Re-Learning to Be Human in Global Times
Challenges and Opportunities from the Perspectives of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion

Edited by
Brigitte Buchhammer

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy
Re-Learning to be Human in Global Times: Challenges and Opportunities from the Perspectives of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion

Edited by
Brigitte Buchhammer
Table of Contents

Foreword
Herta Nagl-Docekal
v

Preface
Kurt Appel
vii

Introduction
Brigitte Buchhammer
1

1. Biblical Traces of the Guest
Kurt Appel
5

2. The Search for Lost Intimacy: Georges Bataille on Religion as Immanent Human Experience
Thomas M. Schmidt
17

3. Transformations of Doctrine as Cases of Mutual Learning Between Religions and Cultures: Schleiermacher’s Proposal for Translating Christology in Modernity
Maureen Junker-Kenny
33

4. Learning to be Human in the Silence
Sibylle Trawögær
53

5. To Whom It May Concern: Humanity and Dignity in Interreligious Perspective
 Birgit Heller
63

6. Learning to Conceive of Climate Change as a Truly Global and Moral Problem
Angela Kallhoff
81

7. (Re-)Learning to be Human in Central and Eastern Europe: When Political Authoritarianism Flirts with Religious Fundamentalism
Rita Perinfalvi
97

8. What is it to be a Human Being? Charles Taylor on “the Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity”
Ludwig Nagl
117

9. The Happiness of the Defeated: Jan Patočka and Walter Benjamin on the Human between Annihilation and Redemption
Sandra Lehmann
137
10. The Human Being – “A Beginner”: Anthropological Foundations and Current Relevance of Hannah Arendt’s Understanding of Childhood and Education  
*Leonhard Weiss*  
153

11. Educating Humanity: A Core Concern of Kant’s Philosophy of History  
*Herta Nagl-Docekal*  
167

*Cornelia Eșianu*  
183

13. Lessing’s Ideal Model for Culture, Religion, and Ethics Today: Humanity  
*Claudia Melica*  
197

*Carlo Willmann*  
209

15. Emersonian Anxieties: The Age of Anthropocene and the Legacy of Humanism  
*Stephan Steiner*  
223

*Brigitte Buchhammer*  
231

17. Occam’s Razor: Simplicity versus Simplification or How to Deal with the Complex Images of Humanity  
*Elisabeth Menschl*  
243

*Isabella Guanzini*  
265

*Index*  
275

*Contributors*  
281

---

**Foreword**

*Herta Nagl-Docekal*

It is my pleasure to offer a very warm welcome to you all on behalf of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, which is one of the sponsors of this symposium. Founded in the year 1847, the Academy of Sciences is Austria’s most important extramural research institution. As a learned society, it has 770 members from all spheres of the humanities as well as the natural sciences. Additionally, its 28 research institutes are the workplaces of 1,450 scholars.

It is worth noting that there exists a special relation between the Academy and philosophy: The first draft for an Austrian Academy was submitted to the emperor by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz during his last and longest stay in Vienna in the years 1712-14. (During this stay Leibniz also wrote his study on the *Principles of Nature and Grace* and the final parts of the *Monadology.*) In commemoration of this historical background, the Academy organizes the annual Leibniz Lectures.

One of the core concerns of the Academy is to promote the employment of innovative research in the public debate on pressing issues of contemporary society. The topic of our symposium clearly meets this objective. The Presidium of the Austrian Academy wishes us all fruitful discussions and much success.
Preface

Kurt Appel

The Research Platform “Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society” is based at the University of Vienna under the direction of Kurt Appel (speaker) and Sieglinde Rosenberger (vice speaker). It is an interdisciplinary research community including seven faculties: Faculty of Catholic Theology, of Protestant Theology, of the Social Sciences, of Laws, of Philosophical and Cultural Studies, of Philosophy and Education, and of Historical and Cultural Studies.

The program focuses on the role of religion in the transformational processes in contemporary societies and its impact on social, political, and cultural spheres. Besides the questions concerning mechanisms of “inclusion and exclusion” and the “transgression of borders” that are both closely related to the issue of “religion and migration,” the research platform is also concerned with monotheistic religion’s universal ethical and noetic claims, condensed and expressed in conceptions of God in the context of a multicultural society. The platform considers the hermeneutics of religious texts in so far as hermeneutics is of importance to the self-understanding of religions and functions as a catalyst for conflicts and societal transformation processes. In addition, the juridical aspects of religious and religion-related transformation processes, as well as the paradigmatic changes in constructions of social meaning and value systems, are subjects of analysis.

The future focus will be the question concerning the relation of “Religion and Boundaries” – geographically, politically, legally and symbolically. We will seek to understand how religions on the one hand contribute to the construction of boundaries and on the other hand to their subversive undermining. Under this perspective the research platform dedicates its work especially to four main thematic areas (“clusters”):

1. Contemporary religious movements in Austria in the context of migration and modernity;
2. Aesthetical and normative transformations of religious texts;
3. Religious education in secular societies;
Introduction

BRIGITTE BUCHHAMMER

The essays published in this book are the proceedings of the symposium held in Vienna, April 7-8, 2017 entitled Learning to be Human for Global Times: Challenges and Opportunities from the Perspective of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. This book is part of a series, published by the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, D.C.

The idea for this conference was born in 2016 in Washington, at the Catholic University of America, when I took part in the fall-seminar of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy with the title: Re-Learning to be Human for Global Times: Structure and Role of Compassion. Dr. Hu Yeping, Executive Director of the Council, encouraged me to organize a symposium with a similar theme in Austria.

What is the idea of this project? The topic of the symposium refers to the XXIV World Congress of Philosophy to be held in Beijing, China: August 13-20, 2018. The familiar theme of the conference will be “Learning to be Human.” The philosophers and theologians from five countries address current global issues such as the phenomena of increasing loss of solidarity and violent conflicts, the societal impact of recent research in the sciences (such as neuro-science and techno-science) and the dynamic changes in the socio-economic sphere. In view of these fundamental challenges, the symposium explored new philosophical approaches to the human being and its self-understanding. The scope of topics includes suggestions to re-define the relationship between human beings and extra-human nature, as well as theories focusing on the situation of religion in the context of modernity.

These eighteen papers demonstrate the broad spectrum of approaches to the question: “What does it mean to be human under current conditions?” through different traditions of philosophy and theological perspectives.

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington D.C., was founded by Professor George Francis McLean (1929-2016), who is unfortunately no longer with us. He was a philosopher in the service of humanity. Dr. Hu says, and I would like to quote her: “McLean was a scholar and teacher, but most importantly he worked to democratize philosophy – promoting the research of philosophers coming from many different cultural traditions, and publishing the academic work of teams of scholars from countries and regions around the globe. (...) He has helped to
bring together professors from many countries and regions in order to create opportunities for dialogue, communication, and cooperation, and to assist in building teams which, through their scholarly work, contribute to addressing the vital questions of the day.” (Hu Yeping, “George Francis McLean: A Philosopher in the Service of Humanity,” in To the Mountain: Essays in Honour of Professor George F. McLean, edited by William Sweet and Hu Yeping [Taipei, Taiwan: Fu Jen Catholic University Press, 2004]).

In 1983 Professor McLean founded The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. “The objective of the council is to break through ideologies in order to engage deep human concerns, to bridge traditions and cultures, and to seek new horizons for social transformation. It aims to mobilize research teams to study the nature, interpretation, and development of cultures; to bring their work to bear on the challenges of contemporary change; to publish and distribute the results of these efforts; and to organize both extended seminars for deeper exploration of these issues and regional conferences for the coordination of this work.”

As Dr. Hu points out when she characterizes Father McLean: “Kant says that to love is to do good; love also involves an openness to and a respect for others that requires a willingness to listen to them and to hear them on their own terms. (...) Philosophy as an intellectual discipline helps us to look at reality from a critical distance, to provide a rational analysis, and to express what we see in conceptual terms. But love for others requires us to read between the lines -- to see the shift of human awareness from the vertical to the horizontal, from object to subject, from the material to the spiritual, and from the quantitative to the qualitative. This shift provides an opportunity for all people and all cultures to pursue self-realization, self-consciousness and self-perfection actively. If Kant is right in saying that to love is to do good, then McLean has shown a love that complements his intellectual commitments to help philosophers throughout the world to engage in their own philosophical work. (...) McLean has strong philosophical views. Characteristically, however, he lets others speak first -- and this reflects the influence of various traditions and cultures on his own work. (...) Someone once asked McLean what his motives were for travelling to places where philosophy was considered by many in the West to be less developed, and where the social and intellectual situation was difficult. McLean’s response was that philosophy is not a ‘top down’ activity; it is not something to be done in isolation or by a single individual. It comes from the grassroots, from people’s everyday lives, and from the culture in which they live. Each person has its own way of living and searching for the meaning of life. Yet it also needs a window to let in new light and new air, and to let its unique character be seen by those outside. In the Republic, Plato gives us the allegory of the cave. Only those who climb out of the cave - painstakingly, passionately, and consistently - will come to see the light, the truth, and the Absolute. Philosophy, then, is the exercise of freedom.”

I would like to quote the following paragraphs to describe the concept for the Council’s project “Re-Learning to be Human for Global Times.” The following quotation comprises the last written words of Professor McLean, who described the project after consultation with Charles Taylor and Jose Casanova at his residence near Boston in December 2015.

“Humankind is changing paradigms at an unprecedented speed and depth: in science and technology, in the socio-economic and political sphere, in the self-understanding of cultures and societies, in the transformation of major religious entities and the creation of new cultures and modes of being. And yet, we need to ask: What are the constancies or consistencies in human self-understanding needed in order to further the global process of becoming human?

Moreover, the human race still faces enormous challenges when it comes to solving problems such as the creation of conditions required to affirm the dignity of all members of the human family, particularly in regard to such phenomena as needless hunger and chronic unemployment, violence and terrorism, injustice and exclusion, abuse of children and abandonment of the elderly, illiteracy and ideological manipulation, destruction of human values and of the natural environment in which we are destined to live.

Hence the need to ask: what role should be played by ethics and morality in the advancement of political and economic processes, in science and technology? How to reconfigure the humanizing mission of education and the processes of communication and/or diffusion of knowledge? In what sense must the great religions of the world advance their own self-understanding, their identity and their mission? How to understand the role and the mission of family and school in the process of renewing humanity and so create the conditions of possibility for a future, that can be said to be more truly human and, by the same token, even more divine than before?

This philosophical work will try to further the kind of human self-understanding that is capable of bridging the multiple contributions of East and West, of North and South, of religion and science, of art and technology, of freedom and law, of self-interest and mutual cooperation.”

This is just a brief summary of the concept behind our conference and its title.

When I returned from Washington to Vienna I consulted Herta Nagl-Docekal, who supported this project from the very first moment and has made a great effort with energy, commitment and enthusiasm. Without her generous support and effort, the staging of this symposium would not have been possible. I am very grateful to Herta Nagl-Docekal.
As always, financial considerations were a major challenge for organizing this kind of endeavor. However, immediately and instantly Kurt Appel from the research-platform “Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society” was more than willing to help. I would sincerely like to thank Kurt Appel and the platform so much for their great generosity. Furthermore, I am also indebted to the Austrian Academy of Sciences for their generous support.

I would also express my gratitude to the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington D.C. for making the publication of this volume possible.

1. Biblical Traces of the Guest

KURT APPEL

*And in this mountain shall the LORD of hosts make unto all people a feast of fat things, a feast of wines on the lees, of fat things full of marrow, of wines on the lees well refined.*

*And he will destroy in this mountain the face of the covering cast over all people, and the veil that is spread over all nations. He will swallow up death in victory; and the Lord GOD will wipe away tears from off all faces; and the rebuke of his people shall he take away from off all the earth: for the LORD hath spoken it.*

(Isa. 25.6-8)

In this citation, the Prophet Isaiah condenses and articulates a category which permeates the whole Bible and which, although little considered in theology, like few others leads into the very center of biblical speech about God, i.e. the category of the “guest” and the “host” respectively. This paper will examine the traces of these words in respect to their substance – concepts are deliberately not spoken of – in the Bible, as well as in the contemporary philosophical tradition. In this endeavor, it appears meaningful that in the “guest” dwells a crucial potential against an egotistically understood concept of the person (the person as “ego”), as well as a search for identity, which is often encountered nowadays and whose reverse side consists of the exclusion of the “other.”

Abraham as the Paradigmatic Guest-figure of the Bible

Let us start the biblical search for the guest – whether or not he has already visited us the following considerations will decide – with one of the central salvation-historical figures of the Bible, who overlaps both the European-

---


2 The following reflections are crucially inspired by Hans-Dieter Bahr, *Die Sprache des Gastes* (Leipzig: Reclam, 1994). Restrictively it must be added that Bahr does not precisely deduce theological consequences from his reflections, but rather exposes classical metaphysics and implicitly traditional theology to a fundamental critique.
6.
Learning to Conceive of Climate Change as a Truly Global and Moral Problem

ANGELA KALLHOFF

Climate change is a fact that has been underpinned by empirical studies, and this fact is about to change significantly the living conditions on planet Earth. Even though climate change is not the result of ill-will or bad intent, there is a continuous accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere due to carbon-based industries, high emission in various industrial sectors, and a growing world population. Raising temperatures cause severe and extreme weather events, from the melting of the ices at the poles, to a host of negative side-effects so severe that today statistics account even for human victims of climate change.\(^1\)

The development of deep changes to our natural surroundings are not only challenging in terms of the necessary readjustments we must make to create new living conditions. Instead, the world population is faced with a normative scenario that is unprecedented: Whereas one part of the world population profits from a lifestyle that produces high amounts of greenhouse gases, the other part of the world population suffers severe and even deathly damage. In particular, the moral conclusions from this scenario are by no means obvious. Whereas the diagnosis of climate injustice cannot be rejected any longer, the conclusions from this observation are difficult to draw. Does climate injustice include that climate victims deserve support from climate profiteers? How do we judge the motives of actors who are involved in economic development and who might even not have known that this development causes harm and pain? What about collective responsibility or specific responsibility of governments of the developed nation states?

In this contribution I wish to address a detail of the complex debate on climate justice. I wish to address the question of what it means to "learn to be human in a global world," presupposed climate change fosters moral debate on climate justice. In order to "learn to be human in a global world," it is not only important to acknowledge the fact of climate change. It is

\(^1\) This research has been supported by the Austrian Science Foundation project “New Directions of Plant Ethics.”

equally important to acknowledge the normative claims resulting from this
new situation.

This contribution starts with an interpretation of climate change not only as a "truly global problem." Instead, it has been conceived of as an
imminently ethical problem. Even though not caused by ill will, climate
change is the end result of activities and a lifestyle that up to today persist in
highly developed rich countries. The rich north has not only caused cli-
mate change. It even does so at the cost of the poor south. Today, the people
who suffer most from climate change do not have the least means to
protect themselves from the effects of climate change. Poor people cannot
build dams or protect settlements effectively when mega-storms and flood-
ing threaten to destroy houses and buildings. The same divide between rich
and poor goes through societies and is a more general fact. Whereas rich
people have a chance to buy out when it comes to environmental hazard,
the poor are the most vulnerable group, left alone with environmental haz-
ards. The first section gives a sketch of the ethical challenges that can only
be acknowledged after having framed the climate crisis accordingly.

Yet, there is no straight way to draw normative conclusions from the
fact of injustice. Instead, authors in the field of climate justice have argued
a range of fine-grained principles that help to adjust climate duties. In par-
ticular, two levels of debate need to be distinguished. On a most basic level,
philosophers discuss whether or not moral claims can be reasoned at all.
Two polar cases are provided: rescue cases, on the one hand, and a cosmo-
politan ethics, on the other hand. I shall give a short sketch of both in order
to demonstrate that it is fair to discuss the global duties of climate justice.
I shall then explain some basic principles that address a second level of con-
cern. Presupposed, it is fair to claim climate duties, it also needs to be dis-
cussed how the burdens resulting from climate duties need to be allocated
in order to provide a fair scheme of burden-sharing. The third section ex-
plains some of the principles that have been argued.

The final section summarizes this discussion and focuses on "learning
to be human in a global world" by presenting two theses: Firstly, I shall
argue that an important component of learning to be human in our current
world is to also learn to shoulder climate duties. We, the current world
population, need to learn that environmental duties are among the most ur-
gent duties today. In particular, as embodied living beings, natural re-
sources should be distributed according to principles of fairness. Secondly,
I wish to defend the claim that authors invoking a "collective age" are right,
in particular with regards to climate change. No single person, no single
institution will change the world. Instead, it is important to learn to work
together again, especially on an institutional level.

Why Climate Change is a Moral Problem

In one respect, hardly anybody denies an ethical dimension to climate
change today. This aspect has already been mentioned: Some people are the
profiters from climate change, at least in an indirect way. They live at the
high end of economic development; in a way they still profit from emis-
sions that were caused by their ancestors in building infrastructure, de-
veloping the economy, and supporting a highly consumer-based lifestyle. Yet,
others who do not enjoy all these outcomes of a carbon-based and other-
wise greenhouse-intensive lifestyle suffer the effects of climate change. The
already poor people today suffer from the effects of the highend lifestyle of
the rich. This is a problem of injustice.

A debate on climate change as a normative problem has to start with
acknowledging a deep injustice. High emission rates are correlated with a
rich and good lifestyle. Generations who profit from a highly developed
economy today also do so at the cost of poorer regions of the world which
suffer from negative side-effects of the accumulation of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere. Since the climate victims have to suffer harm from the
profit-seeking behavior of the rich, this is unfair. Yet, besides this acknow-
ledgment, which is already not a widely shared everyday concern, almost
everything depends on the theoretical framing of climate change. Interest-
ingly, the differences in interpreting moral claims do not result primarily
from different empirical facts. Reservations result from taking into account
further facts: Even though climate change is to a high degree man-made,
the cause of events cannot easily be changed today. Yet, moral claims are
reasonable when it is possible to change or to adjust behavior. Moreover,
climate change has not been caused by intent, nor has it been the bad will
of any actor to destroy climate stability. Instead, consequences of industries
with high greenhouse gas emissions were not foreseeable. Even when ac-

---

3 This oversimplified opposition of climate profiteers and climate victims has been supplemented by a range of alternatives to classify climate injustice. See
Steve Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Dominic Roser, Ethical perspectives on climate policy and climate economics (Zurich: University of Zurich, Zurich Open Repository and Archive, 2010).

4 For an examination of this more general fact of environmental injustice, see

5 In the context of this contribution, the concept of a climate duty serves as an
abbreviation for a diversity of moral obligations, including duties to either sup-
port climate victims or to contribute to bearing the burdens of mitigation,
which is a reduction of greenhouse gases, and adaptation.
countability in the case of climate change can be argued, this claim should address governments that are responsible for the welfare of citizens, but not single persons.  

These are only some reservations about and against climate duties. In the remainder of this contribution, I shall argue that despite these reservations, climate duties are justified. I shall address them in two steps. I shall first argue that two approaches in ethics support the view that climate duties are justified. I shall then argue that even though this claim can be made, it is equally important to care for fair patterns of distribution. In the climate scenario, a fair distribution of burdens and profits does not only include transfer-payments of rich people to climate victims, it also includes a fair assessment of what climate duties propose and who the right addressee is.

Climate Change and Moral Duties

A moral approach to climate change argues that climate change needs to be framed so that this theoretical framework also includes climate duties. The term ‘climate duty’ serves as an abbreviation for a range of obligations that relate to climate change. In order to reason climate duties, it does not suffice to acknowledge climate change as a fact; nor does it suffice to regard climate change as a fact that spurs injustice. Instead, it is necessary to explain why persons have moral obligations that relate to climate change. The reason to argue in favor of fulfilling climate duties is not that people who live at the high end really are responsible for the suffering of the poor from climate change-effects. Nor are they guilty in the literal sense. Instead, the debate focuses on two scenarios, both of which come with different moral claims: a rescue ethics on the one hand, and a cosmopolitan ethics on the other hand. Both approaches provide arguments for justifying climate duties, even though they present these arguments in different ways.

Within a utilitarian framework, Peter Singer has described climate duties as rescue duties. His normative claims rely on two aspects of the climate case that have not been mentioned so far. Firstly, he interprets the atmosphere as a common natural good, whose access conditions need to be modeled against a basic fairness condition. In particular, the atmosphere serves as a sink for greenhouse gases. As long as another claim is not real-

---

6 For a discussion of this argument, see Axel Gossery, “Historical Emissions and Free riding,” Ethical Perspectives 11/1 (2004), pp. 36-60.

7 Arguments against direct responsibility include that the harm caused by climate change is neither literally ‘caused’ nor ‘intended’ by actors. Instead, climate change is an effect of an accumulation of gases in the atmosphere as a side-effect of carbon-based industries.

soned, it needs to be presupposed that each single person deserves the same piece of that atmospheric sink as everyone else. Prima facie, there is no reason why a single person deserves a bigger part than each other person from a global and natural good. Secondly, persons are morally obliged to help persons in desperate situations, particularly when the rescue endeavor provides only marginal costs to them, yet has an enormous positive impact on the person who receives it.

Singer states that he frequently prepares his students in this respect by discussing an example: Presupposed, you come along a lake in which a child is drowning: would it not be fair to ask each person passing by the lake to rescue that child if ever possible? He then asks his students:

[W]ould it make any difference if the child were far away, in another country perhaps, but similarly in danger of death, and equally within your means to save, at no great cost—and absolutely no danger— to yourself? Virtually all agree that distance and nationality make no moral difference to the situation. I then point out that we are all in that situation of the person passing the shallow pond: we can all save lives of people, both children and adults, who would otherwise die, and we can do so at a very small cost to us: the cost of a new CD, a shirt or a night out at a restaurant or concert, can mean the difference between life and death to more than one person somewhere in the world—and overseas aid agencies like Oxfam overcome the problem of acting at a distance.

In the utilitarian framework, Singer does not claim that persons owe to each other the duty to rescue. But he says that persons as well as political institutions are obliged to invest in the welfare of humankind. In particular, each person is obliged to invest in rescuing the very poor in accordance with the most good she can do. Following the principles of an optimal return on investment and of marginal utility, each person should give something to the very poor in order to enhance their living conditions. Each person living


9 For a comprehensive justification of this rescue duty, see also Peter Singer, The Most Good you can do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas about Living Ethically, Castle Lectures in Ethics, Politics, and Economics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2015).


11 Singer, The Most Good You Can Do.
Climate Change as a Truly Global and Moral Problem

Presupposed, this argument holds—and many agree with the premise that basic human rights need to be respected and supported within a cosmopolitan framework—. Caney also states that duties correlate to human rights. Yet, this does not lead to the conclusion that each single person needs to account for the human right not to suffer from the disadvantages. Instead, this claim opens another field of research, which is research on principles that help to respond to human rights as outlined by Caney. The next section gives a short sketch of some of the key principles.

Principles of Climate Justice

Presupposed, each single person has a right to either being rescued from climate death and severe climate damage and each single person even has a right not to suffer severe harm caused by climate change, then the debate about climate obligations is also opened. In taking rescue scenarios or human rights-scenarios seriously, it is also stated that persons deserve being rescued and deserve not being seriously harmed. Yet, this leaves much room for interpreting climate duties and for discussing the issue of whether or not these duties are moral duties in the strict sense. Instead of presenting arguments for one or another approach to moral duties, I wish to discuss another issue. I shall presuppose that each single person and each single political institution has some obligation with regard to climate duties, and I shall take the arguments presented in section one as providing sufficient evidence that climate duties in one way or another exist and possibly also accrue to each single actor. The question that still needs to be dis-


Climate Change as a Truly Global and Moral Problem

Angela Kallhoff

... burdens that necessarily result from the fulfillment of climate duties. The question that this section discusses is: Presupposed climate duties are justified, how can the burdens resulting from the fulfillment of climate duties be allocated according to principles of fairness?

The debate on climate justice has provided a variety of principles that account for a fair allocation of burdens. To answer the question in the context of this contribution, I shall give a short sketch of the following principles: historical responsibility, capacity principle, beneficiary pays and polluter pays-principle, efficaciousness principles, principles of distributive fairness. This sketch is not meant to portray the rich debate on climate justice; nor is it an exhaustive list. Instead, I wish to argue that it does not suffice to justify climate duties. Instead, climate duties provoke another irritating feature in the debate on moral obligations. Besides the fact that they cannot be reasoned without also taking into account an interpretation of climate change as man-made, as disastrous and as global, they cannot be reasoned accordingly without also taking into account that they are “conditional duties” in a second respect. The justification of climate duties in its concrete shape does not only depend on a moral-cum-empirical interpretation of facts, but also on further premises that shape climate duties in terms of principles of fairness. What has been recalled as a necessary step from “ideal theory” to “non-ideal theory” is better conceived as the need to frame climate duties as conditional duties.

**Historical Responsibility**

In environmental ethics, the polluter-pays principle expresses historic responsibility: the actor who has spoiled an environmental good also needs to account for the costs of remediation. As for climate change, the moral idea that the actor causing harm needs to repair it is still valid. Yet the empiric side is difficult, since climate change is the effect of an accumulation of greenhouse gases. The causal chains are distorted and the effects cannot easily be accredited to single actors. Therefore, authors argue for a broader concept of historical responsibility including the benefits that generations today face from former high emissions. Yet, both concepts – polluter pays and beneficiary pays – appear to presuppose intent of the emitters. Against this, it is helpful to recall a concept of liability which also works without intent. Overall, the claim that highly emitting countries should take over historic responsibility for the damage which results from climate change today is one of the most important insights in allocating climate duties fairly. It claims that rich countries should shoulder climate duties first.

**Capacity Principle**

Another argument works on the concept of “ability to pay.” Even though it is right to claim that each single actor bears climate duties, the most potent actors should take responsibility first. The capacity principle allocates the burdens of climate duties in accordance with the capacities of actors to either really rescue climate victims or to bring about change. In addition to adaptation to already happening climate change in terms of erecting dams, resettling people, or building more storm-resistant buildings, substituting carbon-based industries with green technologies is costly. The capacity principle claims leadership of the rich nations and of the rich firms and global players.

**Luxury-avoidance Principle**

Henry Shue has not only provided many core ideas in the climate justice debate. He also once argued a moral line between luxury emissions and basic emissions. Shue argues that some sources of emissions are essential to a basically good life for persons, whereas others are not. He states:

---

16 For an overview over key positions, see Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, and Dale Jamieson et al. (eds.), *Climate Ethics. Essential Readings* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).


18 In “One Atmosphere,” Peter Singer provides arguments that the polluter pays-principle in the climate case includes the claim “You Broke It, Now You Fix It.” Yet, different from other incidents of environmental pollution, it needs to include that “a wrongful expropriation is grounds for rectification or compensation” (Singer, *One world*, p. 32).


22 Ibid.
The central point about equity is that it is not equitable to ask some people to surrender necessities so that other people can retain luxuries. It would be unfair to the point of being outrageous to ask that some (poor) people spend more on better feed for their ruminants in order to reduce methane emissions so that other (affluent) people do not have to pay more for steak from less crowded feedlots in order to reduce their methane and nitrous oxide emissions, even if less crowded feedlots for fattening luxury beef for the affluent world would cost considerably more than a better equality of feed grain for maintaining the subsistence herds of the poor.25

The point is that a fair allocation of burdens resulting from mitigation needs to account for the difference between “subsistence emissions” that account for basic needs and “luxury emissions.” Even though he later revoked this distinction to some degree because it might be taken as claiming that some parts of the world population should be granted additional emissions and freedom from mitigation,24 the claim to distinguish between luxury emissions and subsistence emissions can be regarded as also providing a basic principle of justice. It says that luxury emissions should be avoided in order to prevent unnecessary harm caused by high emission rates. Overall, climate duties can also be framed as duties not to produce additional harm by fulfilling luxury interests such as traveling by plane, driving highly emitting cars, etc.

Efficaciousness Principles

Duties to reduce emissions or to avoid luxury emissions have been called into question as particularly inefficacious. A recurrent theme in the climate debate is that it is unfair to ask single persons to change their lifestyle, since individual actions do not change anything regarding the mass budget. Most of these empirical arguments state that climate change results from high emission rates over a long period of time, not from single small emissions today. Here, I shall focus on one aspect regarding global duties. Presupposed climate duties can be reasoned, it is fair to allocate burdens according to an efficaciousness principle. It is reasonable to prioritize claims whose effects are proven and are highly effective. Efficaciousness does not have to be reasoned in terms of high amounts as a quantitative criterion. Instead, leadership effects and effects of crowding in are also important.

Further Principles of Distributive Justice

In addition to the listed proposals, a range of principles of distributive justice that have already been reasoned-out in other contexts are also helpful in discussing climate fairness. Presupposed, gains and losses are distributed rather arbitrarily among rich and poor nations, it is fair to claim transfer payments to the worst off. This “priority view” has been reasoned against various theoretical backgrounds.25 Following a proposal by Pogge, this transfer could also be reasoned against as an unequal and arbitrary distribution of natural goods.28 As for climate change, it is possible to adjust these proposals to transfer payments to nation states which do not profit from climate change, but suffer from it.

Overall, a broad range of proposals have been made to explain the burdens that result from the fulfillment of climate duties accordingly. In my view, these proposals are particularly helpful as a second step in reasoning climate duties whose concrete content and extent is conditioned by a range of facts and insights regarding justice more generally. In particular, many of the principles do not present a radical alternative in allocating the burdens of climate duties. Instead, it is wise to share Simon Caney’s view that

27 For a comprehensive overview of the broad range of principles of justice, see Bernward Gesang, Klimaethik (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2011), pp. 48-73.
on the level of non-ideal theory, a "hybrid" approach combining various principles of justice is the best choice.  

**Climate Change and Learning to be Human**

So far I have given a sketch of some of the central themes of the recent debate on climate justice. I have argued that it is right to discuss climate duties as moral obligations. Two arguments that support this claim have been presented. In a utilitarian framework, rescue duties can be adjusted to include support for climate victims in the international arena. In a cosmopolitan framework, climate duties are based on the human right not to suffer arbitrary and severe harm from climate change. Both approaches suffice to demonstrate that climate change, whose effects have a growing impact on parts of the world population, needs to be addressed in a framework of mutual moral obligations. The second section adds an important point: Presupposed, climate duties can be reasoned, opponents will still argue that climate duties need to be regarded as part of an ideal moral reasoning. In order to reject this reservation, some principles of justice that help to adjust the allocation of burdens resulting from climate duties have been presented.  

This section aims at relating the discussion of climate justice to the issue of “learning to be human in a global world.” The debate has two important implications for this endeavor. Firstly, environmental duties and climate duties in particular cannot be neglected when addressing a framework that focuses on “learning to be human in a global world.” Today, climate duties are among the pressing duties in a world that suffers from climate change. In particular, there is no time for passing the buck to future generations, as Steven Gardiner argues.  

It is utterly unfair to harvest the fruit of natural resources today, including the functions of natural goods as sinks, and to pass the rubbish and the severe harm that overexploitation costs to subsequent generations.  

The debate on principles of fairness also provides answers to the reservation that climate duties cannot be fulfilled because of climate injustice as an inconsistent moral problem. Climate change deniers do not only evade normative claims by ignoring the facts; they also state that climate duties cannot be reasoned, because they do not cohere with conditions of responsibility or with conditions of fair regimes. Both can best be rejected by recalling the many options to frame climate duties according to principles of justice.

At this point, another important lesson needs to be taken into account. Climate change is not only a truly global problem. It also demonstrates that solutions to the most pressing problems of our times cannot be developed without also calling for political responsibility. Governments in particular are not only elected for “governing the people.” Instead, Broome is right in claiming: “Morality also requires governments to make the world better.” It is no accident that this claim has been made in the context of investigating justice and fairness in the context of climate change. Independently of the proposal for a global climate politics, philosophers do agree that governments from all over the world need to work together in order to achieve a coherent and efficacious climate policy. Even the political and social “obstacles to action” are all on the table. What is needed now is an efficacious and inter-national climate regime that resonates with the duties to protect the poor and with the duties to work together in favor of a sustainable world.

**Bibliography**


---


31 For arguments in favor of intergenerational justice in the climate case, see Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change, pp. 111-142.


Roser, Dominic. 2010. *Ethical Perspectives on Climate Policy and Climate Economics*. Zurich: University of Zurich, Zurich Open Repository and Archive.


