Meteorological support for nuclear disarmament and
weapons control
This web page continues my previous one at BOKU.
Staff: Petra Seibert
Former staff: Anne Tipka (now at CTBTO), Radek Hofman (now at IAEA). At BOKU: Andreas Frank (now at ZAMG), Paul Skomorowski (now at ZAMG)
>> Jump to Disarmament and related envents
>> Jump to DPRK 2016 information
>> Jump to DPRK 2017 information
Separate pages:
2017 Nobel Peace Prize for ICAN and information on the TPNW
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
TPNW Scientific Advisory Group (TPNW)
ATM Challenges - Statistical evaluation
Activities:
Ongoing:
- Participation in the Working Group B of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test-Ban-Treaty Organisation / Preparatory Commission
- Research to support source location from radionuclide measurements
- WOSMIP
Past activities:
- Participation in source location experiments of CTBT/PrepCom
International Data Centre and WMO
- Organisation of the Kick-off workshop of the new Independent Group of
Scientific Experts on the detection of clandestine nuclear-weapons-usable
materials production (iGSE)
Recent conferences:
-
Participation in the CTBTO Science and Technology Conference 2019, 24-28 June 2019 at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna. Contributions:
- Filling a gap in the wet scavenging scheme in FLEXPART 10.3 , Petra Seibert, Anne Philip (poster)
- Atmospheric Dispersion and Ground Level Deposition of Cs-137 Released From Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident Efem Bilgic, P. Seibert, A. Philipp (poster)
- ECMWF data sets as input for the ATM FLEXPART prepared by a new version of the flex_extract tool A. Philipp, L. Haimberger, P. Seibert
(poster)
-
(c)www.annarauchenberger.com
Georges Schneider
CC2.0
Participation in the CTBTO Science and Technology Conference 2017, 26-30 June 2017 at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna. Contributions:
- Uncertainty Measurement in Atmospheric Transport Modelling and Atmospheric Dynamics, Petra Seibert (Panel discussion)
- Quality Assessment of Meteorological Data from CTBTO/IMS Radionuclide Stations,
P. Seibert, C. Jank, A. Philipp (poster)
- Influence of Resolution on the Performance of FLEXPART with ECMWF Data in the ATM Challenge 2016
P. Seibert, A. Philipp (poster)
(c)CTBTO's Official Photostream on Flickr
CC2.0
Participation in the CTBTO Science and Technology Conference 2015, 22 - 26 June 2015 at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna. Contributions:
- A Framework for Systematic Testing of an Improved Wet Deposition Scheme for the Lagrangian Dispersion Model FLEXPART
Oral, A. Philipp, P. Seibert
- Inverse Modelling Analysis of Xe-131m Measurements over East Asia in April 2013, Poster, R. Hofman, P. Seibert
- Inverse Modelling Analysis of the Radioxenon Detections in Takasaki, April 2013 as a Step Towards Data FusionPoster, P. Seibert, R. Hofman, A. Philipp
Participation in the 5th Workshop on Signatures of Medical and Industrial Isotope Production (WOSMIP V), Egmont Palace in Brussels, Belgium May 12-14, 2015.
More: WOSMIP web site, Workshop summary reports
- Poster: Assessment of Network Sensitivity under the Presence of Civil Radioxenon Sources
from an Atmospheric Transport Modelling Perspective
Participation in two conferences on nuclear disarmament held in Vienna, December 2014:
Read more:
THE THREE-WAY SPLIT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS: The EU is a microcosm of the nuclear weapons regime. (disappeared)
Majority of countries pledge to support negotiations towards a nuclear weapon ban treaty
UN General Assembly First Committee Vote on the Humanitarian pledge (map)
Information about nuclear events
(reverse chronological order)
April 2018: Discussion on DPRK nuclear-test moratorium
DPRK's leader Kim announced on 21 April 2018 (local time) that his country no longer needed to test nuclear weapons or long-range missiles and would close a nuclear test site (ee e.g.
this NYT article). This could be understood as an announcement of a moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing. CTBTO/PrepCom Executive Secretary immediately suggested that DPRK then should join the CTBT (see
CTBTO News Release).
Recently, a number of media report that North Korea's move may be caused by the DPRK test site being unusable anyway, referring to the strong aftershocks of the September 2017 test (see also information below.), see for example New York Post or The Guardian. These articles are based on a report by a Hongkong-based Chinese newspaper, saying that an article will soon come out on the testsite destruction in GRL, by a team around Lianxing Wen. Rumours are spread that even respuspended radioactive dust from the mountain's interior could threaten Chinese territory. While we don't have solid information, this at least appears to be far-fetched.
As explained on the 38North web site, even if the tunnel system used collapsed, the Punggye-ri test site has more sections, which are probably not affected. See also a follow-up article on 38N.
DPRK nuclear test of 03 September 2017
Weak seismic event on 23 September 2017 (
USGS analysis of 08:29 event /
L. Zerbo's twitter message with seismograms of 04:43 and 08:49 event) - considered to be a geological mass movement triggered by the large 03 Sept test. It increases again the possibility for later seeing some radionuclides at monitoring stations.
|
CTBTO/PTS Comparison of seismic signals (to scale) of all six declared DPRK nuclear tests, as observed at IMS station AS-59 Aktyubinsk, Kazakhstan. |
BGR (German National Data Centre for CTBT) provides a
detailed analysis (in German) with atmospheric transport modelling and a map of the CTBTO radionuclide (RN) stations.
38North analyses:
- First analysis by 38North, 3 Sept 2017
- Analysis of satellite imagery by 38North, 5 Sept 2017
- Analysis by 38North, 12 Sept 2017.
Some highlights: 250 kt yield - close to what 38 North had previously determined to be the maximum estimated containable yield for the Punggye-ri test site. - significant “cracking” (possibly extending to the surface) ... Such cracking facilitates radioactive gas seepage in other environments. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not the North Portal will ever be used for another nuclear test. There are still two unused additional tunnel complexes (served by the South and West Portals) that are also deemed potentially capable of further nuclear testing, albeit for tests having lower yields than that of the sixth test.
Facts in short:
- Signal comes from known DPRK test site, close to previous tests
- Signal strength was about 5-10 times higher than Sept. 2016 test (which was estimated at 10-30 kt). The details of CTBTO's interactive analysis have not yet been published but there is a (re)tweet on CTBTO_alerts that says the mb is 6.07 and calculates an estimated yield of 140 kt.
- The second seismic signal 8 min after the main one is interesting. It can indicate a cavity collapse or a mass movement on the mountain surface. Analysis of satellite imagery posted on the 38North web site reports small landslides but no collapses of cavities that deform the surface.
- If there was a prompt release of radionuclides into the atmosphere, they will be sampled by the CTBTO station RN58 Ussurysk probably on Monday 4 Sept 2017, with the analysis being available ca 48 h later. Note that the Xe measurement at this station is not yet certified.
Conclusions:
- Given the strength, it is reasonable to assume that the device indeed had a fusion component; however, boosted fission is more likely than a two-stage thermonuclear device.
- The progress on weaponisation is still difficult to judge (i.e., whether the device would fit on the available missiles, and whether it would survive the re-entry phase of an ICBM).
- The strength of the detonation means that more radionuclides were produced and that it will be more difficult to contain them, therefore the chance to see a signal in the CTBTO radionuclide network is higher this time. In addition, national verification means in form of airborne radionuclide sampling (and probably additional surface sampling) are also undertaken by some countries.
Science-oriented background links
Policy-oriented links
This time, the DPRK test deserves a different attitude - not only because of its magnitude, but also because of DPRK's progress in missile technology and last not least because of the personalities of political leaders involved. Even if the general public's attention has decreased, the risk of war has not!
DPRK nuclear test of 09 September 2016
DPRK nuclear test of 06 January 2016
CTBTO/PTS Briefing, official photostream,
CC BY 2.0
Currently available information shows that the magnitude of this test is very similar to the 2013 test (ca. 10 kt). Thus, claim of the DPRK to have tested a hydrogen bomb (fusion as the primary source of energy, typically over 1 Mt yield, rarely under 100 kt) appears to be wrong. At most, they may have tried to test a boosted fission device; it would be hard to say whether there was a significant boost effect or not.
If a prompt release of radioxenon would have occurred, it would have been measured at the Takasaki monitoring station in Japan a few days later, which did not happen. A delayed release through the access tunnel is still possible. Analyses (see below) indicate that the rock overhead of the 2016 test site was larger than 2013; a prompt release thus is quite unlikely.
DPRK nuclear test of 12 February 2013
Radioxenon detections in the CTBT international
monitoring system likely related to the announced nuclear test in North Korea on February 12, 2013
by A. Ringbom, A. Axelsson, M. Aldener, M. Auer, T.W. Bowyer, T. Fritioff, I. Hoffman, K. Khrustalev, M. Nikkinen, V. Popov,
Y. Popov, K. Ungar, G. Wotawa.
Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, Volume 128, February 2014, Pages 47-63
Analysis by U.S.-Korea Institute at the School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, Baltimore MD ("38 NORTH" website)
May 2010 radionuclide detections over East Asia
DPRK nuclear test of 25 May 2009
Contemplating a third nuclear test in North Korea by Frank V. Pabian and Siegfried S. Hecker, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 08/06/2012 - 13:55 (online). Has discussion of 2006 and 2009 tests and their location.
Detailed
news with technical information on the CTBT public website
DPRK nuclear test of 09 October 2006
A long distance measurement of radioxenon in Yellowknife, Canada, in late October 2006 by Saey, P. R. J., M. Bean, A. Becker, J. Coyne, R. d'Amours, L.-E. De Geer, R. Hogue, T. J. Stocki, R. K. Ungar, and G. Wotawa,
Geophys. Res. Lett. (2007), 34, L20802, doi:10.1029/2007GL030611.
Publications:
Petra Seibert and Paul Skomoroswki (2009), Source Location for the
CTBTO-WMO
Exercise 2008, Oral presentation at EGU General Assembly 2009. (pdf, 3.5 MB)
A. Becker, G. Wotawa, L.E. de Geer, P. Seibert, R.R. Draxler, C.
Sloan,
R. D' Amour, M. Hort, H. Glaab, P.Heinrich, Y. Grillon, V. Shershakov,
K. Katayama, Y. Zhang, P. Stewart, M. Hirtl, M. Jean, P. Chen
(2007): Global backtracking of anthropogenic radionuclides
by means of a receptor oriented ensemble dispersion
modelling system in support of nuclear-test-ban treaty
verification. Atmos. Environ.,
41 (21), 4520-4534 ([Abstract; fulltext for
Elsevier subscribers] )
Wotawa, G., Lars-Erik DeGeer, Philippe Denier, Martin Kalinowski,
Harri
Toivonen, Real D'Amours, Franco Desiato, Jean-Pierre Issartel, Matthias
Langer Petra Seibert, Andreas Frank, Craig Sloan and Hiromi Yamazawa
(2003): Atmospheric transport modelling in support of CTBT verification
-- Overview and basic concepts. Atmos.
Environ., 37 (18),
2529-2537 [Abstract; fulltext for
Elsevier subscribers].
Links to institutions
Links to resources
Links to disarmament and related events