Jus in Bello” (Frowe 2011, 95–117) do not suffice to answer this question. Are soldiers ever justified in doing what they do? Where are the limits of justification and of guilt (Rodin and Shue 2010)? In this paper, I do *not* intend to focus on this debate since it is one of the most complex issues in recent war theory.

Secondly, I shall presuppose that it is part of the soldier's obligations to wound and sometimes even to kill soldiers who figure as “enemies”. Whether or not this claim is justified is part of a difficult moral exploration, and one that I do not intend to focus on. Overall, scholars in just war theory agree that the actions of soldiers, including killing in war, need to be justified and morally explored (McMahan 2011). There is no “free pass” for soldiers in war. In particular, exceptional allowances to fight and to kill are restricted by “Jus in bello”. The internationally agreed regulations include a list of legitimate targets, exempting civilians, and legitimate tactics (Frowe 2011, 103–117). In addition, philosophers agree that the situation of soldiers in war is in many respects exceptional; yet, this does not exempt actions in war from moral exploration – in particular also in the aftermath of a war. Whereas epistemic as well as moral limitations are granted (Shue 2008), the issue of justified excuses also needs to be settled, particularly when judging a war *ex post* as “unjust” (Lichtenberg 2008).

Thirdly, each war has an aftermath which is different from normal life for all victims and participants in war. Recently, discussion on post-war scenarios has also been taken up by philosophers who explicate the conditions of peace in a post-war scenario (Fabre 2016; Holmes 2016). Especially in scenarios of civil war and war among parties that share a territory, peace orders need to be established with care. Philosophers deliver concepts and criteria not only for rules and norms, but also for coping with post-war scenarios in a very basic sense. In a remarkable recent explo-

8 It should be noted that one of the still central and internationally agreed norms is that self-defense of a nation when endangered by a military attack that threatens sovereignty and integrity of the nation state is still the only unquestionably accepted just cause for military intervention; see Frowe 2011, 29–49. Exceptions that have been argued for include humanitarian intervention and responses to military attacks by terrorists.

ration of post-war scenarios, Cécile Fabre has proposed theoretical ingredients in ending wars, in peacekeeping and military occupation, peace-agreements, punishment and reconciliation (Fabre 2016). This paper tries to start a conversation between this recent line of thought and Martha Nussbaum's insights in anger in a specific way. The discussion focuses on combatants who have been wounded in war. This is a very specific focus, yet one that gives a rather precise idea of what it means for war victims not only to suffer from severe disabilities, but also to experience anger. In particular, this scenario appears to have an affinity to war morals in an understanding that differs from classical war ethics and adds to new war ethics an important insight.

In an investigation of the experiences of war veterans from recent wars, Nancy Sherman explains that it is particularly important to veterans whether or not the wars they fought were "just wars". In *The Untold War. Inside The Hearts, Minds, and Souls of Our Soldiers*, Sherman (2010) discusses experiences of war veterans in the US. She conducts interviews with them and draws a close link between personal experiences of traumas and of having been wounded in war on the one hand, and the attempts of military personnel to cope with them on the other. In particular, she builds a bridge between a moral assessment of warfare through the lenses of soldiers and now-veterans and what happened to them. This includes reports of Sherman's father, at the time of her study a veteran of WWII. She claims that in order to overcome war trauma it is particularly important for veterans to regard their own fight as part of an endeavor that was in general a "just war" or at least a particularly worthwhile enterprise at that time. In this light, Sherman comments on the reports of her father:

In his case, he does have time to reflect, and wonders if the fight is worth the horrific ruin and devastation he anticipates and then sees up close in dying men and mutilated bodies. That sense of his own responsibility for the specific war he fights is there, whether he talks about it openly or not. The worry is about proportionality, the ratio of the good anticipated to all the carnage. Is it worth it? In the war he fought, he believes it was, then and now, as most do. But the point I am making is that the moral oversight is internal. Yes, it is not just about what he did as an individual soldier, in his case, administering inoculations and relief to the war-torn and maimed. It is also about the war he was in. That frames his perspective and his responsibility. (Sherman 2010, 46)

Insights into the need to transcend war traumas in an after-war scenario also by means of addressing the issues of "just war" once again provide a background

against which I wish to discuss a particularly complex issue: What happens when combatants have been wounded by the enemy and suffer lasting disabilities? It has been stressed recently that experiences of combatants resonate with issues of guilt and innocence, among others. Yet, in this analysis it also becomes apparent that the reports also need to be discussed with respect to the issues of anger and forgiveness.

Before taking a closer look at these issues, I first wish to introduce some elements of Martha Nussbaum's recent interpretation of anger.

2. Martha Nussbaum on Anger

This section starts with a short introduction of some of the elements of Martha Nussbaum's complex theory of emotions. It is not my goal to give a comprehensive interpretation of what has been labelled a "cognitivist theory of emotions". Instead I shall highlight some elements that help to interpret the theory of anger in an appropriate way.

Martha Nussbaum's theory of emotion includes a paradigmatic case for emotional responses. This is the experience of "deep dependency". In her theories of the emotions, it is a recurrent theme that emotions are responsive in character. In *Emotions and the Origins of Morality* Nussbaum (2005, 61–117)⁹ outlines a psychological approach that also includes insights in early child development: She argues that children are at a very early stage aware of their dependency; through reactions of anger they try to cope with the experience of extreme asymmetric relationships to the persons nourishing and caring for them (Nussbaum 2005, 76–79). It appears as if the deep experience of dependency is on a par with the experience of helplessness and vulnerability of a single person (Nussbaum 2001, 70–73). Emotions help to cope with this frustrating and irritating basic experience. In *Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance* Nussbaum states: "Emotions are thus, in effect, acknowledgments of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency." (Nussbaum 2004, 185)

However, this is only one, yet basic aspect of Nussbaum's theory of emotions. She also holds the view that emotions come close to judgments; sometimes it even looks as if they were judgments by their very nature. In *Political Emotions. Why Love Matters for Justice*, Martha Nussbaum slightly corrects her former view that emotions are "judgments", even though having always stated that this is not perfectly correct in that emotions are not linguistically formulated or formulable. She now prefers the concept of "thoughts" (Nussbaum 2013, 142). This again has several

9 This text was first published in Nussbaum 2001, 174–237, under the title: *Emotions and Infancy*.

aspects. Overall, Nussbaum sets herself apart from theories of the emotions that regard them as either more or less stable reaction patterns which are triggered by events. Following Nussbaum, emotions are not “*pathé*”, but cognitive events. She also sets her theory apart from theories that set emotions on a par with beliefs (Nussbaum 2004, 188–191). Even though sharing with judgments and beliefs the character of being “about something”, the aboutness is correlated with value judgments that highlight the importance of the object. In particular, emotions have distinct ways of how the object is perceived.

It is to be stressed that this aboutness [of emotions] is part of the identity of the emotions. What distinguishes fear from hope, fear from grief, love from hate – is not so much the identity of the object, which might not change, but the way the object is perceived: in fear, as a threat, but with some chance for escape; in hope, as in some uncertainty, but with a chance for a good outcome; in grief as lost; in love as invested with a special sort of radiance. (Nussbaum 2004, 188)

In particular, Nussbaum’s theory of emotions also sides in an important respect with Aristotle’s approach to the emotions. In his *Rhetoric* (book II, chs. 2–11), Aristotle explores the content of emotions, in particular emotions that are invoked in tragedies and as part of his theory of catharsis (see Rapp 2002, vol. 2, 553). Aristotle holds not only that emotions have “aboutness”, but also that some emotions come with certain beliefs. Nussbaum shares the view that those beliefs can – at least regarding some emotions – be portrayed in a universal way. As for anger, she states:

In order to have anger, I must have an even more complex set of beliefs [more complex than in fear]: that there has been some damage to me or to something or someone close to me; that the damage is not trivial but significant; that it was done by someone; that it was done willingly; that it would be right for the perpetrator of the damage to be punished. It is plausible to assume that each element of this set of beliefs is necessary in order for anger to be present [...]. (Nussbaum 2004, 188)

These few comments about a complex theory of emotions are helpful in order to interpret anger along those lines. I shall first recall general features of Martha Nussbaum’s theory of anger. A more detailed exploration will follow when addressing war victims.

In her analysis of anger, Nussbaum starts with the ancient view that anger is a notion that resonates with concepts of serious wrongs done, but also with restitution or punishment. In *Anger and Forgiveness*, Nussbaum states:

Concurring with a long philosophical tradition that includes Aristotle, the Greek and Roman Stoics, and Bishop Butler, I argue that anger includes, conceptually not only the idea of a serious wrong done to someone or something of significance, but also the idea that it would be a good thing if the wrongdoer suffered some bad consequences of somehow. Each of these thoughts must be qualified in complex ways, but that's the essence of the analysis. I then argue that anger, so understood, is always normatively problematic in one or the other of two possible ways. (Nussbaum 2016, 5)

The so-called “road of payback” aims at restoring justice, but is unaware of the impossibility that this ever happens; the “road of status”, instead, comprehends the offense as “down-ranking” and thinks that lowering the status of the wrongdoer helps to calm anger (see *ibid.*, 5f).

Yet, most obviously, both are not constructive in any respect. But Martha Nussbaum argues that most people arrive at a more constructive stage at some point. In order to develop a forward-looking concept Nussbaum describes “transition-anger”. This is a forward-looking emotion. Its content is summarized as: “How outrageous. Something should be done about that.” (*ibid.*, 6) Yet, in its pure form this anger is rare, since most people who experience anger will also have some urge for revenge. Nussbaum then argues that anger needs to be specified in accordance with various types of relations that persons engage in. Intimate personal relations relate to other types of anger than the so-called “middle realm”, which is the realm of daily transactions, often with strangers. Finally, Nussbaum also investigates anger in the political realm. Here, anger needs to be handled with care, e.g., by means of specific laws that punish wrongdoers. Nussbaum also investigates what she calls “revolutionary anger”; as for political revolutionaries, however, anger has only a limited instrumental role.

Overall, Martha Nussbaum sets her approach also apart from theories that are all too ready to support forgiveness as a key political virtue. Instead, she states: “The ‘road’ of forgiveness begins, standardly, in terrible anger over a wrong one has suffered at the hands of another.” (*ibid.*, 10) The way from that anger to forgiveness is long and stony, including processes of confrontation, confession, apology, and working through; finally emerging triumphant from the process, the former angry person has invested in a process called “transactional forgiveness” (*ibid.*).

This approach to anger includes many remarkable and unique features, which I cannot discuss at length. I just wish to highlight the remarkable last step, warning us not to take a far too easy and too quick way in pledging for forgiveness, which

can come to the cost of victims.¹⁰ I also wish to say that I was particularly impressed by the way in which Nussbaum handles the all too natural wish of victims to see punishment and redistribution. Instead of buying into the story of the necessity of this, she offers in her analysis of “transitional anger” a completely new view on anger: She construes a path through the confusions of the angry person and helps to open a window not for quick reconciliation, but for realizing another deep wish of angry people: to get rid of desires of retribution, and instead being freed of anger (ibid., 21–40).

3. Anger and War Injuries of Combatants

Nussbaum develops a theory of anger that shares common ground with her more general assumptions about emotions. Anger, too, is about something; it comes with a complex set of beliefs; it is comparable to a judgment, if not itself a judgment; and it is spurred by a deep feeling of vulnerability of the single life of a person. These basic features already support the assumption that civilians as well as soldiers will experience anger in some way or another. In situations as portrayed at the beginning of this talk, severe damage occurs – either to the person herself or to persons close to her. The damage is not trivial, but significant. War is not a natural disaster, but indeed composed of many single actions and complex processes of group agency and also of chains of command. This does not mean that each single injury really is intended. It just states that victims will know that they suffer from intentional harm in some way. And soldiers as well as civilian victims would be saints if they did not desire some sort of punishment.¹¹

Yet, this acknowledgment of suitability is just a first step in addressing Nussbaum’s theory of anger in the chosen context. In addition to diagnosing this suitability, I would also like to first portray some more elaborate theses about anger which Nussbaum develops in her approach to that emotion. I shall then formulate some final ideas of what this theory might add to war ethics in the way already

10 This coheres with a very cautious approach to forgiveness outlined by Fabre in a post-war scenario. She describes reconciliation in an after-war scenario including that “forgiving does not imply overcoming all relevant negative feelings” (Fabre 2016, 253). For a detailed discussion of forgiveness including the roles of perpetrators and victims, see *ibid.*, 253–257.

11 Before applying these thoughts to war victims, I need to mention that the positive transition at least, if not the whole phenomenon, is reserved to a basically mentally sane person. In addressing post-traumatic stress, one might think that this is reason enough not to address war victims in terms of anger. Yet, in my view, post-traumatic stress is not a mental illness; instead, it is something like a trace that a very deep and brutal event leaves on the soul of victims. It can even be regarded as a strategy to cope with stress, which potentially could destroy a personality altogether.

suggested. Specifically, I shall first defend the claim that according to some reports of war veterans, “anger” better fits their emotional experiences than “grief”. I shall then argue that anger is also the best category to explain what soldiers experience when comrades have been wounded. Finally I shall discuss a path to forgiveness that Nussbaum’s theory of anger opens. Even though this is only the attempt to highlight ways to apply Nussbaum’s theory of anger to this very specific scenario, it fits into the discussion of forgiveness.

A study on “Changes of Personal Values in Deployed German Armed Forces Soldiers with Psychiatric Disorders” (Zimmermann et al. 2016) is remarkable in various respects. It explores psychological disorders and changes in the value orders of German soldiers who were treated after deployment in the Afghan war.¹² The participants of the study were inquired regarding challenges and changes in personal values and moral sensitivities both during the war and afterwards. Soldiers were asked about their psychological and social sequelae and reactions to deployment by way of changes of value orientation during the deployment. Among 7 reported answers, they also state: “compassion and sympathy for the suffering of the indigenous population, feeling of helplessness” and “rage against the indigenous population” (ibid., 11). Moreover, negative attitudes (most of all anger and disappointment) towards the civilian population was voiced by about half of all participants, at times combined with feelings of shame about those attitudes. After returning home, negative feelings against fellow combatants and superiors and feelings of alienation were reported, among other manifest feelings of disappointment, mistrust, bitterness and tension.

The first outcome is remarkable in our context of research. Instead of addressing soldiers as challenged by feelings of guilt, they feel anger directly related to the population. Helplessness also addresses not primarily their own situation, but helplessness to help the people there. This outcome might relate immediately to the situation of soldiers involved in the Afghan missions; but it also supports two aspects of Nussbaum’s approach to anger: It is conceptually and empirically linked to helplessness. Losing control of a situation, i.e., not being in control, spurs this emotion (Nussbaum 2016, 45).

12 The data rely on a sample of 78 participants, who were exclusively active service, male, German Armed Forces soldiers and who had participated in one or more military deployments as part of the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. In 54 persons PTSD was diagnosed. Data analysis was performed following qualitative contents analytics, as was the qualitative analysis of interviews conducted at the Berlin hospital (Zimmermann et al. 2016, 8–14).

Nussbaum's analysis also helps to distinguish the experienced feelings from comparable emotions, as for instance grief. Comparable to anger, grief also focuses on a damage to the self or the self's circle of concern. Yet, differently from anger, grief focuses on an event, not on a person, more precisely on the loss brought about by an event (*ibid.*, 47). Nor does grief share the belief of wrongfulness. That said, what is also important is the fact that grief has a different action-tendency than anger. In Nussbaum's words: "[...] grief seeks restoration of or substitution for that which was lost, whereas anger typically wants to do something to or about the perpetrator. Grief addresses the hole or gap in the self, anger the wrongful infliction of that damage by a target." (*ibid.*)

The latter is pretty much in line with reports of war veterans, particularly when they have been forced to fight a war that later needs to be regarded as somehow senseless or even useless (Sherman 2010, 54; Zimmermann et al. 2016, 11). In line with the applicability, there is also another feature. Anger is distinct from other negative emotions in that it focuses on a wrongful act. Disgust, hatred, contempt, and envy instead also focus on persons, yet on relatively stable traits (Nussbaum 2016, 48).

The first step is already important: Following Nussbaum's exploration of anger, this emotion plays a significant role in the life of war victims, especially in the life of victims who are simultaneously also responsible for harmful events themselves: the combatants. I have not looked into the experiences of non-combatant victims; yet it appears to be all too obvious that they experience an even stronger sense of anger. It has been reported that soldiers experience one incident as particularly outrageous; known as "friendly fire", an accidental killing of a comrade by friendly forces (Zimmermann et al. 2016, 11). Even though I do not have a proof of this impression, in reading the chapters on "anger in intimate relationships" (Nussbaum 2016, 98–113) I was very much reminded of what happens to soldiers who unintentionally kill a comrade. In discussing anger in intimate relations, Nussbaum first explores anger in close relationships, as for instance a mother-child relationship. Yet, she also explores what might be regarded the closest relationship, which is anger at oneself. She distinguishes various types of anger at oneself. And she notes: "A lot of anger at self, however, is accompanied by self-inflicted pain, which is a type of payback; and it is often thought that this pain is an important part of the moral life." (*ibid.*, 128) She then associates it with guilt and feelings of guilt. She then also explains that she wishes to correct her former views of "hostility to oneself", the pain inflicted on oneself that is an intricate part of anger (*ibid.*, 130). Now, she believes that the negative part of anger at oneself is neither necessary nor particularly helpful.

I cannot portray the arguments in detail here. But I wish to quote Nussbaum in applying her recent insights to the issue of forward-looking practices in dealing with anger at oneself. This coheres with what she also wishes to argue in the political context. She says: "I shall insist that we need two things: truth, and reconciliation, i.e., acknowledgment of what was done, and then a move beyond it to a better future. That is what we need here too: a truthful acknowledgment that this was not just a hurricane or wildfire, but a deed done intentionally by me, albeit in the worst circumstances and under duress; and then, a strategy to move beyond the horror." (Nussbaum 2016, 135) Even though anger at oneself with respect to a cruel and irreparable deed, such as killing a comrade, is particularly difficult and complex, Nussbaum reminds us of necessary ingredients of what might be called reconciliation. Neither self-punishment nor lasting remorse is helpful. Instead, the move from "hostility to oneself" towards a friendlier attitude, perhaps even love of oneself promotes a future-oriented way to cope with dreadful actions.

Recently, philosophers have investigated both the opportunities and the limits to peace-processes after a war.¹³ Whereas hatred among the various war-waging parties is a recurrent theme, Nussbaum's exploration of anger adds to important new insights. *Firstly*, she insists that there is no shallow way to forgiveness – in particular not so in a psychologically conceived way.¹⁴ Instead: "Acknowledgment of the truth of what happened is essential, because one cannot go forward into a regime of justice, establishing trust, without insisting on the seriousness of the human interests that were damaged: that insistence is a way of dignifying those interests and committing the nation to not repeating the wrongs." (ibid., 238) Yet, without serious attempts to generate and support generosity, these endeavors to give peace chances, will fail.

Secondly, and equally important, the path towards a constructive future is in Nussbaum's account of anger, part of the very basic analysis of that phenomenon. Anger is not just part of human nature; it is not the destiny of victims, nor the destiny of societies that have suffered from war. Instead, there is at least the potential of transitional anger. Even though I think that a cure for anger by means of sympathetic understanding and by its rational counterpart, by sharing the points of view of the offender, is forestalled in the scenarios which were at the center of this debate, I nevertheless think that Nussbaum is right in not guaranteeing anger an irreversi-

¹³ See also section (1).

¹⁴ This coheres with the critique of psychological theories, focusing on people freeing themselves from obsessive and corroding anger; see Nussbaum 2016, 125–128.

bility that it usually is supposed to have: Thinking hard about anger and its reasons might follow the proposals of Nussbaum. In particular: "We might also be able to appreciate mitigating factors such as duress of various types, or the pressure of conflicting obligations." (ibid., 53) Perhaps this is particularly helpful counsel regarding self-anger after having committed dreadful actions. In addition, two further suggestions go to the heart of post-war anger: Blocking the effects of anger might firstly make us think hard about payback as a particularly inefficacious and detrimental strategy to cope with anger (ibid.). This also includes the uselessness of retribution, in particular against oneself. Moreover, thinking hard about the facts might help us to avoid focusing on our own status, including down-ranking and revenge. Both aspects are of particular importance in a post-war scenario.

4. Conclusion

In this article, I have tried to apply some of the insights of Martha Nussbaum on the emotion of anger to a specific area of concern. Anger is something that people experience in many ways and in different situations. Yet, what is often forgotten is the fact that anger is also a distressing experience of people who already suffer severe physical harm. I have focused on war victims who suffer not only from wounds and significant impairments of war, but also from anger.

Nussbaum's theory of anger has a range of specific characteristics. She starts with a cognitive theory of emotions. She defends the claim that emotions are judgments, and she also takes into account that emotions are an important part of the development of children and adults. As for anger, Martha Nussbaum highlights its close connection not only to status injuries, but also to retribution as a supposed remedy of anger. I have argued that the detailed distinction of various forms of anger also helps to find a classification of anger that fits the feelings of veterans. Most importantly, Nussbaum also opens new ways to think about an important ingredient in post-war peace. In order to achieve a stable situation in a post-war scenario, reconciliation is an important step. Yet people who suffer from anger do not find an easy way to reconciliation.

One window for forgiveness is opened by Nussbaum when explaining transitional anger. In particular, Nussbaum does not propose a quick solution to justified anger. Instead, she states that when resulting from former injustice, an acknowledgment of the facts is an essential part of the process of reconciliation. Moreover, perfect reconciliation is sometimes a utopian idea. Instead, it might suffice to stop the payback-mechanisms and the wishes of revenge that anger sometimes includes.

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