

The Normative Limits of Consumer Citizenship

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Abstract In political philosophy, citizenship is a key concept. Citizenship is tied to rights and duties, as well as to concepts of social justice. Recently, the debate on citizenship has developed a new direction in focusing on qualified notions of citizenship. In this contribution, I shall defend three claims. Firstly, consumer citizenship fits into the discussion of qualified notions of citizenship. Secondly, the debate on qualified notions of citizenship cannot be detached from the normative claims in the philosophy of citizenship more generally. In particular, duties and rights receive a distinct shape when debated in terms of “consumer citizenship”. Thirdly, I shall argue that further normative limits can be established by discussing qualified notions of citizenship as items of a list that need to cohere in normative terms. I shall pay particular attention to environmental citizenship.

Keywords Citizenship · Environmental citizenship · Consumer citizenship · Political liberalism · Social justice

Introduction

The concept of consumer citizenship ties the term “consumption” to the term “citizenship”. This juxtaposition of two terms tears into different directions. Whereas citizenship addresses duties and rights of persons as political persons, consumption addresses persons as participants in the market economy. Sometimes, this fact is supplemented by a normative claim: As citizens, persons should obey the

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laws and norms of a political society; as consumers, persons should be free to choose as they wish. This contrast has been expressed clearly by Milton and Rose Friedman: “When you enter the voting box once a year, you almost always vote for a package rather than for specific items. If you are in the majority, you will at best get both the items you favored and the ones you opposed but regarded as on balance less important. Generally, you end up with something different from what you thought you voted for. ... When you vote daily in the supermarket, you get precisely what you voted for, and so does everyone else. The ballot box produces conformity without unanimity; the marketplace, unanimity without conformity. That is why it is desirable to use the ballot box, so far as possible, only for those decisions where conformity is essential” (Friedman and Friedman 1990, 65–66). Even though this quotation transports an under-tone that relates to a certain approach to economics, it addresses a more general view on a gap between consumption as free and citizenship as restricted by rights and duties.

In this contribution, I shall argue a concept of citizenship and of consumption that differs sharply from that presupposition. Consumption needs to be contextualized as a qualification of a normative concept of citizenship, too. An approach to “consumer citizenship” includes normative constraints and obligations resulting from rights and duties of citizens more generally. Yet, recent debate on citizenship does not end here. Instead, the limits of freedom also relate to claims that have been summarized in the notion of “environmental citizenship” that highlights responsibilities of citizens regarding the natural environment.

The context for this discussion is the debate on citizenship in political philosophy. Citizenship is one of the core concepts in political philosophy (Barber 1999; Bell 2005; Benhabib 2004; Falk 1994; Faulks 2000; Habermas 1994; Kymlicka and Norman 1995). Yet, besides general debates on citizenship, it has also been at the center of a new debate on citizenship that focuses on so-called qualified notions of citizenship (Kallhoff 2013b). Authors who contribute to this recent debate claim that a more thorough look on sub-spheres of society is necessary in order to discuss capabilities and duties of citizens in these spheres. This includes an exploration of citizenship as related to the natural environment in terms of “environmental citizenship”, “ecological citizenship” and “green citizenship” (Bell 2005; Dobson 2003; Smith 2005). Yet, it is not restricted to an ecological agenda; it also includes “market citizenship” (Barber 1999; Kallhoff 2013a), “economic citizenship” (Ulrich 2008; Little 2002), and “educated citizenship” (Galston 1989; Gutman 1999; McDonough and Feinberg 2003). Consumer citizenship as well as ecological citizenship are among the newly discussed qualified concepts of citizenship.

My main argument is that constraints to consumer citizenship do not come from “outside”. In particular, there is no need to reason a moral theory working in the background of a theory of citizenship in order to establish constraints and obligations. To put it downright: as citizens, consumers are not free to choose as they wish. Instead, they are under the norms of citizenship—some of which will be explained in this contribution. Moreover, they should also comply with the norms of environmental citizenship as well. This adds further normative constraints.

This contribution falls into four sections. Section “[Citizenship Theory in Political Philosophy](#)” gives a short introduction into the background theory of citizenship in political philosophy. Section “[Qualified Concepts of Citizenship](#)” introduces the core ideas underlying the concept of qualified citizenship. Section “[Consumer Citizenship](#)” explores consumer citizenship against this background. In particular, it highlights duties and liberties of consumer citizens. Section “[Constraints Resulting from Environmental Citizenship](#)” draws a conclusion from the discussion in comparing the outcomes to ecological citizenship.

Citizenship Theory in Political Philosophy

Citizenship is a notion that has been theorized in political philosophy since ancient times. Aristotle’s *Politics* of the fourth century B.C. is regarded as the first systematic approach to a theory of citizenship (Aristotle 2009). Aristotle thinks that citizens are persons who are willing and predisposed to partaking in the political agencies of the city-state (Aristotle 2009, III. 1, 1275 a 22–24; 1275 b 18–22). Moreover, Aristotle is very much concerned about the virtues of citizens. Indeed, he thinks that justice is a core competence in both governing the city-state and serving as a member of the citizenry (Aristotle 2009, III. 4–5). Since then, debates about the political person are an integral part of political philosophy. I shall not recall this debate here. Instead, in order to give background to the discussion of “consumer citizenship”, I wish to recall two options of theorizing citizenship that pull into different directions. Each of them gives a glimpse of what “normativity” means in this context. Moreover, each of them contributes to the debate on a theoretical concept of citizenship, in particular one that coheres with the basic assumption that a concept of citizenship builds on normative key concepts. Yet, the sketch is limited to two theoretical backgrounds: political liberalism on the one hand and civic republicanism on the other hand. They both contribute to an important insight: Even though the questions of “belonging” are important in debating citizenship (Habermas 1994; MacIntyre 1995), it is fair to say that this is not the prior concern in political philosophy. Citizenship is not primarily explained in terms of the facts of membership. Instead, being part of a political society is explained in terms of normative concepts.

Two traditions that shape the debate until today are at the core of citizenship theory. Even though each of them provides a focus different from the other, they are not regarded as mutually exclusive, but rather as mutually supportive theories: political liberalism on the one hand and civic republicanism on the other hand. In order to understand the focus of each, I shall give a short sketch of both.

Political liberalism focuses on the citizen’s rights. John Rawls (1973; 1996) argues that—as citizens—persons should be endowed with a range of basic rights. What might be overlooked is that Rawls also highlights the duties and responsibilities of citizens. After having explained that citizens are considered free and that they conceive of each other as having a conception of the good (Rawls 1996, 30) and “as self-authenticating sources of valid claims” (Rawls 1996, 32), Rawls explains: “The third respect in which citizens are viewed as free is that they are

viewed as capable of taking responsibility for their ends and this affects how their various claims are assessed. Very roughly, given just background institutions and given for each person a fair index of primary goods (as required by the principles of justice), citizens are thought to be capable of adjusting their aims and aspirations in the light of what they can reasonably expect to provide for. Moreover, they are viewed as capable of restricting their claims in matters of justice to the kinds of things the principles of justice allow” (Rawls 1996, 33–34). This means that citizenship freedom is limited freedom—in particular so with respect to justified claims of fellow-citizens.

Even though political liberalism is a wide-spread position, citizenship has also been reasoned in terms of responsibilities for the “*bonum commune*” and in terms of civil virtues. *Civic republicanism*—a version of republicanism that distances itself from historical forms of imperial republicanism—focuses on the role of the common good in justifying politics (Pettit 1997; Sunstein 1988). As for its historical roots, this type of republicanism is much closer to civic republicanism in Renaissance Italy than to the republicanism of the Roman Empire (Viroli 2002). It highlights civic virtues, including justice of citizens, authenticity, and dedication to the public good. Today, it has been highlighted not only as a theory that contrasts with political liberalism in that it sets the common good at its center. Instead, it supplements political liberalism in important aspects. It reasons legitimate political practice that serve the promotion of the common good and of shared interests of the citizenry (Pettit 1997).

The re-establishment of civic republicanism coheres with an enrichment of citizens’ rights and duties in terms of new groups of rights, as recalled in Marshall’s approach to generations of rights, including political, civil and socio-economic rights (Marshall 1964). Today, many think that we are in a situation in which a new group of rights has become critical. This includes a range of ecological rights (Hayward 2004; more critically: Hiskes 2009). Some of the ecological rights have been at the center of recent debate in philosophy, including the right to water (Gleick 1998; Brown and Schmidt 2010; Kallhoff 2014, 2015). It has been argued that the environmental rights extend the list of basic rights that include already socio-economic rights, as for instance a right to work and to education. In my view, the debate on new groups of rights is most significant in debating citizenship today. It is also mirrored by the new turn towards qualified notions of citizenship.

Qualified Concepts of Citizenship

Recent debate on citizenship in political philosophy has shifted the focus of attention towards concrete concepts of citizenship. Instead of theorizing citizenship in the context of the big programs, many authors now pay tribute to specified areas of political life and of particularly problem-laden areas of social life. Political philosophy tries to respond to this situation in theorizing new concepts of citizenship. These are notions of *qualified citizenship*. They respond to special claims and demands in specified spheres of social life and exchange. The points of reference are given by adjectives and qualifying terms, as for instance as “educated

citizenship” (Gutman 1999), “ecological citizenship” (Dobson 2003), “green citizenship” (Bell 2005) and “economic citizenship” (Ulrich 2008). The exploration of each concept contributes to rendering the more general claims and concepts of citizenship theory concrete.

In particular, the exploration of qualified concepts is not detached from citizenship theories in political philosophy. Instead, qualified concepts address a specified problem, often so in a critical way, without deviating from the big themes in the political philosophy of citizenship. Even though each of the term relates citizenship discourse to a specified area of political life, it addresses citizenship in a comparable normative context. The theories also try to relate to civic republicanism and its emphasis on the common good. Instead of contrasting liberalism with republicanism, these recent approaches try to bring together some aspects of both theoretical approaches to citizenship.

Basically, the discourse on qualified citizenship relates to two groups of normative claims: they relate to *rights* of citizens; and they relate to *duties* regarding the common good. In Rawls’s version of rights, citizens are justified in claiming respect for their freedoms and their basic needs. As already mentioned, citizens are right in regarding themselves and each other as “self-authenticating sources of valid claims” (Rawls 1996, 32). As for valid claims, concepts of qualified citizenship pay special respect to claims of the second-generation rights that address socio-economic claims of citizens and to rights that set new agendas. Here are some rough examples: In terms of economic citizenship, citizens deserve participation in the economy (Ulrich 2008). Ulrich has given some precise content to this rather general claim. He develops an approach to economic justice in terms of rights of participation—both in the gains of the private sector and in work (Ulrich 2008, 303–314). As “educated citizens”, citizens are justified to claim education (Galston 1989; Gutman 1999; McDonough and Feinberg 2003)—yet not only in general terms, but also in education for citizenship and for cosmopolitan citizenship in particular (Nussbaum 1997). As “environmental citizens”, they are also right to claim a healthy and intact environment (Hailwood 2005; Eckersley 2004; Hiskes 2009). Yet, they are also asked to contribute to environmental conversation and sustainability. In short, qualified citizenship is reasoned in terms of specific rights that apply to the respective sphere of social life.

As for *duties* of citizens regarding the *common good*, qualified concepts of citizenship contribute to a more concrete debate, too. In particular, instead of focusing exclusively on duties and responsibilities, the debate also pays tribute to the fact that citizens need to be prepared for becoming responsible citizens. A concept of qualified citizenship aims at explaining the duties of citizens in concrete circumstance. Yet, it also aims at explaining necessary presuppositions for being in a situation to fulfill these duties. Therefore, the notion of *citizenship competences* is central in outlining the content of qualified citizenship (Kallhoff 2013a, 33f.). *Educated citizenship* may again serve as an example.

In the approaches of Galston (1989) and Macedo (1990), the conditions of being in a situation to perform as a citizen are explored in terms of civic liberal virtues. These virtues have to be trained. They include the capacity to listen to arguments, to bracket own opinions in order to listen to opposing claims etc. Citizens have the

duty to perform according to these duties. Yet, persons also need to be trained to doing so. In liberal societies, the common good is not something whose realization can be defined in advance. Instead, core notions of the common good need to be shaped by means of mutual agreement and by means of political debate. In short, qualified concepts of citizenship include the question of what citizens need in order to being in a situation to perform as citizens in specified areas of societal life in order to support the common good.¹ Recent theories highlight *citizenship competences*.

This resonates with a more general insight. Citizenship theory also needs to respond to practical exigencies. In this context, it appears as if it was unfair to claim that persons should partake in particularly demanding spheres of society without being prepared to doing so. This claim reiterates an old theme in theories of democracy, a paradox if one so wills: A democracy needs to prepare its own living conditions. Today, some of these conditions need to be explained in terms of specified competences. Citizens need education and knowledge, they need ecological space and they need being prepared for participating in a new economy. Simultaneously, providing these conditions is not their task; instead, governments and political institutions are obliged to preparing citizens for these areas of life—yet, without infringing upon the freedoms of citizens to realize their concept of a good life. Today, this general insight receives much attention regarding the new focuses of concern: regarding the relationship between societies and the natural environment with a special focus on animals, institutions of education and health care, regarding the development of the economy, and the behavior of consumption. I have now prepared the background for taking a closer look at consumer citizenship.

Consumer Citizenship

The concept of *consumer citizenship* is part of a set of qualified notions of citizenship. As such, it continues and shapes the debate on citizenship. In particular, it relates to the normative concepts that are beneath each debate on citizenship in political philosophy. In order to discuss the normative claims related to consumer citizenship, I shall start with a liberal political perspective that resonates with John Rawls's approach to political liberalism (Rawls 1996) and with predecessors in political theory, as for instance John Stuart Mill (1989). It focuses on liberties; yet, it already restricts the liberties of consumers as citizens in some important respects. I shall then turn to the other side of citizenship: the obligation of political persons to contribute to the common good.

As consumer citizens, persons partake in the economic sphere. Even though the interpretation of the economic rights of citizens varies, to claim that citizens have a right to be protected from practices that cause harm and arbitrary pain is common ground. This aspect is particularly clear in the writings of John Stuart Mill. John Stuart Mill states that in writing *On Liberty* he wishes to establish a principle that

¹ I use “common good” here in a rather loose sense; a more precise definition of issues of general interest is given in the debate on public goods. See Kallhoff (2011).

protects the individual person from paternalism and coercion by society. He then recalls the following principle: “That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill 1989, 13). Even though the interpretation of the no-harm principle is much debated, one claim that this principle underscores is obvious: In political society, persons do not have a right to inflict harm on persons in an arbitrary and harmful way. Put the other way round, persons are free as long as their actions do not provide incidents of willfully inflicted serious harm to fellow persons.

This approach to the normative side of citizenship has an immediate consequence regarding the limits of consumer freedom. At the very least, consumption should not cause immediate harm to other fellow citizens. This speaks against an interpretation of economic freedoms as unrestricted freedoms as, e.g. reasoned by the Friedman and Friedman (1990). Even though persons should be free to choose how to spend their money, this freedom is already limited by a no-harm principle.

The no-harm criterion is a minimum criterion that has been reasoned in political liberalism. Yet, political liberalism goes beyond that principle—both in claiming basic rights and in addressing another important theme: social justice. The latter is considered a key value that contributes to obligations and normative constraints in terms of citizenship. John Rawls claims that justice is one of the core political values of a well-ordered society (Rawls 1996, 128). It is important to notice that even though social justice is considered a value, it differs from personal values. Rawls thinks that it does not necessarily collide with the claim that persons should be free to unfold their own and freely chosen value set. The reason for this option is the following: Citizens have two sets of values; in Rawls’s terms: “Citizens usually have both political and nonpolitical aims and commitments. They affirm the values of political justice and want to see them embodied in political institutions and social policies. They also work for the other values in nonpublic life and for the ends of the associations to which they belong” (Rawls 1996, 30–31). As a consequence, social justice can be reasoned without neglecting the fact of a reasonable pluralism within modern societies. It is a core value of well-ordered societies; it is also part of the common good of a society that each citizen is obliged to support.

Even though the value of social justice can be outlined in various ways, it appears as if claiming justice will in some way or another have an effect on consumer citizenship. At the very least, access to consumption goods need to be regulated so that burdens and benefits do not counteract the principles of equality of opportunities of citizens. Here again, a general idea about normative constraints to freedoms of citizens will result in a limitation to the freedom of consumers.

Both the no-harm principle and the claims of social justice highlight normative limits of consumption. Moreover, obligations of citizenship include that citizens accept conditions of fairness in consumption. Here, Rawls’s emphasis on the limited freedoms gains a distinct feature. Let us recall a normative aspect of citizenship that has already been highlighted: “[Citizens] are viewed as capable of restricting their claims in matters of justice to the kinds of things the principles of justice allow”

(Rawls 1996, 33–34). This might be interpreted as including that consumption should depend on a framing that also takes into account that each person deserves a “fair share”, in particular so regarding social goods that are the products of a society and not of market exchange alone. Yet, it might also resonate to claim responsibility for sharing both social goods and social burdens according to principles of fairness.

Finally, it is only one further step to also address responsibilities of citizens in consuming goods. As citizens, persons partake in cooperative schemes. The results of that cooperation comprise both goods and bads (Rawls 1996, 15–16). As citizens, persons are responsible for sharing both. As for consumer citizenship, this emphasizes the duties of persons as responsible actors in cooperation. Actually, the debate on consumer responsibility is more demanding than the debate about a fair share of goods. Many now claim that it is not the market, but the consumer who could achieve a turn-around in the economic sphere (Siipi and Uusitalo 2011). Since the system of the market depends on consumer choices, a shift of preferences and responsible behavior would be a very powerful mechanism in order to change market structures. Consumers could demand information about the economic value creation chain; the consumer could claim that firms reveal the ecological footprints of their products; consumers could claim that a firm pays respect to human rights.

To sum up the discussion of this section, I wish to highlight three normative claims that result from an interpretation of consumer citizenship within the frame of qualified, yet normative concepts of citizenship:

- a. The freedom of consumer citizens is limited in that no person should be harmed arbitrarily and severely by consumption (no-harm principle).
- b. The freedom of consumer citizens is limited in terms of a fair distribution of social goods and social bads (claims of social justice).
- c. Consumer citizenship more generally emphasizes the duties of persons as responsible cooperators in the market sphere.

Constraints Resulting from Environmental Citizenship

Citizenship theory does not only have to take into account the specification of general moral claims—as for instance the concrete shape of citizenship rights and the legitimate ties to the common good. Instead, the various types of citizenship provide mutual support, yet also highlight the boundaries that also set normative limits to each single notion of qualified citizenship. Due to this fact, it is also important to compare concepts of qualified citizenship and to reconnect them after having presented an analysis of a single notion of qualified citizenship. In this section I shall give an example of how a concept of citizenship that integrates environmental duties—in brief a concept of environmental citizenship—contributes to further normative constraints on consumer citizenship.

Authors in the field of environmental ethics have been developing a future vision of a citizenry that does not only prevent harm regarding co-citizens. It provides

normative reasoning for including rights and duties of citizenship regarding the natural environment (Barry 1999; Eckersley 2004; Hailwood 2005; Hayward 2004). I cannot comment on this debate here; yet, I wish to highlight some consequences of environmental citizenship as a qualified notion of citizenship regarding consumer citizenship as another qualified notion of citizenship. The underlying idea is that all qualified notions of citizenship are based on a common ground of normative resources. As qualifications of a shared notion of citizenship, the range of qualified notions need to be regarded as at least minimally coherent within a list of qualified notions of citizenship. As a consequence, consumer citizenship needs to cohere to some degree regarding its normative foundation with environmental citizenship. In this section I wish to highlight some consequences of this approach to citizenship as a minimally coherent normative concept.

Authors in the field of environmental citizenship address the citizen as a person whose duties include responsibilities for the natural environment, as for instance responsibilities for the protection of the environment from environmental hazard (Dobson 2003). On the one hand, authors in this field of research argue that the normative claims inherent in citizenship are well set by political liberalism. Yet, duties and rights include rights of non-human living beings, in particular so of animals (Baxter 2005; Bell 2005; Doherty and de Geus 1996). *Environmental citizenship* is the concept for that extension. Different from environmental citizenship, *ecological citizenship* indicates a more radical shift in citizenship theory. It relates to republican concepts of citizenship and highlights responsibilities and virtues of citizens in addressing the environment. In particular, it has been interpreted as a post-national and even post-cosmopolitan notion of citizenship (Dobson 2003). In this section, I shall take *environmental citizenship* as a concept that includes both environmental rights and duties and responsibilities that have been specified in approaches to ecological citizenship. It has both a political liberal and a republican aspect.

Environmental citizenship cannot be reasoned without also redefining the relationship between citizens and nature in basic respects. Visionary accounts go so far as to claim a new status of nature, and a citizenship status of animals in the citizenry (Francione and Garner 2010; Steiner 2010; Haraway 2003). Whether or not these visionary accounts will be integrated into already existing accounts of citizenship or will substitute former accounts of citizenship does not have to be decided here. Instead, I wish to give a sketch of how these claims effect the claims of consumer citizenship. One shared concern in theories of environmental citizenship is that harmful effects on the environment need to be classified not only as a negative side-effect of civilization. Instead, harmful effects on the environment need to be regarded as violating environmental rights of persons as well as infringements on duties to keep the natural environment intact (Dobson 2003). Following this proposal, political persons are not only obliged to take into account the effects of their behavior in terms of harms to fellow citizens. They are also obliged to respect nature in terms of *not* afflicting non-arbitrary harm either on living beings that deserve moral concern, foremost animals, or on natural goods

such as water and the atmosphere.² Not caring about the side-effects of consumption and thereby producing harm to the environment does not only count as a violation of rights of co-citizens to an intact environment (Hayward 2004). Moreover, it violates the duties of citizens as environmental citizens.

The acknowledgment of environmental citizenship as another notion of qualified citizenship adds further normative constraints to the already existing normative constraints on consumer citizenship. In particular, realizing rights as consumer citizens needs to cohere with duties that result from respect for nature and duties that relate to citizenship in terms of environmental citizenship. The consequences are particularly visible when authors claim a new status of animals within the political community as co-citizens. Under the presumption of co-citizenship of animals, as reasoned by Donaldson and Kymlicka (2013), it is not only the consumption of meat that needs to be re-debated in a perspective that takes the sufferings of animals seriously. Instead, animals deserve various forms of citizenship rights.

Conclusion

In this contribution, I have argued that consumption is not as free as one might presuppose in the context of market theory. Instead, normative constraints on consumption have been reasoned in the context of citizenship theory. They result from two different considerations. Firstly, consumption is tied to rights and duties of citizens more generally. This presupposes that the exchange of goods and commodities cannot be separated as a “market sphere” from exchange processes among citizens. Instead, if societies are built on diverse forms of cooperation, including market processes, the market sphere needs to be interpreted as just another sphere of political societies. As Rawls (1973; 1996) famously argues, cooperation among citizens needs to be framed by a theory that sets forth basic normative principles that shape a well-ordered society. Secondly, “consumer citizenship” is part of a list of qualified notions of citizenship that serve as ascertainment and as expression of concrete dimensions of a broad notion of citizenship. As one item on a list of notions of qualified citizenship, consumer citizenship rests on normative resources of citizenship theory more generally. Moreover, in this list approach to citizenship, a minimal coherence between the various qualified notions needs to be explained.

As a consequence, normative constraints on consumer citizenship have two sources. Firstly, consumer citizenship needs to cohere with general insights in the duties and rights of citizens as political persons. Secondly, consumer citizenship needs to be integrated into a list of qualified notions of citizenship. At its end, the

² Lichtenberg (2014), among others, argues that “new harms”, including harming effects on persons that result from side-effects of civilization on the environment, are part of the negative of persons sharing one world. The discussion of “harm to strangers” also spurs the intriguing question of how duties not to harm persons translate into obligations to avoid activities that produce side-effects on persons. This is part of a debate in political ethics on the “duties regarding strangers” (Chatterjee 2004; Lichtenberg 2014). As for natural goods and principles of justice and of ecological conservation, many fruitful proposals have been elaborated both in the debate on water ethics (Kallhoff 2014, 2015) and in the debate on climate ethics.

article is focused on one specific correlation, namely between environmental citizenship and consumer citizenship. Even though much more has to be said about concrete aspects of this juxtaposition, it is foreseeable that the freedoms of consumer citizens will shrink significantly, if environmental citizenship is taken seriously.

In particular, this approach goes beyond the more general claim in political philosophy that it is obligatory to set normative limits to the economic sphere of life. It has long been observed that marketization and economization are threats to core dimensions of citizenship. In order to protect the civil life of persons and in order to enhance social justice, markets need to be fenced. Even authors in the camp of political liberalism already argue against the colonialization of social life by market structures (Habermas 1995, 470) and for a strict separation of different spheres of social life, including the economic sphere (Walzer 1991; Barber 1999). This approach can be rendered much more precise and more demanding by discussing consumer citizenship and environmental citizenship in the context of the political philosophy of citizenship.

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