mahr'svierteljahrsschriftfürästhetik
8
(2005), Nr.2/June
Aesthetica
„Give me a break.“ The
Goodman Debate on the aesthetics online server, January to April 2005, https://listserv.indiana.edu/archives/aesthetics-l.html. 52112 Zeichen.
communication
The
Martian I am comes late at a time when the earth has dried out and, for
miraculous reasons, one of the computers I can find that’s still working
shelters data under the label „aesthetics-on-line“. My particular interest is
drawn to a voluminous collection of letters spanning a period of several
decades of early 21st century. Miraculously, with constantly growing interest I
stumble repeatedly over two characters that obviously form an acronyme: LA. It
can’t be nothing else than the West Coast town named after Spanish „angeles“
and effaced long since, I mean, Los Angeles. Well, quite wrong! It reveals to
be the short form of a book called „Languages of Art“ whose
author is Nelson Goodman.
I
start with a letter a guy called William Conger wrote. He had obviously
suggested the whole debate with writing: „We should go through his Languages
chapter by chapter“ and, after some exchange on technique and its relevance to
art under the heading „No Gombrich, Yes Goodman“ he suggests „that we each,
active listers,“ - non-active listers keeping non-active - „take one chapter
and provide a brief summary explanation, starting with chapter 1. Kate? Wanna
start?“ (5 Feb 2005 08:16:03)
No. It is Alexei Procyshyn who will do so, though only at the final stage of
the discussion.
Copies of the book. Reluctance
with Allan and Sullivan. Do they want the „whole“ book?
the notation all in one? Derek Allan (in the thread
misleadingly called „No Gombrich, Yes Goodman“): Gombrich traditionally
representational, dated psychology, hidden critical Berenson. „But moving on to
Goodman, I would like to discuss ‘Languages of Art’ chapter by chapter as you
suggest but I will first have to borrow a copy from the library. I’ll let you
know when I’ve got one. I hope Bob Cantrick – and any one else who wants to –
will join in.“ (6 Feb 2005
12:44:39) Why doesn’t he own a copy anyway? Like Kate Sullivan disappointingly
tells: „I have to go and find the book first. Chapter one is probably the
simplest, so yes, I would prefer that one, unless I'm wrong and some other
chapter is easier to precis.“ („No Gombrich, Yes
Goodman“ 7 Feb 2005 22:55:07) Is Goodman’s not one of the three most important American books on
aesthetics and every aesthetics online lister supposed to have a copy at disposal. Also, as we know, it’s the last chapter of the
book that is introductory and has been widely anthologized. After comparably
long five days Sullivan tells us that „I have now managed to borrow a copy of
'Languages of Art'“ (12 Feb 2005
16:59:06) and even reports progress two days later: „I am acquiring a copy of
language and Art which should arrive soon.“ (14 Feb 2005
13:36:53) What a considerable effort to get hold of a material book in internet
times! I have also a problem with the participants’ not minding secondary
literature - for instance Chris Miller on the significance of „a
non-distinguishable copy [...] and what about a contemporary painter like Sol
LeWitt -- who writes scores for paintings that others will paint“ could have
mentioned that Kirk Pillow discussed the question „Did Goodman's Distinction
Survive LeWitt?“ in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61 (2003), pages
365-381 (27 Jan 2005 11:40:10). Kelly brings in at one of the very few times a
third person, Thomas Mitchell, probably W.J.T. Mitchell (8 Mar 2005 07:17:48).
There
has been some humor, for instance when Derek Allan sphinxicly replies to
Frances Kelly’s terminology. „'Phaneron' fascinates me. Sounds like something
out of 'Star Wars'.“ (Tue, 15 Feb 2005
09:09:54). In general, the sound of the discussion is refreshing, like a phone
talk, conversational. It confirms that electronic mail originated by means of
telephone modems well before internet mail became possible on a large scale. I
imagine Robert Cantrick virtually phoning up Derek Allan with the conversation
later deposited in our „voice“ boxes. For better or
worse, there is no duty to respond. Somehow can be watched in slow motion what
happens in a philosophical café, the discussion happenings that Marc Augé
invented. The philosophical café and the mailing list - that makes already two
new forms that emerged in the history of philosophical discourse only in two
decades.
Humanly,
all too humanly, the debate here included less noble behavior like cunning: „I
admit that I mis-quoted you, but I also admit that I was not entirely innocent.
I wanted to find out whether you know LANGUAGES OF ART by reading it yourself
or whether you know it from reading what someone else has said about it.“ (Robert
Cantrick on 18
Feb 2005 02:21:02)
Or a long message provided by Frances Kelly (18 Feb 2005
18:03:51) with a following short one by her and without response immediately
after in this thread by Derek Allan (19 Feb 2005
19:06:03). Yet Kelly responded to the latter as if there had happened nothing (19 Feb 2005 09:51:07). This is not really new. It was not even new when encounter groups
started to let live it.
Or,
Bob Cantrick is once more suspicious of second hand information: „No, you have
it completely wrong. The distinction made by Goodman's 5 criteria is the
distinction between what is a work of art and what
isn't. The distinction is not between one individual work of art and another
individual work of art“ (19 Feb 2005
18:57:20). This is not entirely correct because Goodman here refers to the
aesthetic and not to the work of art. It seems to be difficult to take
appropriate distance to conversation participants when Robert Cantrick praises
Kelly because of her acquaintance with Goodman’s book „Structure of Appearance“
and feels the urge of saying: „Well, after that bouquet what can I throw at you
now? I do have some questions“ (19 Feb 2005 21:16:14).
Derek
Allan plays the advocate’s devil, the badman vs. Goodman. He is provocative,
aggressive or at least ironical in several contexts and respects. For example:
„I think it is a bit unfair that you are the only one who is coming to the
defence of Goodman. (Well, Kate has now joined in …) I thought Goodman was a
bit of an icon in the world of aesthetics. Is there no-one else to plead his
cause? Or do we have so few readers of this list?“ (27 Feb 2005 19:52:25) Or those nice (characteristics of) „bloopers“
ascribed to Goodman (Allan 26 Feb 2005 18:44:25)!
An exchange between Kelly and Allan reveals some unserious treatment by Allan. Kelly
pockets criticism though he is not wrong criticizing her: „Why use two or three
words when one will do? ('genuine and original and authentic'… ‘a forge [forgery?] or fake or fraud’ ….’ fooled or tricked’).
It wears the reader out.“ (22 Mar 2005
09:23:19)
Cantrick
is hardly fairer to her with saying „You say: ‘Even if aesthetic objects of
humanal art are ... in some sort of linguistic language as Goodman insists.’ Now,
this is a flat contradiction of what Goodman says. What Goodman says is that
works of art are symbols in a NON-LINGUISTIC system“ and
claiming she only read a „second-hand account of LA“ (23 Mar 2005 21:33:52). Sublimation in scientific discourse does not work as politely as it
used to do. Aggression, impatience, subjectivity - yes, it’s a mailing list! -
take over. The will is weak to obey discursive rules. The result may be the
„uneasy feeling I’m talking to myself“ (Derek Allan on
8
Mar 2005 18:06:43).
To
profile Allan with Allan himself „what a generous and kind-hearted soul I am“ (3 Mar 2005 11:50:56) or with Cantrick who credits him with „taking aesthetics seriously“ (27 Feb 2005 05:18:16). It will not help. A month later Cantrick’s settling-day re Allan
takes place: „I am delighted to hear you say that you are going to drop out of
the thread on Goodman.“ (31 Mar 2005
06:24:33) There are others who keep being skeptical toward Nelson Goodman, a
„very theoretical fellow“ who remains „a question mark“ (Armando Baeza on 2 Mar
2005 16:20:14 and 14 Mar 2005 20:08:25).
ontology, reality
According
to Cantrick the main point is - and with saying this already signaling a debate
emerging from the thread „conger's evasion“ - the
„five syntactic and semantic requirements for symbolizing [...] theory of
notation.“ (28
Jan 2005 02:30:39).
Three weeks later Cantrick involuntarily highlights one of the underlying tasks
of such a theory: „If I have misrepresented Goodman by implying that his theory
of notation is about ontology, then that would be unfortunate“, ontology in the
sense of „what exists and what doesn't exist“ (19 Feb 2005 19:15:33). Well,
doesn’t Goodman himself say in a differenciated way that existence - in the
sense of compliance - is a matter of extension? (LA, 144) Pondering what
ontology has to do with reality seems all the more to be inevitable since an
invocation of the pictorial and literary arts’ stylistic feature of realism is
readily at hand. Cantrick: „I do have some questions. One of them concerns the
issue: realism vs. anti-realism. Another concerns the aesthetic vs. the
artistic. [...] So far, so good -- in re LA. The
theory of notation is such a systematic description. There is no question of
ontology at all. There is, rather, a question of language. Insofar, this might
be construed as a Peircian theory. However, it is not at all clear to me that
Peirce distinguished what signs signify from what WORLD signs signify. To
assume that there is only one world which signs signify is to ignore the
20th-century literature on anti-realism.“ (19 Feb 2005 21:16:14). Kelly who is addressed by Cantrick proposes an
idealist realism with Peirce focused on sense, but without psychologism
(24
Feb 2005 07:42:28).
Yet Cheerskep is a bit right with cautioning against a discussion of isms,
especially realism: „I would die semi-happy if all the listers following the
current Goodman topic on our forum were to see that it's not a dispute about
the "is-ness" or "no is-ness" of "art". It's a wrangle
about what we should CALL art.“ (23 Feb 2005 14:52:32)
symbol, not sign
Everybody
who watched the debate knows that until the end Derek Allan did not leave off
reproaching Goodman that he had not defined „symbol“, nor distinguished sign
and symbol (30 Mar 2005 17:31:54). Allan hears Goodman still „talking about
‘symbols’, ‘symbolization’ etc with nothing more substantial to define the
terms than the non-definition in the Introduction“ (27 Feb 2005 11:57:34). He further wants to know how to get from symbols to art, more
precisely, to art works, for instance when „“symbols are works of art in the
world”“ (27 Feb 2005 19:52:25). What, however, if we assumed or even more,
interpreted „Languages of Art“ as an overall attempt implicitly defining
„symbol“ in terms of art languages? Maybe, Allan is too impatient with
connecting a definition of symbol with a theory of art and demanding from
Goodman to immediately say what art is a representation or
expression OF! Bob Cantrick is appropriately strict: „Until you
understand this distinction <„ that the world is the reality which concepts
are OF [and] that the world is the reality which symbols MAKE“>, you cannot
move on. For moving on will not be constructive. Any
further comments that you make will be irrelevant.“ (27 Feb 2005 05:18:16)
With
an eye on sense Frances Kelly summarizes with Goodman as had already done
Cantrick: „The nonverbal "languages" of artistic objects deposit to
sense or stir in sense nominal notions that are mentioned or expressed as
symbolic "notations" in the "textual" form of
(allographic/autographic?) "inscriptions"
which may be oral or literal. [...] The grammatic structure of the symbolic
"scheme" and the symbolic "system" consists of: (1)
syntactic density, and (2) semantic density, and (3) syntactic repleteness, and
(4) exemplification, and (5) multiple complex referability.“
(21
Feb 2005 22:23:01)
She also wants to say with Kant and Goodman „that the world is merely a
subjective reality which the mind makes with symbols“ -
something which would well fit into a constructivist stance - . And she adds
that this is „the best nineteenth century position we have on the art symbol
that exists in our current century“, or: „both fiction and faction can be
conditional propositions“, or: „On realist pragmatism, it with its categorics
and semiotics is the best tool we now have to bridge the gap between
metaphysical philosophy and empirical science.“ (28 Feb 2005 18:44:57).
Kelly
more precisely: „Goodman must say this because he is a nominalist, and his
symbols therefore need be reduced to lingual signs like terms. It might be best
however to perhaps wait and see how the discussion by listers on Goodman will
proceed, before pursuing this line of thought.“ (1 Mar 2005 07:36:45) Yet, all this does not prevent Goodman from Kelly’s vigourous
criticism: „Goodman fails to make a global theory of symbolicity for art or
nonart. [...] Goodman indeed fails to differentiate at least between kinds of
"artistic classes" as say fine and liberal and applied or craft, and
between kinds of "aesthetic experiences" as say emotional and
sensible and material and technical and practical and intellectual and so on. [...]
he completely misses the fact that what an original work of lofty fine art in
being genuine and authentic has that others lack is the "formal
power" to reflect worthy values and to evoke intense responses that might
be held worthwhile as aesthetic or artistic.“ (3 Mar 2005
07:23:18) And he seems to miss „appreciating just what the material and original
of the various arts really is.“ (9 Mar 2005 10:34:40) Eleven seconds later she says concerning one of the difference between
the arts: „in an artwork like a painting, even the slightest change of form in
a figure in a ground however will alter the feeling and "meaning" of
the painted artifact, in ways that would not affect the knowing and meaning of
the lettered word. The difference it seems to me could only be accounted for
with a theory of iconicity and also indexicity.“ (9 Mar 2005 10:34:51)
In
defence of Goodman - doesn’t he theoretically still profit from and demonstrate
the formalist tradition not so much of Bell and Fry but the
formalism of Frege and Russell which was a pendant to vigourous Russian
formalism at the time? There is a formal power that is not so much the power of
the material constituents but of the linguistic/symbolic/fomalist structure
that brought the linguist turn in the theory of art. It is precisely in this
that Goodman participates in the late aesthetic avant-garde that was developed and
brought forward in the 1960es.
Kelly’s
view is „that Goodman has a good special theory, of abstract symbols which are
formally arbitrary and socially conventional, but that his analytic theory
fails as a general or universal theory“ asd does his theory of metaphor that
shows Goodman ending up with a „radical kind of subjective relativism“ (6 Mar
2005 10:27:16). While opting for „realist pragmatism“ which
is not nominalist Kelly underlines the need „to get a historic inventory of
symbols“. She thinks Goodman „is after all an extreme nominalist and holds the
art symbol to be an arbitrary convention whose meaning is socially agreed upon“ (13 Mar 2005 05:23:34) whereas she is convinced that „all
attributed essences and manifested substances and exemplified presences in the
world are ‘seeming’ phenomena, and are sensed by normal humans as existent
facts by the semiosic process of representation.“ (13 Mar 2005
05:44:10)
At
one of the many times of switching to Peirce she says: „There is a reason in
Peirce why he early on almost called his logic by the name "symbolic"
rather than "semeiotic" which he first chose and that is now commonly
called semiotics. The reason for "symbolic" was that representation
and logic for him turns on signs, and symbols are the main kinds of signs used
in logic. He changed his mind however when he found that logic in fact involves
all kinds of signs, and not only symbols. [...] There is for me a strong covert
presence of Peirce in Goodman struggling to get out. If the theory of Goodman
were reframed in original Peircean thought, then perhaps a new symbolic
perspective on Goodman might emerge, and even present his theory on a more
global level. It is not likely however that his theory can be salvaged as a
general theory from within itself without other external influences.“ (21 Mar 2005 07:44:11)
Kelly
writes in „regard to the Goodman theory“ (9 Mar 2005 10:30:46). True, we want a theory. But shouldn’t we be careful with demanding a
theory from a philosopher who thinks in the nominalist tradition of analytic
„theory“, a tradition that rather aims at clarifying the relationship to (art)
theory than constructing a theory itself. That means Goodman aims at resetting
a debate on art with refocusing the analytic enterprise. Though
we need not go as far as Wittgenstein who understood philosophy as a cure
against theory. Locke will do, as Kate Sullivan reports (1 Mar 2005 08:40:27).
So,
when Kelly obviously needs to clarify the relation to the theory of Peirce, she
does so with a general interest in philosophical theory more than with a
specific interest, as admittedly do others, in the aesthetics online list. She
says that „sign is the genus umbrella under which any symbol should actually
and properly fall as a species of sign“ (9 Mar 2005 10:34:40) as one of her
„tasks here in this topic is to play an advocate for Goodman by trying to
salvage his theory of art as a symbol in language. The only possible way for me
to do this might be by placing his theory tentatively within a Peircean system
of signage signs“ (30 Mar 2005
11:14:08). So Kelly receives response at different levels. Michael Brady (9 Mar 2005 10:39:16): „(1) You sent three messages,
"Goodman," "3 Goodman," and "4 Goodman." Is there
a No. 2? (2) Thank you for rediscovering the active
voice and the natural cadence of the language! These messages are so much
easier to read and follow.“ In a reply to Robert
Cantrick Kelly who does not intend to enter a discussion on the theory of
notation rather confesses: „Now, artworks are symbols supposedly
in nonverbal language as Goodman speculates, which language of course
does not yet exist. Furthermore, there is no such sign system as a
nonlinguistic language. If signs are in a nonlinguistic system, then it is as
signage and not as language. Artworks can nonetheless be symbols in nonlingual
signage with no contest or problem, but this neat solution is not what Goodman
is proposing. Rather, he is after a language of art.“
(24
Mar 2005 00:03:26) „Then, why do you
bring it up?“, replies Cantrick with unease: „Goodman
is not talking about signs. He is talking about symbols. [...] Goodman is not
talking about signs. Period. Goodman is not talking
about non-linguistic languages. Period. Goodman is not
talking about semiotics. Period. Goodman is not
talking about non-linguistic symbol systems as though the term 'non-linguistic
symbol system' were a synonym for the term 'language'. Period.
If a non-linguistic symbol system is not a language, what is it? It is the
theory of notation in chapter 4.“ (30 Mar 2005 03:12:28)
The
debate about symbol and/or sign remains unsettled until the end of the debate. Could
symbol and sign be used interchangeably, as Alexei Procyshyn indicates (23 Mar 2005 21:22:07)? Or should more or less primitiveness be the distinguishing criterion,
as Boris Hoshensky offers: „This is my take on understanding the difference
between ‘sign’ and ‘symbol’ as Goodman sees it, but I may be wrong and I am
sure you will correct me. “Symbol” in art is a complex of signs similar to the
relation of molecule to atom. There is molecular biology, but no ‘atomic’
biology because atom can’t be ‘organic.’ The same in art we have ‘symbolism’,
but no ‘signism’.“ (8 Mar 2005
22:47:28) Or is the task of „Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols“ to develop a
philosophy of language focused on the arts - prompting Goodman to step from
language to languages - before we can have a concept of the symbol. This is
what Kate Sullivan observes: „The first paragraph of the introduction says that
the objective is an approach to a general theory of symbols. It is possible
that Goodman felt after the theory was conceived was a better time to define
symbol.“ (26 Feb 2005
20:06:56) In fact, much of „Languages of Art“ reads, under the auspices of
constructive nominalism, like a conversion of what is spreaded in Goodman’s
„The Structure of Appearance“ for different aims.
Or
does „symbol“ remain a foreign body to the philosophy
of language as well as the philosophy of art altogether?
What
ought to be said is that we should distinguish „symbol“ and
„sign“ - with Goodman. For tactical and much more strategically subterranean
reasons he says symbol, but often means sign. Obviously he wants to steer
against a tradition that does not exist as simply as sometimes understood. Peirce
(icon, symbol, index), Collingwood (representation), Morris (sign), Langer
(symbolization) - the semiotic, the expressionist, the analytic, the symbolist
tradition? Certainly not one single tradition alone.
Leave alone what is or has become of the Lacanian symbolic, the art movement
symbolism, Hegel’s symbolic art form (the natural forms of an oriental and
Egyptian art of sublimity). Also „symbol“ is close to
„sign“ because of a technological aspect invisible but at hands in Goodman’s
approach. Art works could - „letters, words, texts, pictures, diagrams, maps,
models“xi - be understood as products that are sign-like („zeichnerisch“) and
design-like (plan/finish) produced by kinds of sign technologies.
William
Conger is relaxed, with an eye on Goodman’s prehistory: „I wonder if he was
influenced by Suzanne Langer who makes clear distinction between sign and
symbol but feels that sign 'could' refer to both. She then adopted the term
'signal' (from Charles Morris) to keep separate the notion of simple reference
to an object or situation while symbol stands for the idea (something bigger
than object or situation) or conception. At any rate, I think it's ok to keep a
somewhat fluid relation between signs and symbols since they require each other
and thus must share some discursive traits.“ 8 Mar 2005 17:57:05) Much ado about nothing?
valuation
Ontology
in a quasi evaluative sense is touched by Boris Hoshensky who maintains that
the „'reality' of artwork is much richer then plain physical reality.“ (19 Feb 2005 21:25:59) Yes, true. But the richness of an artwork is achieved right away by
means of Goodman’s „grammatic structure of the symbolic "scheme" and
the symbolic "system" [...]: (1) syntactic density, and (2) semantic
density, and (3) syntactic repleteness, and (4) exemplification, and (5)
multiple complex referability“ as renders Kelly (21 Feb 2005 22:23:01). Rich and real in the sense of an ontology of
symbols is what is dense and replete and what is exemplified rather than
represented. With this intention of Goodman in mind we can at least understand
why he hoped to sublate questions of value and judgment into questions of the
arts and their cognitive efficacy and of the intrinsic value as provided by the
very structure of the artwork itself (LA 109, 262).
So
Chris Miller seems to miss the point when he says: „As Mothersill pointed out
[...] the theory applies to matchbook covers as well as a Rembrandts -- without
accounting for why one might have greater value than the other.“ (17 Feb 2005 11:59:55) Here Cantrick correctly says „that Goodman is not asking the same
question as Mothersill. She is asking: what is an aesthetic judgment of an
INDIVIDUAL work of art? This question is distinguished from the question: what
is an aesthetic judgment of ANY work of art? In either case, the point is to
distinguish what is good art from what is not. To say that Goodman's theory
applies just as well to match book covers as to Rembrandts is to imply that
Goodman's theory makes no aesthetic judgment at all. However, to imply this is
not to discredit Goodman.“ (18 Feb 2005 03:17:12)
To
which Chris Miller replies: „This inspection is not going to verify whether the
match book cover could be considered a work of art -- or is even worthy of any
attention at all -- but will just verify how one match book cover can be
distinguished from another match book cover -- or from a Rembrandt painting --
or from any other made thing --- or from any natural thing --- is that correct ? If so -- my concern is that most of these
distinctions are going to be -- as Cheerskep might put it -- 'banal' -- indeed,
only a few will not be -- and how to discover and distinguish those few from
the plethora of others would seem to be a more important question.“ (18 Feb 2005 11:50:06)
It
is, however, to be maintained that this kind of distinctions is the basis for
arriving at the aesthetic or the aesthetic difference. It does not matter
whether it is art in the first place. As long as symbols are inscribed to
languages/technologies, any symbolic activity is art. Of course we have the
„arts“ in the conventional sense. Yet it is not a
matter of (exclusion or) inclusion in the (non)meritorious
sense. And for the banal - did not Arthur Danto write a whole book about the
„Transfiguration du banal“ as the French title has it?
February,
24
„Be faithful to the earth!“
Nietzsche
Those
are the fourteen messages sent according to the numbers 349, 351-3, 356-63,
367, 369 as registered by the aesthetics-on-line list server on February 24, 2005 (note the different time zones):
349
09:08:47 Allan versus Cheerskep
351
10:17:41 Allan more precise (to Cheerskep)
352
12:08:53 Allan coping with Cantrick
353
02:47:14 Cantrick to Miller: “I am sorry I don't know“
356
05:09:47 Cantrick contra Allan
357
05:46:34 Hoshenski: „Alexei, you have me right 101%.“
358
16:52:12 Allan contra Cantrick
359
06:04:01 Hoshensky assists Cantrick
360
17:19:08 Allan (versus Hoshenski)
361
06:35:34 Hoshenski insists
362
07:42:28 „Frances to Alexei and Boris...“
363
11:08:15 Cheerskep to Procyshyn and on Kelly
367
12:20:30 „I have now got a copy of Goodman. Kate Sullivan"
369
16:21:05 Procyshyn accepting praise by Cheerskep
Given
Aristotle’s three unities, could we imagine this disperse conversation in the
internet - a spatial unity! - (1) of this day (2) „Re:
Goodman“ (3) re-performed on a stage à la Feyerabend’s late plays? Yes. It
could well form a whole act.
This
is the material:
349
09:08:47 Derek Allan is skeptical toward Cheerskep (who misunderstands Goodman -
who never said - that a lost painting falls out of the symbol system) saying to
Cheerskep that such a kind of philosophy of art is not specific to art.
351
10:17:41 Derek Allan corrects 349: „an“ instead of
„any“
352
12:08:53 Derek Allan copes with Robert Cantrick and keeps with the faith in
„what the ‘reality’ or ‘world’ that is represented *is*“. He further suspects
that Goodman’s dispensing with resemblance might yield more problems than it
solves.
353
02:47:14 Robert Cantrick knows disappointingly little: „I am sorry I don't know
the details you request“ although Chris Miller, the
day before, asked very specific questions „Bob, can you tell us more about
Goodman's career as an art dealer ? Did he have his own gallery
? In what period did he specialize ? How long
did he do it ?“ (23 Feb 2005
12:03:22) right after he had reported: „At one time Goodman was a professional
art dealer. When he came to my college at my invitation to give a lecture, he
requested that a curator at the local art museum prepare a large number of
slides selected from various periods and styles without telling him in advance
who the artists were or what the periods and styles were and without providing
any such information when projected on a screen. He then proceeded to lecture
extemporaneously by identifying each artist, each period, and each style in
order to explain that during the time when projected on the screen these
representations were symbols conforming to various non-linguistic symbol
systems. During the time when these individual objects were not being
exhibited, for example when they were freight in a moving van, this freight did
not conform to any non-linguistic symbol system. He titled his lecture
"When Is Art", and subsequently made the point part of his 1978 book
titled "Ways of World-making".“ (23 Feb 2005 02:51:19)
356
05:09:47 Robert Cantrick becomes increasingly impatient to Derek Allan with
responding to Allan’s suspicion that „Goodman seems to have no clear idea of
what the ‘reality’ or ‘world’ that is represented *is*“ (352
12:08:53): „There is one landscape represented. There is more than one
representation of it. You say that this simple elementary distinction by
Goodman is a vague generality? Give me a break.“
357
05:46:34 Hoshenski who has been approached by Kelly on Feb 23 and got help from
Alexei with asking Kelly again who did not enter Boris’s question (who himself
had given no answer to Kelly’s before): „Alexei, you have me right 101%.“
358
16:52:12 Derek Allan continues the quarrel with Cantrick. He insists that
Goodman was unclear about what reality is which for Allan is supposed to be
what the artist addresses.
359
06:04:01 Boris Hoshensky assists Cantrick with a message containing this one
sentence: „I think Robert's example is as clear as it could be.“
360
17:19:08 Derek Allan (versus Boris Hoshenski): „Yes. It just wasn't relevant to
my criticism, as I explained. But I am hoping we can move on...“
361
06:35:34 to which measage Hoshenski replies with insisting: „It is question of
one landscape. The fundamental question the painter-S have to deal with is to
represent (paint) the same landscape in as many ways as the number of painters.“
362
07:42:28 „Frances to Alexei and Boris...“ wants to enter a
discussion with Procyshyn and Hoshenski (out of disappointment because one of
her posts went unnoticed?): „The recent discussions of Derek and Robert on this
topic might be best consulted here“, but then sets out to delineate Peirce’s
position on the senses.
363
11:08:15 Cheerskep to Alexei Procyshyn who the day before wrote pro Wittgenstein
and his everyday language stance and on Kelly. It is basically criticism on
Kelly’s Peirce and about the distinction of everyday and expert language,
something to which Kelly herself will not respond.
367
12:20:30 „I have now got a copy of Goodman. Kate Sullivan“
369
16:21:05 Alexei Procyshyn who just entered the discussion a day earlier
referring to the early Wittgenstein’s discussion of solipsism (23 Feb 2005
22:07:45) accepts „praise“ by Cheerskep and tells the source with quoting
Tractatus 5.631-5.641 which also is a hint for Kelly in particular. Procyshyn
stands up for a „justification for a dense and presupposed vocabulary“ used instead of justified, and communicates that „I just
picked up a copy of LA“. Also Procyshyn and Hoshenski want to stay with the
topic landscape. Procyshyn: „I am not going to protest William's or Boris' (to
name a few active listers that are artists) or my mechanic's use of it.“
What
the director of the play would have to keep in mind: there is a multiple
attention on behalf of the mail conversation participants akin to the attention
of non-academic TV audience phoning into talk shows or zapping programs. Being
online, as on this thursday, means for instance to Derek Allan to be able to
respond at any (day) time which for Feb 24 allows for sending messages at
09:08:47, 10:17:41, 12:08:53, 16:52:12, and 17:19:08.
forgery, two letters and a
debate disintegrating
Boris
Hoshensky judgement on Goodman’s chapter III „Art and Authenticity“: „It feels
like pure mental ‘gymnastics’.“ (8 Mar 2005 22:47:28) Yes, it may especially do so to someone who cannot - after all this
forging in contemporary art since the 1960es by the market in general and the
parodies on it from Warhol to the appropriationists - imagine how shocking the
forger Van Meegeren case was at the time when Goodman developed his „Languages
of Art“. Nonetheless the different ways of detecting an authentic work are
crucial to understand the basic distinction for edifying a general theory of
the arts, which is the distinction of autographic and allographic as Robert
Cantrick reminds us (23 Mar 2005 03:23:11). Here as often Allan’s hermeneutical
will is weak: „A distinction which I think I have now shown in two or three
recent posts to be both muddled, and irrelevant to any useful analysis of the
question of forgery.“ (23 Mar 2005 15:15:23) - Also with distancing resemblance and copy from conceiving
representation in chapter I - II The Sound of Pictures - chapter III Art and
Authenticity prepares for chapter IV „The Theory of Notation“.
The
discussion about forgery and authenticity, obligatory for any Goodman debate,
is launched by Derek Allan (3 Mar 2005 11:50:56). Only later, Allan is ready to include discussing the distinction
autographic/allographic (11 Mar 09:07:50). He had discussed the
person distilled or distinguished from the sculpture of the person (2 Mar 2005 09:46:27) and asks himself „what is going on when a picture is painted. It's a
conceptual issue, not a practical one.“ (2 Mar 2005 13:18:15) After this, he speaks of portraiture in general which is an important
change because portraiture takes of and replaces what had been covered by
sculpture (Goodman) and painting (2 Mar 2005 13:31:32). And Boris Hoshensky imitates Allan’s double sequence (2 Mar 2005 15:45:02): „You are making my point by excellent examples. There is no
mechanical duplication in all of them, but "extraction of 'soul'"
using different 'symbols'.“
William
Conger: „I suggest that Derek stop throwing stones until he gets there with him
<Goodman>. But I know that's hopeless because we had this same
conversation about Gombrich a few years ago. Ultimately, Derek wants to know
why he feels some distress when confronted by fake art. The fact is that his
malaise has nothing to do with Goodman or art as such but with some
psychological reaction to betrayal or being lied to or being hoodwinked or
being fooled, all understandable. Yet there's also a certain kind of admiration
for convincing fakes and fakers. We like to be fooled because we want some zone
of magic and mystery or some evidence that causality or reality can be
subverted...but only with our prior agreement. It's a vanity thing.“ (8 Mar 2005 17:57:05).
As
it turns out, Robert Cantrick introduces the final stage of the debate with
presenting an exchange of two letters he had with Goodman more than thirty
years ago. Does it indicate, apart from scanning problems with „hotmail“ not
allowing attachments, a failure of communication (13 Mar 2005 22:09:50). The
letters are finally presented by Cantrick in typed form under the heading
„goodman's 1974 letter to me“: his letter to Goodman of August 14, 1974 about forging a symphony and Goodman’s answer of September 3, 1974 (18
Mar 2005 01:36:14).
It
is Derek Allan who has a reply referring to „Languages of Art“,
p.112, but cannot refrain from offending Cantrick: „I would rather read someone
who thinks clearly.“ (20 Mar 2005
23:32:05) Replies come from Miller and two times from Allan: „both boxing with
shadows“ and „I had always suspected that he was a far
less substantial thinker than he was crackled up to be. Now I know that to be
so.“ (21 Mar 2005 12:13:15) And Miller: „And what about those popular music groups -- like the
Temptations -- where only one member of the orginal group is still involved --
but they still use the name and imititate the style of the originals. It might
be legal -- but it's still a forgery, isn't it -- especially when they go back
in the studio to re-record the famous old songs and issue an album called
"Greatest hits" ?“ (27 Jan 2005 08:38:31)
From
now on, March 15, there is a partition of the Goodman debate in those, like
Allan and Miller, who do not like to anymore discuss „Languages of Art“ and
want to talk about the letters relating to „Problems and Projects“ and those
who further on wish to enter more intensely „Languages of Art“ like Procyshyn.
Late
verve, end of the debate
The
final stage of the debate arrived with several topics parting under the thread
„Re: Goodman“ still in place for two more weeks: an exchange of Kelly and
Armando Baeza, comments on the correspondance of Cantrick and Goodman, and
Alexei Procyshyn’s remarks on Goodman’s distinction of linguistic and
non-linguistic systems.
What
a difference a day makes! March 15 shows to be the debate’s
point of no return. Derek Allan had criticized LA, pp. 108 and 109 (12 Mar 2005 11:46:35) after Alex Procyshyn had expressed his feeling: „My frustration,
Derek, [...] you don't say anything interesting about goodman.“
(11
Mar 2005 20:33:53)
But Allan does not respond to that strong personal statement. Moreover he
hastes to refer to LA pp. 109-112 with asking: „does it make any ‘aesthetic
difference’ to the viewer knowing who painted it?“ (12 Mar 2005 17:28:19) and writing: „Bit disappointed that my analysis of pages 109 to 112 of
Goodman <of 12 Mar 2005 17:28:19> is slipping into the realm of forgotten things, without comment.“ (15 Mar 2005 10:58:44) Yet Alexei Procyshyn is ready to take up the cudgel concerning the
anaesthetic and aesthetic difference. He removes the question mark again that
had been smuggled in by Kelly (13 Mar 2005 05:44:10) and says „about Goodman:
there isn't much that hasn't been directly imported -- without due reflection
on what such an importation might entail or transform -- from typical analytic
philosophy of language“ and that Goodman is interested
more in extension than in the work itself (15 Mar 2005 01:08:34). Allan replies
that Goodman, with respect to the „powers of discriminating among works“ of art
(p.111), does not define „aesthetic“ and does not seem to need feeling the
difference between a Raphael and a Rembrandt painting (16 Mar 2005 11:27:45). To
which Alexei replies: „My inclination is, to your dismay i'm sure, rather
Kantian viz. a work of art: there is something fundamental about a work of art
that resists conceptual subsumption. Goodman seems, however, to be trying to
assimilate aesthetic judgment -- whatever that turns out to be -- to a notion
of judgment (and by implication also experience in general, since it requires
judgment) that Kant would call a determinative judgment (as opposed to a
reflective one). [... <no difference between a rooster and a Vermeer
painting> ...] He may be wrong, but not because there is a problem with the
argument, but because some of his premises are wrong -- namely that 'aesthetic
judgment' is identical with (for want of a better way of putting it) 'empirical
judgment'.“ (15 Mar 2005
22:10:12, see also 16 Mar 2005 10:51:38) Again Allan simplifies: „Goodman is simply guilty of very sloppy
thinking.“ (16 Mar 2005
18:57:49)
With
objecting against Goodman that he „would have provided a rather detailed
introduction that sketches the argument and hints at a few of the major results
or definitions [... and] would hate to see a paper about literature, that began
as a logic proof might: defining a universe of discourse, constructing a model,
and then providing a valuation of it“ (16 Mar 2005
10:51:38), Procyshyn gets into his stride. He discusses art and epistemology
with regard to the symbol and takes up the distinction reference/symbol with
Goodman’s early coordinates - something the non-active listers would have liked
to read already at the beginning of the debate: „However, as Goodman writes in
his preface, "my inquiries into the theory of knowledge ... joined my interest
in the arts," (v) and (from the Introduction) that "[t]hough this
book deals with some problems pertaining to the arts, its scope does not
coincide very closely with what is ordinarily taken to be the field of
aesthetics" (xi). Moreover, "the objective is an approach to a
general theory of symbols" (xi). In short, what might have been
groundbreaking, or epoch making as you have mentioned, about Goodman's work
here is the connection he attempts to establish between art and epistemology
(by way of adopting a conception involved in both discourses -- 'symbol'): art
is another way to know; and if it is another way to know, it is not susceptible
to the emotivist reduction of an artwork's content to either a 'boo!' or
'Hurrah!' (which was, as I'm sure you are aware, a
predominent trend up to about the late fifties (or even the seventies according
to some) in normative or value theory. With this fundamental methodological
shift to the techniques of analysis offered by the philosophy of language, some
of the problems of language in general have to be addressed within his theory
of art's language. If Goodman is to consider Art to fall within the purview of
the philosophy of language, then 'reference,' as one among many perennial
problems of phil. of language, needs to be addressed. Nevertheless, the cost
incurred by this shift might be profitable, since one of the immediate upshots
is that the domain of art is not a semantically vacuous one.“
(17
Mar 2005 13:21:39)
Without
uttering doubts - a rare occasion with Allan - Procyshyn is confirmed by him
(Fri, 18
Mar 2005 10:03:49).
Procyshyn for his part delivers under the title „Goodman, a digest“ an account of G.’s definition of symbol with
„Preliminaries, a Construction“ and a summary of Goodman’s introduction and ch.
1, secs. 1-9 (19 Mar 2005 18:31:43) solliciting comments and a summary of LA chs. 4 to 6 by Robert Cantrick (23
Mar 2005
22:28:40,
1 Apr 2005
02:22:57). Allan seems to be overtaxed and does not respond to it at all (20 Mar
2005 23:32:05) whereas Hoshensky is pleased of Procyshyn’s text that is „very
clear, convincing and easy to read“ (21 Mar 2005
03:18:16) and Kate Sullivan reacts like a high school teacher: „I don't think
the precis is supposed to be nearly as long as the original regardless of its
clarity.“ (21
Mar 2005 12:28:56)
Joseph Nechvatal replies merely artistically (21 Mar 2005
17:38:05). The same goes for Miller’s „Reply“: „On my website, for example,
there's 13 different sculptural portraits commissioned [...]
http://www.ilovefiguresculpture.com“ (21 Mar 2005 11:52:16).
Procyshyn
does not show to be discouraged by this overall non-(specific) response. He
proceeds to elaborate on the extension of a
predicate/schemata II/6. Whether it can be translated, remains to be circular (21 Mar 2005 23:02:01) on the artistic conceptual scheme (21 Mar 2005
23:52:50) and on what Goodman has to say about deception, the „interface --
between our typical mode of interpretation and the one used in depicting
something. [...] Derek Allan: „As for your claim that “in Goodman's sense,
'realism' is … a conceptual classification of works of art that involves two
axes: horizontally, one tracks the everyday conceptual scheme used by people in
going about their business; vertically, one tracks the conceptual scheme an
artist uses in depicting an object. and the relation
between these axes is an index of a work of art's 'realism'”, I have no idea
where you get this from. Can you quote me the words where Goodman says this?“ (22 Mar 2005 17:29:09) Procyshyn: „Admittedly, the notions of a 'horizontal' and 'vertical'
axis are mine. I introduced them only in order to make more apparent the
distinctin goodman does in fact draw between the symbolic scheme used in
depiction and the one used by someone in 'decoding'.“ (22 Mar 2005 21:35:25)
The
ensuing posts - by Cantrick and Cheerskep - include indirect responses to
Allan. Cantrick praises „Alexei: Your large posting (44b or so) came through to
me O.K. I regard it as setting a high standard for others to follow.“ (23 Mar 2005 21:22:55; Allan also with compliment on 24 Mar 2005
09:40:12) Cheerskep says, also a bit directed to Kelly, that during Goodman’s
lifetime „philosophers were accepting without question that an action they
termed "denotation" could be carried out by insensate, inert,
immotile extra-mental objects. But such objects do not "act" in any
way.“ (23 Mar 2005 17:10:05) And Cantrick once more sheds praise on Procyshyn because he „raises
the discussion above the level of lexical semantics“ mentioning what „Goodman
says in ch. 2, p. 57, <not only!> of the first edition: "... not all
labels are predicates; predicates are labels from linguistic systems." The
point is that Goodman is not advocating any linguistic system. He is advocating
a non-linguistic symbol system.“ And further on: „You
have plucked two concepts out of two methodological traditions without
recognizing that the two traditions are not in the same category“ which makes
him, less friendly said, „very suspicious of anything you may say in the future
(à la Derek Allan).“ (23 Mar 2005 22:28:40) Of course this is the moment when Allan cannot prevent himself from
reentering the discussion: „I suspect I should be offended by this but I find
Bob’s sentence rather hard to follow so I will just smile and nod instead.“ (24 Mar 2005 09:40:12)
My
goodness, Goodman! The goddess deconstructuralism!
It
occurred to Allan as he „was musing over Goodman (not a pleasant experience by
the way) that there is an interesting similarity between his approach and
deconstructionist thinking.“ (10 Mar 2005 09:03:25) This may have been stimulated by Alexei who wrote the other day „that
many Deconstructionists say that everything is text. But it is important to
note that Derrida himself said something more like, there is nothing outside of
texts. and all this means is that so long as we hold onto the referential
function of language, the only thing that can be referred to are other signs or
symbols.“ (9
Mar 2005 18:04:19)
There is a reply by Allan, but he does not enter pondering the possible Derrida
share. He will touch however Lacan: „something is a symbolic only“ (10 Mar 2005 11:29:56) and the „Symbolist poets in France“:
„God! I really don’t know if they ‘refer’ or not! I didn’t say they didn’t. The
closest anyone has come to saying that is Bob Cantrick who seemed to end up
saying that Goodman means that symbols symbolise symbols. My head is still
spinning from that one“ (10 Mar 2005
19:50:18). That seems to have prompted Procyshyn to restrict his sympathies for
the deconstructivism of Derrida and Heidegger: „I don't particularly like what
Blanchot, Later Heidegger, or Derrida (*Truth in painting* might just be the
worst book I have ever read, and "...Poetically Man Dwells..." the
most dishonest analysis ever put forward), for example, have to say about
anything, but that doesn't mean I read them - when I have to - as ascetically
and negatively as possible. Even *Truth an Painting* has a moment or two that
is suggestive.“ (10 Mar 2005
12:16:16)
Yet,
two weeks later, Procyshyn answers, with reference to his digest 1/4, to the
(Cheerskep’s) question „whether a symbol, taken in-itself [...] or whether an
object for-itself (i.e. with my 'help'), denotes“ (23 Mar 2005 20:10:34). And
he addresses Cantrick’s remark on property and predicate und his reproach using
structuralism in a Saussure way of reformulating Goodman about the schema: „The
second comment, however, requires a little more effort to defend. I invoked the
tried and (un)true structuralist notion of a 'system
of differences' (langue) in an attempt to explicate the manner in which Goodman
deploys the notion of a schema. That is, a label is only articulate within a
particular schema, wherein the range of its application is determined by other,
distinct, different, as well as associated, similar, etc. labels. Only within a
schema (which offers a certain fine-grainedness to a label by way of its
differences and similarities to other labels, which constitute the schema) can
the extension of a label be determined (LA 71-72). in
short, it is not merely a matter of binary oppositions (e.g. between langue and
parole), but how certain differences, etc, refine the scope of particular
labels within a schema. This can be translated, i think, into set theoretic
terms: one need only determine the intersection of certain labels, contrasted
with their compliment and difference (i.e. what falls outside of the
intersection of two labels, but contained by another distinct label). As such,
while perhaps a strained transfer between two vocabularies, my point is not a
category error.“ (23 Mar 2005
20:39:24)
Derek
Allan joins the discussion with specifically replying with regard to the symbol
that „one of the first things one would want to do is distinguish it from the
idea of a sign. Goodman as far as I can see never does“ (24 Mar 2005 12:48:35) which reply makes Procyshyn defend himself with structuralism
continued: „I don't think I'm using 'sign' and 'symbol' interchangeably. I'm
only suggesting that the Connection between referent and symbol has yet to be
determined -- not that the connection between signifier and signified is
arbitrary (i.e. the difference par excellence between sign and symbol). Furthermore,
all i am suggesting is that the connections between signifier, signified, and
referent is not absolute or invarient. But this does not suggest that they are
arbitrary. And it is precisely these connections, i think, that Goodman takes
to be epistemological.“ (23 Mar 2005
21:22:07) This makes Allan answering with a question: „Why would we call a
painting a ‘symbolic structure’?“ (24 Mar 2005 14:17:42) And while Cheer<radical?>skep claiming that denotation needs to
be understood as action (24 Mar 2005 16:12:37) is confronted with Procyshyn’s question „if relations are not
external, mind independent ontological enitities, could they be (as in say the
British Hegelians) internal to mind independent ontological entities, a kind of
potentiality that a subject actualizes?“ (24 Mar 2005 17:25:03), Allan is confronted by Procyshyn with a double maneuver: „the term 'structure'
has become a bit of a verbal tick for me as of late (too much Althusser on the
brain). Nothing may really depend on it. [...] G.'s idea of Realism is indeed
idiosyncratic. [...] it's the *ease or expedience* of translation between the
conceptual scheme used in the depiction and the conceptual scheme used in
viewing that defines realism.“ And he is right with
saying: „The real problem, i think lies in how symbols are constructed (hence
the use of structure earlier, but again, my bark might have sprung a conceptual
leak). [...] Goodman takes personification to be a metaphor. Now, I don't know
how to square this, since personification is a tried and true method of
*allegory* (one need only look at Prudentius's *Psychomachia* to verify this). Now,
I know of at least one approach to allegory (namely the structrualist one) that
treats it as an extended metaphor: the whole of an allegorical text, painting,
etc., is a metaphor. But this can't be what Goodman has in mind, can it? How
would personification, as a transfer of a schema, be extended in this sense? if it is, then we can, by parity of example, claim that the
work itself is a symbol, whereas if it is not, then it has to be a structure of
symbols... i think. in any event, there is something wonky at work in Goodman's
treatment of personification and how this might affect the notion of symbol by
way of his conception of schemata.“ (25 Mar 2005
14:07:11)
Is
this the kind of thought that will make us with Allan helpless like a child: „I
confess I don’t want to read any more of him“. (26 Mar 2005
17:49:54) Quite the opposite. There may be more of it
in the future.
the battle for the question mark
Kelly
adds the question mark - „Goodman?“ - for the first time without any further explanation in the
mail body. Is it a reaction to an uneasiness that cannot be pulverized, maybe
also a late answer for Armando in all Lord’s early morning (13 Mar 2005 05:44:10)? It becomes clear very quickly where the line are.
„Goodman“ without question mark is recreated by Derek
Allan (15
Mar 2005 10:58:44)
while Armando Baeza reinstalls the mark (14 Mar 2005
20:08:25) and Alexei Procyshyn removes it again (15 Mar 2005
01:08:34). Kelly perseveres adding (15 Mar 2005
08:45:52) and Derek Allan removing it (16 Mar 2005
11:27:45). Armando Baeza adds (15 Mar 2005 23:45:14), Allan removes (16 Mar 2005
18:57:49), Kelly adds (16 Mar 2005 10:57:35), Boris Hoshensky removes (16 Mar
2005 16:14:00), Cheerskep adds (16 Mar 2005 12:35:33), Allan removes (17 Mar
2005 17:45:42) with Kelly and Baeza finally keeping it that way (21 Mar 2005
07:44:11, 21 Mar 2005 15:12:35) after there had in the meantime popped up two
new threads: „goodman's 1974 letter to me“ and „Goodman, a digest“. It’s „1 Goodman“ that
establishes as a thread since a Reply of Kelly to Cantrick (24 Mar 2005 00:03:26). It is Allan who shows kind of a disappointment with the heading
„Languages of Art and a debate that never was“ (5 Apr 2005 18:08:23).
exemplification
An
example of the debate may be exemplary of the higher levels of the debate:
Goodman’s artificial term „exemplification“.
What
has been cited above from Frances Kelly: „The grammatic structure of the
symbolic "scheme" and the symbolic "system" consists of:
(1) syntactic density, and (2) semantic density, and (3) syntactic repleteness,
and (4) exemplification, and (5) multiple complex referability“ is immediately followed by Kelly’s „PS The terms
"exemplification" and "expression" as used here by Goodman
are somewhat foggy for me. An exemplification for me is an ideal type or a pure
norm or a perfect sample. An expression for me is cathartic as in a reagent or
style or symptom.“ (21 Feb 2005
22:23:01) Kelly insists the next day: „Goodman does allow that the notated
inscription of a symbol can be used as a referention via representation or
description and exemplification and expression, but his representation is
indeed mimetic.“ (22 Feb 2005
12:35:45) It does not come as a surprise that Derek Allan is sceptical too: „The
next bit on ‘exemplification’ looks particularly dull so I don’t plan to spend
a lot of time on it.“ (26 Feb 2005
18:44:25) But Cantrick rejects this: „if you dismiss exemplification as dull,
you will fail to understand his theory of expression. ... Expressing OF is not
conceptualizing OF the world at all; it is exemplification OF properties plus
possession OF properties.“ (27 Feb 2005 05:18:16)
Kelly
copies and pastes: „From the "Philosophy of Art" weblog at
<http://artmind.typepad.com/> here is a posted message dealing with
Goodman and exemplification that Derek mentioned earlier, for those who are
interested.“ (8
Mar 2005 07:37:39)
Miller takes up „exemplification“ this way: „What is
the best way to experience that which these objects <„imaginary or legendary
persons> exemplify ? Is it through a systematic study of these objects as
systems of symbols --- or is it through a contemplation of what is immediately
given, uncontaminated by distracting thoughts ?“ (9 Mar 2005 11:39:08).
Procyshyn
gives this short formula in his summary of Goodman’s Chapter 1/section 9 on
depiction and description: „we can determine what and how these possessed
properties express, by way of exemplification and metaphorical transfer,
something determinate that is denoted by the representation.“ (19 Mar 2005 18:31:43). And more extensively he has this to say to Chris Miller: „To
determine the extension of the predicates possessed by a symbol, we need a
notion of exemplarity. As Goodman puts it, "while a picture denotes what
it represents, and a predicates denotes what it describes, what properties the
picture or the predicates possesses depends rather upon what predicates denote
it" (LA 51). More simply put (hopefully), a picture represents something
by way of the interrelations of labels that constitute it, AND these labels in
turn also have certain properties [i.e. their extension]. So, Goodman's
solution turns out to be the following: the reason for our knowledge of the
truth of the statement, "there is no one way the world is" derives
from the further fact that we know what the properties of the labels we use
are. This appears to involve, of course, an infinite regress that i can't see
any way out of. And this is a huge problem for Goodman. Moreover, the only ways
out of this regress are to either postulate Platonic Ideas, or to do what
Goodman does: rely on exemplification of labels by way of samples. There are
some things/symbols which exemplify some label and denote something in the
world (LA 52-59). And because "exemplification as the subrelation of the
converse of denotation [i.e. it works in the opposite direction of symbolic
reference: a symbol refers by describing something in the world, whereas
exemplification refers to the properties of the predicates possessed by a
symbol that refers to somethign in the world], ... exemplification implies
reference between the two in both directions" (LA 59).“
(21
Mar 2005 23:02:01)
Against
this Cantrick tries to hold: „We can proceed to discuss exemplification in ch.
2 without getting bogged down in alll the meanings of the word 'label' that
could be cited. I will postpone discussion of exemplification to a subsequent
post.“ (23 Mar 2005 22:28:40) But this will not happen when Cantrick later is „Continuing my summary
of LA“: „A fourth symptom may be exemplification. Exemplification, like
denotation, relates a symbol to a referent.“ (1 Apr 2005 02:22:57)
In
the end the discussion doesn’t get going as shown by a message of Procyshyn to
Allan: „If you're willing perhaps we can go back to the expression and
exemplification thing -- i don't recall you posting any criticisms of that part
of the 2nd chapter.“ (5 Apr 2005
03:09:26)
How
to perceive peircing with piercing?
Derek
Allan (13 Feb 2005 16:12:07, 14 Feb 2005 08:54:17, 15 Feb 2005 09:09:54), Boris
Hoshensky (23 Feb 2005 00:52:14), Alexei Procyshyn (9 Mar 2005 20:56:25) and
Armando Baeza (23 Mar 2005 16:36:37) miswrite Peirce with „Pierce“.
True,
Frances Kelly sometimes gives a hard time with permanent references to Peirce,
in many cases not legitimated by the matter considering Ockham’s economical
principle. Does it justify parapractical abuse of a name, intentionally or not?
Certainly not.
Armando
responds to Kelly personally, yet on the list written words „with fond
greetings“ with inapproriately hard criticism given
sentence by sentence: „Give Pierce a kick in the rear. AB“ (rather
than „Give peace a chance!“) or „No Nirvana good end goal expected here“. (23 Mar 2005 16:36:37) One cannot refrain here and at other occassions of independent
occurrences of „pierc-“ from supposing allusions to
piercing? A Merleau-Ponty-like essay with a title like „The Sign, the Flesh,
the Body“ could well submit these and other
occurrences under investigation with the hypothesis that they are only
negatively meant. The palette is manifold: tearing apart, disfiguring a father
figure like Peirce, marking sexual penetration. Particularly
nasty Armando’s „remains a subjective personal perception to all percievers“ (22 Mar 2005 00:53:33)
is a praxis, not even a parapraxis of this kind.
Derek
Allan, however, might be correct in saying that Peirce’s/Kelly’s is a kind of
an „eschatological approach to philosophy“ (11 Mar 2005 09:07:50) in responding to what Kelly confessed shortly before (11 Mar 2005 06:47:17). There is an idealist Schellingian-Coleridgean heritage in Peirce’s
philosophy that post-Hegelian analytic philosophers like Goodman were eager to
overcome.
final stage
There
seems to be only one fragment of Cantrick’s contribution under the heading
„Continuing my summary of LA“ (1 Apr 2005 02:22:57) answered by Cheerskep
however under different title „Subject: Language and "Art" (part
one)“ (2 Apr 2005 14:36:20) and „Subject: Language and "Art" (part
two)“ (2 Apr 2005 14:46:35) with a Reply by Allan containing sharp criticism on
Cantrick (4 Apr 2005 20:33:23) und a final sequel (5 Apr 2005 10:21:18) under
the title „Subject: Languages of Art and a debate that never was“ summarizing
another contribution of a another web page. Follows a reply
by Kelly to Cheerskep (5 Apr 2005 08:42:24)
with tangling Peirce against (!) nominalism.
In her long sequel (10:31:57) she enters discussing what Cheerskep had written to
Bob before finishing with a second sequel (10:58:23). Miller finally
returns to „Language and "Art" (part one)“
with „feeling“ - and tingle (5 Apr 2005 11:49:08)?
The
difficulties of a non-guided list are obvious. The advantages either. At one
point Robert Cantrick wanted to remove Derek Allan from the list as he had
himself announced with settling by topic after topic in „Subject: Goodman's
1974 letter to me“. Cantrick wanted to actually discuss the „main disagreement
with [...] chapter 4“ (31 Mar 2005
06:24:33). This makes Allan withdraw from his accusation. He shows to be
offended and says hypocritically: „I understood that was good academic
practice. Perhaps I should discontinue it?“ (31 Mar 2005 17:21:18)
As
with mailing lists in general, very few references are given to earlier
discussions about Goodman in the list. What the discussion about Goodman here
lacked is taking pains on the hermeneutic context, not only of the person, but
the systematic prerequisites of Goodman’s own philosophical stance, his
historical environment. Everybody acquainted with Hegel’s Phänomenologie des
Geistes knows that it is a confrontation with Kant who is mentioned only once
in the preface. The same with Goodman. Although he
honestly gives the references in „Languages of Art“ the confrontation with
philosophers of his time and tradition happens only underneath the surface:
names of colleagues and opponents only appear once or twice, their work or
thought is never or rarely addressed explicitly. This is in order for a book of
the range of Goodman’s „Languages of Art“. It takes the privilege to converse
with others of his kind on intimate terms unmarked.
The
Goodman debate 2005 may not be accepted to the history of philosophy as the
„Spinoza-Streit“ in late 18th Century, the „Lehrstuhlstreit“ between
philosophers and psycholists in 1913, the discussion between Heidegger and
Cassirer and disciples at Davos in 1929, or the paper and ensuing discussion of
Strawson’s „Analysis, Science, and Metaphysics“ at the Colloque Royaumont in
1961. It represents a lively debate though containing various material to go on with reading and thinking with and beyond
Goodman.
Peter Mahr © 2005
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