Does Tax Competition Really Promote Growth?*

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Abstract

This paper considers the relationship between tax competition and growth in an endogenous growth model where there are stochastic shocks to productivity, and capital taxes fund a public good which may be for final consumption or an infrastructure input. Absent stochastic shocks, decentralized tax setting (two or more jurisdictions) maximizes the rate of growth, as the constant returns to scale present with endogenous growth implies “extreme” tax competition. Stochastic shocks imply that households face a portfolio choice problem, which may dampen down tax competition and may raise taxes above the centralized level. Growth can be lower with decentralization. Our results also predict a negative relationship between output volatility and growth, consistent with the empirical evidence.

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1. Introduction

The link between fiscal decentralization and economic growth is increasingly attracting the attention of economists. In particular, a growing body of empirical research is investigating the links between measures of fiscal decentralization and growth, both at the country and sub-national level. Overall, the evidence is mixed. In particular, cross-country studies, which generally use similar measures of fiscal decentralization, can find positive or negative effects, depending on precise measure of decentralization, sample, estimation method, etc. (Davoodi and Zhu (1998), Wooler and Phillips (1998), Zhang and Zou (1998), Iimi (2005), Thornton (2007)). More recently, two studies on US data have found more robust evidence that fiscal decentralization increases growth (Akai and Sakata (2002), Stansel (2005)). For example, Stansel (2005), in a study of growth over 30 years in 314 US metropolitan areas, has found that the degree of fractionalization (the number of county governments per million population in a metropolitan area) significantly increases growth.

On the theoretical side, explanation of the mechanisms linking fiscal decentralization and growth are thin on the ground. Two mechanisms have been studied. First, as shown by Hatfield (2006), tax competition can raise the post-tax return on capital, thus increasing the return to savings, and thus growth, in an endogenous growth model. Second, Brueckner (2006) shows that centralization, if it imposes uniform public good provision across regions, can lower the rate of savings and thus growth, although this mechanism appears to require difference in the mix of young and old across fiscal jurisdictions.

This paper makes a contribution to understanding of the tax competition mechanism. In formalizing this mechanism, there is a basic dilemma\(^1\). To understand the effect of fiscal policy on growth, a simple endogenous growth model is required. But, simple endogenous growth models have constant returns to scale. As a consequence, in (for example) an AK-type growth model, the firm’s demand for capital is perfectly elastic at the tax-inclusive price of capital. This in turn, under the standard assumption of perfect mobility of capital across regions (i.e. that households can move their capital costlessly across regions) implies “extreme” or Bertrand tax competition: each jurisdiction can undercut the others by a fraction and capture all the capital in the economy. The result is that under decentralization, the tax is driven down to zero, and the growth rate is maximized.

More recently, Hatfield (2006) has shown that a similar conclusion holds very generally\(^2\)

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\(^1\)See Lejour and Verbon (1997), who implicitly make this point.
\(^2\)This holds even when labour supply is endogenous and is taxable, when there are consumption and infrastructure goods, and where agents are different within regions (with respect to their endowments of
in Barro’s (1990) model of infrastructure growth: that is, there is a tax-inclusive price of capital at which firms are willing to employ any level of the capital input. So, the allocation of capital is determined by households, who move capital to the region with the highest price. Thus, again there is implies extreme or Bertrand tax competition: jurisdictions compete to set taxes to achieve the highest pre-tax price of capital. As there is an infrastructure public good funded by the capital tax, this price-maximising tax is not zero, but strictly positive. Nevertheless, the conclusion is the same as in the AK model: under decentralization, the rate of return on savings, and thus the growth rate is maximised.

So, if capital mobility is assumed perfect (costless) between jurisdictions, we have a rather limited theory of the link between tax competition and growth, which cannot easily accommodate the findings of some empirical studies that this relationship is negative. Moreover, the usual arguments used in the static tax competition literature to dampen down tax competition, such as tax exporting (i.e. foreign ownership of fixed factors, Huizinga and Nielsen (1997)) do not apply here, because as long as capital is perfectly mobile, an infinitesimal cut in the tax causes a finite increase in the capital stock owing to that jurisdiction, thus dominating any countervailing effect.

So, in order to proceed, capital must be made imperfectly mobile between jurisdictions. But even this is not enough; imperfectly mobile capital rules out a Nash equilibrium at zero taxes (in the AK model), but it cannot explain how taxes could ever be higher with decentralization. In this paper, we suggest a way out of this dilemma, which does not rely on any ad hoc assumptions. We start with a standard AK model with a consumption public good financed out of a tax on capital. We assume only that there are independent stochastic shocks to production in each of $n$ regions. This generates stochastic returns to capital invested by a household in each region. Thus, a standard portfolio argument implies that - if taxes are not too different - the household located in one region will want to invest some of its accumulated capital in all regions. This in turn generates a negative fiscal externality: an increase in the tax in any “foreign” region reduces the mean return to savings in the “home” region, because the home household will not wish to withdraw all of its savings from the foreign region, in order to maintain a diversified portfolio.

The key point is that this negative "rate of return" externality offsets the usual positive externality arising from mobile capital (i.e. that an increase in the foreign region’s tax leads to a capital outflow from the foreign region to the home region), which is also present in the model. This implies that when the second externality dominates, taxation under capital) and decisions are made by majority voting.
decentralization will be higher, and growth lower, than with centralization. Analytical results show that this occurs when (i) the number of regions is small; (ii) when the variance of the shock is sufficiently high.

We then modify the AK model to the Barro (1990) model of infrastructure growth in which we allow the production technology to be stochastic. This has the consequence that the pre-tax rate of return to capital becomes stochastic, an effect which magnifies as the amount of infrastructure goods increases. Since each region also hosts capital from non-residents, this specification introduces a third type of externality of decentralized government policy. A higher tax increases the riskiness of investment and thus the risk-bearing of non-residents. We find that when the variance is zero, centralization yields a tax rate which is too high to be growth maximizing, while decentralization yields a tax rate which is growth maximizing (replicating the result in Hatfield, 2006). By a continuity argument, growth is higher under decentralized government when the variance of the shock is small. But, as the variance of the shock increases, centralization may generate higher growth than decentralization, as in the consumption public good case.

One of the interesting predictions of our model concerns the relationship between the variance of stochastic shocks and growth. With a public consumption good, we show analytically that growth is (at least weakly) decreasing in the variance of the output shock. With a public infrastructure good, and fiscal decentralization, simulation results indicate a negative relationship between growth and the variance of output shock. This is consistent with the macroeconomic evidence (see Ramey and Ramey, 1995), although of course there are other mechanisms linking output shocks and growth (Jones and Manuelli, 2005).

The most closely related paper to ours is Lejour and Verbon (1997). They were the first to point out that if the household has a diversified (across tax jurisdictions) portfolio of investments across regions, a negative externality via savings could arise in equilibrium. But, they modelled this in an ad hoc way. They just assume that there is some convex mobility cost of moving capital between regions. The increasing marginal cost ensures that capital moves smoothly between regions in response to price (and thus tax) differential. To generate higher taxes under decentralization, Lejour and Verbon

\footnote{Another related paper is by Lee (2004), who studies the impact of output shocks on tax competition in a static model. However, in his model, as the number of regions is assumed large, investors can be sure of a certain return on capital, and only face uncertain wage income. Thus, the negative externality arising though portfolio choice which is studied here does not arise in his model. See also Wrede (1999) for an analysis of fiscal externalities in dynamic economies. But, his paper abstracts from portfolio diversification and endogenous growth.}
(1997) have to introduce another ad hoc element into the mobility cost function: that is, it is assumed that when returns to capital in two regions are the same, households have a strict preference for investing some of their capital in the foreign region i.e. a preference for diversity\(^4\).

The paper is also related to an existing literature on public finance in models of stochastic growth, where fiscal policy rules are taken to be fixed (Turnovsky, 2000 and Kenc, 2004). By contrast, in this paper, taxes are optimized by governments. So, this paper is the only one, to our knowledge, that studies endogenous tax policy in a stochastic growth model. For endogenous tax policy in a deterministic growth models, see Philippopoulos (2003) and Philippopoulos and Park (2003). But these two papers do not deal with the issue of capital mobility and its impact on tax policy.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, solves for equilibrium conditional on fixed government policy, and identifies the fiscal externalities at work in the model. Section 3 contains the main results. Section 4 modifies the model to include infrastructure public goods. Section 5 concludes.

2. The Set-Up

2.1. The Model

Our model is a dynamic stochastic version of the Zodrow-Mieszkowski (1986) model, where regional government use source-based capital taxes to finance the provision of a public good. The economy evolves in continuous time: \( t \in [0, \infty) \). There are \( n \) regions, \( i = 1, \ldots, n \). There is one firm in each region, which produces output from capital according to the constant returns production function. Expressed in differential form, changes in output in region \( i \) over the interval \((t, dt)\) is:

\[
dy_i = k_i (dt + dz_i),
\]

where \( k_i \) is the capital stocks at \( t \), and the stochastic variable\(^5\) \( dz_i \) is temporally independent with variance \( \sigma_i^2 dt \) over the period \((t, dt)\).

\(^4\)Formally, if \( s \) is the share of capital invested outside the home region, the mobility cost is \( c(s) = -vs + \mu s^2/2 \). Given this specification, it is possible to establish that for \( v \) large enough relative to \( \mu \), the equilibrium tax on capital can be higher under decentralization, and thus growth lower. Unfortunately, the \( v \) and \( \mu \) parameters are almost impossible to interpret empirically.

\(^5\)The assumption that random shocks take the form of Brownian motion is standard in stochastic growth models. It describes a situation where productivity is subject to frequent small changes; see Turnovsky (2000) for more discussion.
Firms in region $i$ are willing to operate at any scale if, over any interval $(t, dt)$, the change in output per unit of capital $dt + dz_i$, is equal to the cost of capital, $r_idt + \tau_idt$, where $r_i$ is the rental price of capital at $t$, and $\tau_i$ is the tax on the use of capital. Thus, the rental price of capital in region $i$ is determined by:

$$r_idt = dt + dz_i - \tau_idt = (1 - \tau_i)dt + dz_i.$$  

(2.1)

The actual allocation of capital across regions will then be determined by households, as described below.

Each region is populated by a number of identical infinitely-lived households, and the population in each region is normalized to 1. In region $g_i$, each household has a flow of utility from private consumption and a public good:

$$u(c_i, g_i) = \ln c_i + \beta \ln g_i,$$  

(2.2)

where each of the two utility functions has the same fixed degree of relative risk-aversion equal to unity. At each $t$, the household in region $i$ has an endowment of the private good (wealth) $w_i$, which it can rent to any firm. Let $s_{ij}$ be the share of $w_i$ rented to the foreign firm. The household chooses $c_i, s_{ij}$ to maximize the expected present value of utility - this problem is considered in Section 2.2 below.

Finally, in region $i$, the public good is wholly financed by a source-based tax on capital i.e. $g_i = \tau_ik_i$. This is without loss of generality, as there is no wage income in the model, so our analysis would go through if $\tau_i$ were re-specified as an output tax.

We can now see more formally why in the absence of uncertainty ($\sigma_i \equiv 0$), taxes and public good provision would be zero under decentralization. Without uncertainty, the households in any region will simply allocate its capital to the region where the return on savings is highest. Given the negative relationship between $r$ and $\tau$ in (2.1), it is then clear that all capital will flow into region(s) where $\tau_i$ is lowest. This in turn implies that without mobility costs$^6$, there will be a “race to the bottom” in capital taxes, with the only possible equilibrium tax being zero$^7$.

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$^6$We cannot avoid this conclusion by assuming decreasing returns i.e. $y = f(k)$, with $f''(k) < 0$, as then we are back to a Solow-type growth model, where taxes do not affect growth (in the long run).

$^7$Strictly speaking, a zero equilibrium tax is only possible if the marginal utility of the public good at zero provision is finite, which is not the case with logarithmic utility i.e. (2.2). A precise statement would be that there is no equilibrium with strictly positive taxes in this case.
2.2. Solving The Household Problem

Households solve a portfolio allocation/savings problem under uncertainty. First, wealth evolves according to

$$dw_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} s_{ij} r_j w_i dt - c_i dt,$$

(2.3)

where $$\sum_{j} s_{ij} r_j dt$$ is the overall return on wealth over the interval $$(t, dt)$$. Combining (2.1) and (2.3), we get:

$$dw_i = [\mu_i w_i - c_i] dt + w_i \sum_{j=1}^{n} s_{ij} dz_j,$$

(2.4)

where $$\mu_i = \sum_{j} s_{ij} (1 - \tau_j)$$ is the deterministic part (average) rate of return on wealth. Thus, household in region $$i$$ chooses $$c_i, s_{ij}$$ to maximize

$$E \left[ \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \ln c_i dt \right]$$

(2.5)

subject to (2.4) and $$\sum_{j=1}^{n} s_{ij} = 1$$. Finally, we assume that the taxes (and thus the mean return to investing in any given region) are time-invariant (this assumption will be verified below). The solution to this problem is well-known (e.g. Jones and Manuelli, 2005) and easily stated. First, the optimal consumption rule is simply

$$c_i = \rho w_i$$

(2.6)

Second, the portfolio shares $$s_{ij}, j \neq i$$ are determined by the $$n-1$$ first-order conditions

$$\tau_i - \tau_j - \left[ \left( \sum_{j \neq i} s_{ij} - 1 \right) \sigma_i^2 + s_{ij} \sigma_j^2 \right] = 0, \quad j \neq i.$$  

(2.7)

To get intuition, consider the two-region case. Then, (2.7) solve for regions 1, 2 to give

$$s_{12} = \frac{\tau_1 - \tau_2 + \sigma_1^2}{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2}, \quad s_{21} = \frac{\tau_2 - \tau_1 + \sigma_2^2}{\sigma_2^2 + \sigma_1^2}.$$  

(2.8)

The portfolio rule is simple and intuitive; invest more “abroad” (i.e. outside the home region $$i$$) (i) the higher the difference in average returns as measured by $$\tau_i - \tau_j$$, and (ii) the lower the relative uncertainty of investing abroad i.e. $$\sigma_j^2/\sigma_i^2$$. In the sequel, we simplify the analysis by assuming $$\sigma_i = \sigma, i = 1,..n.$$
2.3. Fiscal Externalities

In this section, we identify the fiscal externalities at work in the model. We focus on the two-region case, thinking of region 1 as the home region. We trace the effects of a change in $\tau_2$ on home welfare. Then the portfolio allocation rule for home and foreign households is

$$s_{12} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\tau_1 - \tau_2}{2\sigma^2}, \quad s_{21} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\tau_2 - \tau_1}{2\sigma^2}.$$ (2.9)

Moreover, the capital employed in the home region is

$$k_1 = (1 - s_{12})w_1 + s_{21}w_2.$$ (2.10)

Finally, in the home region, the household’s optimal accumulation of capital follows the rule (2.4), given also (2.6);

$$dw_1 = w_1 \left[ (\mu_1 - \rho) dt + (1 - s_{12})dz + s_{12}dz^* \right].$$

By inspection of (2.4), (2.9), and (2.10), we can identify two fiscal externalities in the model.

First, increasing $\tau_2$ implies $s_{21}$ up and $s_{12}$ down from optimal portfolio choice, implying $k_1$ up. This is the well-known positive capital mobility externality: an increase in the foreign tax causes a capital outflow, benefitting the home region. Note that it is measured (inversely) by $\sigma$; the higher $\sigma$, the weaker is this externality, as the higher $\sigma$, the stronger the incentive for the household to maintain a balanced portfolio.

Second, an increase in $\tau_2$ has other two related effects. First, it directly affects home welfare by lowering $\mu_1 = 1 - (1 - s_{12})\tau_1 - s_{12}\tau_2$, the deterministic part of the return on $w_1$. Second, it lowers $\mu_2$, and thus $w_2$ and thus $k_1$. We call this the negative rate of return externality. Note that the size of this externality is measured by $s_{12}, s_{21}$: specifically, this externality only operates in equilibrium if $s_{12}, s_{21} > 0$. But, the portfolio allocation rule ensures that at symmetric equilibrium, $s_{12} = s_{21} = 0.5$.

3. Equilibrium Taxes

3.1. Centralization

The central government sets a uniform tax rate $\tau$ and spends tax revenues on a local public goods in all regions. Without loss of generality, we assume that the tax raised in any region is spent on the public good in that region i.e. $g_i = \tau k_i$. With capital taxes being identical in all countries, each households invests an equal share of the savings in each
region, i.e. \( s_{ij} = 1/n \) - see (2.7). Thus, capital employed in region \( i \) is equal to \( k_i = w_i \). Using all this information in addition to the consumption rule (2.6), instantaneous utility in region \( i \) is

\[
\ln c_i + \beta \ln g_i = \kappa + (1 + \beta) \ln w_i + \beta \ln \tau, \quad \kappa = \ln \rho.
\]

Households in all regions become symmetric and the optimal centralized policy can be characterized by maximizing utility of one of the \( n \) regions. Formally, the central government chooses \( \tau \) to maximise

\[
E \left[ \int_0^\infty \left( (1 + \beta) \ln w_i + \beta \ln \tau \right) e^{-\rho t} dt \right]
\]

subject to (2.4), evaluated at \( \tau_i = \tau_j = \tau \), and (2.6), (2.7), all evaluated at \( \tau_i = \tau_j = \tau \). Setting up the Bellman equation, deriving the first-order condition, and guessing that the value function \( V(w) \) is linear in \( \ln w \), we can show (see the Appendix):

**Proposition 1.** The central equilibrium tax rate is

\[
\tau = \frac{\rho \beta}{1 + \beta}.
\]

The tax rate is increasing in the preference for the public good, \( \beta \), and the rate of discount, \( \rho \).

The comparative static results are intuitive. First, the higher the marginal valuation of the public good, the higher the tax. Second, the less the household values future growth i.e. the higher \( \rho \), the more it is willing to increase the tax rate to fund the public good now, at the expense of future growth in the tax base. Note finally that the centralized tax is independent of the number of regions.

### 3.2. Decentralization

Our approach here is the following. It is difficult to solve for government \( i \)'s problem given arbitrary taxes \( \tau_j \), \( j \neq i \). So, we assume that all regions \( j \neq i \) set the same (time-invariant) tax \( \tau^* \), and solve for region \( i \)'s best response to \( \tau^* \). We show that this is also time-invariant i.e. some \( \tau \). Then, imposing \( \tau = \tau^* \) gives a condition for the Nash equilibrium tax.

We proceed as follows. First, let \( s_{ij} = s, \ j \neq i \), be the share of wealth invested by the households in region \( i \) in any region \( j \neq i \). Note that from (2.7), and \( \tau_j = \tau^*, \ j \neq i \), these
share must all be the same. Indeed, evaluating (2.7) at \( \sigma_i = \sigma, s_{ij} = s \), and \( \tau_i = \tau, \tau_j = \tau^* \), and solving, we get

\[
s = \frac{\tau - \tau^*}{n\sigma^2} + \frac{1}{n}. \tag{3.1}
\]

Next, let \( s^* = s_{ji}, j \neq i \), \( \hat{s} = s_{jk}, k \neq j \neq i \) be the shares of wealth invested by the households in region \( j \neq i \) in region \( i \) and the \( n - 2 \) regions \( k \neq j \neq i \) respectively. Again from (2.7), \( s^*, \hat{s} \) solve the two simultaneous equations

\[
\begin{align*}
\tau^* - \tau - \sigma^2[-1 + 2s^* + (n - 2)\hat{s}] &= 0 \tag{3.2} \\
-\sigma^2[-1 + (n - 1)\hat{s} + s^*] &= 0. \tag{3.3}
\end{align*}
\]

We are only interested in \( s^* \). Solving (3.2) and (3.3), we get

\[
s^* = \frac{(n - 1)(\tau^* - \tau)}{n\sigma^2} + \frac{1}{n}. \tag{3.4}
\]

Now let \( w \) be the wealth of region \( i \), and \( w^* \) be the average wealth of regions \( j \neq i \). Then, by definition,

\[
k = (1 - (n - 1)s)w + (n - 1)s^*w^*. \tag{3.5}
\]

Then, using the government budget constraint \( g = \tau k \), and the consumption rule \( c = \rho w \), region \( i \)'s instantaneous payoff can be written

\[
\ln c_i + \beta \ln g_i = \kappa + \ln w + \beta \ln k + \beta \ln \tau. \tag{3.6}
\]

So, it is clear from (3.6) and (3.5) that there are two state variables in the problem, \( w \) and \( w^* \). These follow the following processes. First, from (2.4), given also (2.6), \( \sigma_i = \sigma \), and the definition of \( s \);

\[
dw = w [(1 - (1 - (n - 1)s)\tau - (n - 1)\sigma^2 - \rho) dt + (1 - (n - 1)s)dz_i + (n - 1)s^*dz^*], \tag{3.7}
\]

where \( dz^* = \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{j \neq i} dz_j \). Second, the process for some \( w_j \) is

\[
dw_j = w_j \left[ (1 - (1 - s^*)\tau^* - s^*\tau - \rho) dt + s^*dz_i + (1 - s^* - (n - 2)\hat{s})dz_j + \hat{s} \sum_{k \neq j \neq i} dz_k \right].
\]

As \( w^* = \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{j \neq i} w_j \), tedious but straightforward calculation gives

\[
dw^* = w^* \left[ (1 - (1 - s^*)\tau^* - s^*\tau - \rho) dt + s^*dz_i + (1 - s^*)dz^* \right]. \tag{3.8}
\]

So, the problem for the government of region \( i \) is to choose \( \tau \) to maximize

\[
E \left[ \int_0^\infty (\ln w + \beta \ln ((1 - (n - 1)s)w + (n - 1)s^*w^*) + \beta \ln \tau) e^{-\rho t} dt \right].
\]
subject to (3.7), (3.8), and the portfolio allocation rules (3.1) and (3.4).

Our approach to this problem follows Turnovsky (2000). We first write down the Bellman equation defining \( V(w, w^*) \), and thus characterizing the optimal choice of \( \tau \), given \( \tau^* \). We then evaluate this Bellman equation at \( \tau = \tau^* \). To get a closed-form solution for the equilibrium \( \tau \), we must guess the correct form of the value function \( V(w, w^*) \), which we are able to do, using the fact, from (3.7) and (3.8), that at a symmetric equilibrium \( (s = s^* = \frac{1}{n}) \), \( w = w^* \). Specifically, we guess that \( V(w, w) \equiv A + \psi \ln w \). All these steps are dealt with in detail in the Appendix, and the end result is:

**Proposition 2.** The decentral equilibrium tax rate with \( n \) regions is

\[
\tau_d = \frac{\rho \beta}{\sigma^2 (n-1)} + \frac{1 + \beta}{n}.
\]

The tax rate is increasing in the preference for the public good, \( \beta \), the rate of discount, \( \rho \), and the size of the output shock, \( \sigma \).

A number of comments are in order here. This formula and the comparative statics are intuitive. First, as under centralization the higher the marginal valuation of the public good, the higher the tax and, the less the household values future growth (higher \( \rho \)), the more it is willing to increase the tax rate to fund the public good now. Second, the higher \( \sigma \), the weaker the response of the capital stock in any region to a change in the tax rate in that region (when \( n > 1 \)), and so the smaller the mobile tax base externality, thus increasing the equilibrium tax. Intuitively, the smaller the variance, the more willing are investors to move their wealth between regions in response to tax differences, thus increasing the mobility of the tax base.

More formally note from (3.5), in symmetric equilibrium,

\[
\frac{\partial k}{\partial \tau} = -(n-1)w \frac{\partial s}{\partial \tau} + (n-1)w^* \frac{\partial s^*}{\partial \tau}
\]

\[
= -(n-1)w \frac{1}{n \sigma^2} - (n-1)^2 w^* \frac{1}{n \sigma^2}
\]

\[
= -k(n-1) \frac{1}{\sigma^2},
\]

where in the last line we used \( w = w^* = k \). So, the semi-elasticity \( \frac{1}{k} \frac{\partial k}{\partial \tau} = -(n-1)/\sigma^2 \) is clearly decreasing in \( \sigma \). Note also that the more regions, the bigger this elasticity. This is a similar result to those for the standard static model of tax competition. Note finally this effect is operative only when \( n > 1 \); with no fiscal competition \( (n = 1) \), the size of stochastic shocks makes no difference to \( \tau \).
Last, we turn to a comparison of taxes under decentralization and centralization and how they relate to the number of regions \( n \). Inspection of (3.9) shows that \( n \) affects the denominator of \( \tau_d \) in two places, corresponding to the two different externalities identified above. First, a higher \( n \) increases the tax base elasticity, as already remarked; this is measured by the term \( \frac{\rho(\beta n-1)}{\sigma^2} \) which is simply \( \rho \beta \) times the semi-elasticity of the tax base with respect to \( \tau_d \).

Second, an increase in \( n \) increases the rate of return externality, corresponding to the term \( \frac{1}{n} (1+\beta) \). Intuitively, any resident of region \( i \) only invests \( \frac{1}{n} \) of his wealth at home in equilibrium. So, the government of region \( i \) ignores the negative effect of the tax in region \( i \) on the rate of return to investors in all the other regions, measured by \( \frac{n-1}{n} (1+\beta) \).

As the externalities have opposite effects on \( \tau_d \), we expect that the effect of \( n \) on \( \tau_d \) is not monotonic, and this is confirmed by the following result:

**Proposition 3.** There is a critical value of \( n \), \( \hat{n} \), such that \( \tau_d \) is higher than \( \tau_c \) for \( n < \hat{n} \), and lower than \( \tau_c \) for \( n > \hat{n} \). In particular, \( \tau_d \to 0 \) as \( n \to \infty \).

**Proof.** The denominator of (3.9), \( \frac{\rho(\beta n-1)}{\sigma^2} + \frac{1+\beta}{n} \), is a convex function of \( n \), with a minimum at \( n = \sqrt{\frac{(1+\beta)\rho}{\rho^2}} \). Thus, \( \tau_d \) must be a quasi-concave function of \( n \) with a maximum at \( n = \sqrt{\frac{(1+\beta)\sigma^2}{\rho^3}} \). Note, \( \tau_c = \tau_d \) for \( n = 1 \). Also, \( \tau_d \to 0 \) as \( n \to \infty \) while \( \tau_c > 0 \), \( \forall n \). Thus, there always exists a value of \( \hat{n} \) with \( \tau_c > \tau_d \) if \( n > \hat{n} \). \( \Box \)

Unlike the traditional tax competition model, the effect of \( n \) on \( \tau_d \) is generally ambiguous. This is of course, because an increase in \( n \) increases both the mobile tax base and rate of return externalities, which have opposite signs. So, for \( n \) small, the tax base externality is small and so the rate of return externality dominates (\( \tau_c < \tau_d \)), whereas for \( n \) large, the mobile tax externality dominates (\( \tau_c > \tau_d \)).

Figure 3.1 illustrates the capital tax rates \( \tau_c \) (thick, horizontal line) and \( \tau_d \) as a function of the number of regions (assuming \( \beta = 1 \) and \( \rho = 0.1 \)). For instance, for \( \sigma^2 = 0.5 \) the rate of return externality dominates the mobile tax externality for \( n \in \{2, 3, 4\} \).

The final step in our analysis is to relate taxes and growth. First, at any instant, output must be divided between private and public consumption, i.e. \( y = c + g \). Next, from the government budget constraint and (2.6), we have in symmetric equilibrium that \( y = \rho w + \tau k = (\rho + \tau)w \). So, the growth of output is just proportional to that of wealth. Finally, from (3.8) and the definition of \( dz^* \), in symmetric equilibrium:

\[
\frac{dw}{\tau} = (1 - \tau - \rho)w + \frac{1}{n} \sum dz_i.
\]
Growth has a stochastic and deterministic component, and only the latter is affected by taxes, being decreasing in the tax. In what follows, we refer to $1 - \tau - \rho$ as the average growth rate.

So, Proposition 3 indicates that when the number of regions is less (greater) than $\hat{n}$, growth will be lower (higher) under decentralization than centralization. From Figure 3.1, when $\sigma = 0.5$, for example, $\hat{n} = 5$. Intuitively, it is only when $n > \hat{n}$ that the mobile tax base externality dominates and thus growth under decentralization is higher.

4. Infrastructure Public Goods

4.1. The Model

We now modify the baseline set-up by allowing the government to spend on a public infrastructure good rather than consumption good. For tractability, we assume two regions, unstarred (home) and starred (foreign). We will focus on home region. Output follows the process

$$dy = g^{1-\alpha}k^{\alpha}(dt + dz).$$

Following Turnovsky (2000) and Kenc (2004), we assume that the pretax wage, $a$, over the period $(t, t + dt)$ is determined at the start of the period and is equal to expected
marginal product

\[ adt = (1 - \alpha)g^{1-\alpha}k^\alpha dt \]
\[ = (1 - \alpha)\tau^{1-\alpha}k dt = \theta(\tau)k dt \] (4.1)

using the budget constraint \( g = \tau k \). So, the wage is non-random. The rate of return (pre-tax) over the period \((t, t + dt)\) is thus determined residually:

\[ \frac{dy - adt}{k} = \alpha g^{1-\alpha}k^{\alpha-1}dt + g^{1-\alpha}k^\alpha dz \]
\[ = \alpha \tau^{1-\alpha}dt + \tau^{1-\alpha}dz \] (4.2)

using the budget constraint \( g = \tau k \). So, the post-tax rate of return thus follows the process

\[ dR = (\alpha \tau^{1-\alpha} - \tau)dt + \tau^{1-\alpha}dz = r(\tau)dt + \tau^{1-\alpha}dz, \] (4.3)

where \( r(\tau) = \alpha \tau^{1-\alpha} - \tau \) plays an important role below.

4.2. Solving the Household Problem

For simplicity, consumer preferences are logarithmic. The consumer maximizes

\[ E \left[ \int_0^\infty e^{-pt} \ln c dt \right] \] (4.4)

subject to the stochastic wealth equation

\[ dw = (1 - s)wR + swR^* + adt - cdt \]
\[ = [(1 - s)r(\tau) + sr(\tau^*)]w dt + \theta(\tau)k dt - c dt + (1 - s)w\tau^{1-\alpha}dz + sw(\tau^*)^{1-\alpha}dz^*. \] (4.5)

Unlike consumption good case, this problem is non-standard, and so for completeness, we provide a solution in the Appendix. Moreover, in deriving the solution, we suppose that the household believes\(^8\) that \( k \equiv w \), a belief which is true in equilibrium. The consumption and portfolio allocation rule for the home region are

\[ c = \rho w \quad \text{and} \quad s = \frac{(r^* - r)/\sigma^2 + \tau^{2(1-\alpha)}}{\left(\tau^{2(1-\alpha)} + (\tau^*)^{2(1-\alpha)}\right)}. \] (4.6)

\(^8\)This assumption is slightly different than rational expectations, as when \( \tau \neq \tau^* \), \( k \neq w \) in general. However, we cannot solve the household problem in closed form under fully rational expectations when \( \tau \neq \tau^* \).
We can now compare (4.6) to (2.9). The difference is only in the portfolio allocation rules; for comparison, the portfolio allocation rule in the consumption good model can be written \( s = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\tau - \tau^*}{\sigma^2} \) in the notation of this Section. The difference between this formula and (4.6), therefore, is that in (4.6), \( \tau, \tau^* \) affect the rule directly, and not just via their effects on \( r, r^* \). This is because a higher tax rate in the home region increases the pre-tax rate of return on capital in the home region and thereby the riskiness of the investment from (4.3).

4.3. Fiscal Externalities

Besides the tax base externality and the rate-of-return externality identified in the AK-model, the infrastructure model exhibits a third type of externality. From (4.3), we see that the stochastic, as well as the deterministic, part of the return on capital invested in a given region depends on the tax rate. This is in contrast to the consumption good model, where the tax in a region only lowered the mean return on capital invested in that region, but did not affect the variance of returns.

Specifically, from inspection of (4.3), we see that a higher tax rate magnifies the exposure of investors to risk. Since each region also hosts capital from non-residents, this specification introduces a second negative externality, i.e. a higher tax increases the riskiness of investment and thus the risk-bearing of non-residents. We call this externality the risk-exposure externality. We will now characterize the equilibrium tax policy under (de)centralization and relate it to the externalities.

4.4. Centralization

Under centralization, using (4.6), the government maximizes

\[
E \left[ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \ln c dt \right] = E \left[ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \ln w dt \right] + \text{const}
\]

subject to \( \tau = \tau^* \). It also understands that

\( k = w, \ s = s^* = 0.5 \).

So, there is a single state variable \( w \):

\[
dw = [r(\tau) - \rho]wdt + \theta(\tau)kdt + w\tau^{1-\alpha}[0.5dz + 0.5dz^*].
\]

The Bellman equation is

\[
\rho V(w, w^*) = \max_{\tau} \left\{ \ln w + [r(\tau) + \theta(\tau) - \rho]V(w) + \frac{V_{ww}w^2}{2}\sigma_w^2 \right\},
\]

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where $\sigma^2_w = 0.5\tau^2(1-\alpha)\sigma^2$. The FOC is

$$V_w w[r' + \theta'] + \frac{V_{ww} w^{2\alpha^2(1-\alpha)\tau^{1-2\alpha}}}{2} = 0.$$  

Now, we guess $V(w, w) = A + B \ln w$. Then, the FOC becomes, cancelling $B$,

$$r' + \theta' - \frac{\sigma^2(1-\alpha)\tau^{1-2\alpha}}{2} = 0. \quad (4.7)$$

To interpret this condition, it is helpful to note that (following exactly the argument in the consumption case), the average growth rate in output is $r(\tau) = \frac{\alpha}{\tau^{1-\alpha}} - \tau$ is a strictly concave function with a unique maximum at $\hat{\tau} = (\alpha(1-\alpha))^{1/\alpha} > 0$.

Although (4.7) cannot be solved explicitly for the tax rate, we can see that in the absence of uncertainty, $r' + \theta' = 0$. As $\theta' = (1-\alpha)^2\tau^{-\alpha} > 0$ i.e. the tax has a positive effect on the wage, $r' < 0$. Thus, the tax rate is too high to be growth-maximising. This reproduces the finding of Alesina and Rodrik (1994). Note that uncertainty implies $r' + \theta' > 0$, i.e. it tends to lower $\tau$. This is because an increase in $\tau$ raises the pre-tax return on capital (4.2), and thus the riskiness of investments. So, in principle, $\tau_C$ could maximize growth when there are stochastic shocks to production.

### 4.5. Decentralization

Using (4.6), the government in the home region maximizes

$$E \left[ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \ln c dt \right] = E \left[ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \ln wd t \right] + \text{const.}$$

It also understands that

$$k = (1-s)w + s^*w^*, \quad k^* = (1-s^*)w^* + sw \quad (4.8)$$

and

$$s = \frac{(r^*(\tau^*) - r(\tau))/\sigma^2 + \tau^{2(1-\alpha)}}{\tau^{-2(1-\alpha)} + (\tau^*)^{2(1-\alpha)}}, \quad s^* = \frac{(r(\tau) - r^*(\tau^*))/\sigma^2 + (\tau^*)^{2(1-\alpha)}}{\tau^{-2(1-\alpha)} + (\tau^*)^{2(1-\alpha)}}. \quad (4.9)$$

As in the AK model, there are two state variables, $w$ and $w^*$. Their equations are:

$$dw = [(1-s)r(\tau) + sr(\tau^*) - \rho]wd t + \theta(\tau)kd t + (1-s)w^{1-\alpha}dz + sw(\tau^*)^{1-\alpha}dz^*$$

$$dw^* = [(1-s^*)r(\tau^*) + s^*r(\tau) - \rho]w^*d t + \theta(\tau^*)kd t + (1-s^*)w*(\tau^*)^{1-\alpha}dz^* + s^*w^{1-\alpha}dz.$$

---

\textsuperscript{9}In fact, invoking the implicit function theorem we find $d\tau/d\sigma < 0$ if the share of output accruing to capital $\alpha \leq 0.5$.  

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Again, we set up the Bellman equation and guess the functional form of the value function in order to derive the FOC. All these steps are dealt with in detail in the Appendix, and the resulting FOC, evaluated at symmetric equilibrium, is:

\[0.5r' + \theta' + \theta \frac{k_r}{\bar{k}} = \frac{\sigma^2(1 - \alpha)\tau^{1-2\alpha}}{4} = 0.\]  

(4.10)

Comparing to the centralized case,

\[r' + \theta' - \frac{\sigma^2(1 - \alpha)\tau^{1-2\alpha}}{2} = 0,
\]

one observes three differences:

- First, due to the mobile tax base externality, we have the term \(\theta \frac{k_r}{\bar{k}}\) in the FOC. \(\frac{k_r}{\bar{k}}\) measures the percentage capital outflow due to a 1 percentage point increase in the tax.

- Second, due to the rate of return externality, \(r'\) enters with a weight of only 0.5. The rationale is that half of the total return to capital goes to foreigners and the effect of tax policy on it is external to the government.

- Third, the impact of capital taxation on risk exposure of foreigners is not recognized (the risk exposure externality), explaining the weight 0.5 in the last term.

Thus, in general the average growth rate of the economy, which is \(r(\tau) - \rho\), may be higher or lower under decentralization relative to centralization. To begin the comparison, we can obtain an analytical result confirming (Hatfield, 2006) when there is no uncertainty. Clearly, (4.7) reduces to \(r' = -\theta'\) when \(\sigma = 0\), whereas (4.10) reduces to \(r' = 0.10\) Thus, in the absence of productivity shocks the government sets the tax rate so as to maximize the average growth rate \(r(\tau) - \rho\) with decentralization, but with centralization, the tax is too high to be growth-maximising:

**Proposition 4.** If \(\sigma = 0\), \(\tau_D = \hat{\tau} < \tau_C\), so the average growth rate is always higher under decentralization.

What happens with stochastic shocks? Although we cannot solve explicitly for the equilibrium tax rates \(\tau_C\) and \(\tau_D\), appealing to Proposition 4 and a continuity argument we know that \(\tau_C > \tau_D\) also holds for a small enough variance of the production shock.

\[^{10}\text{More firmly, following (4.1), (4.8) and (4.9) \(\theta \frac{k_w}{\bar{k}}\) reduces to } -\theta' \text{ when } \sigma \rightarrow 0.\]
This allows us to conclude that decentralization yields higher growth when the variance is small.

The latter finding does however not extend to any size of the variance. First, consider how taxes change as \( \sigma \) increases - see figure 4.1. It might be surprising that the decentralized tax rate decreases with the variance of the shock. At first sight, it appears that a higher variance should increases the benefit of diversification, thereby making the investment decision less sensitive to the tax rate differential (recall Proposition 2). As a first observation, a higher variance increases the pre-tax return on capital \( 4.2 \). In response the government lowers the tax rate - last term in \( 4.10 \). A second effect operates through the mobility of capital. Noting \( 4.8 \) and \( 4.9 \)

\[
k_r = -s_r w + s_r^* w^* \quad \text{and} \quad s_r = -s_r^* = \frac{r'}{2\sigma^2\tau^2(1-\alpha)} + \frac{(1-\alpha)}{2\tau}.
\]

Thus, in symmetric equilibrium

\[
\frac{k_r}{k} = \frac{r'}{\sigma^2\tau^2(1-\alpha)} - \frac{(1-\alpha)}{\tau}.
\]  

Under decentralization and \( \sigma > 0 \), we know that \( r' > 0 \) for \( \alpha = 0.5 \). When \( \sigma \) rises the decentralized government realizes that a rise in taxes will increase the interest rate and thus the riskiness of the investment. The consequence is that investors will less likely allocate capital to a region which increases its tax rate. The effect on government policy is captured by the third term in \( 4.10 \). This is in contrast to the case with a public consumption good where a higher variance makes the tax base less elastic - see \( 3.10 \).
Figure 4.2: $r_C$ (thin line) and $r_D$ (solid line) as a function of $\sigma$ for $\alpha = 0.5$.

Note finally that as $k_\tau$ is independent of $\rho$ from (4.11), and (4.7),(4.10) are otherwise independent of $\rho$, then $\tau_D, \tau_C$ are also independent of $\rho$. This is in contrast to the consumption public good case. This is because taxation and infrastructure provision have countervailing effects on growth which are equated at the margin.

Now we turn to the relationship between decentralization and growth, recalling that the average growth rate is $r(\tau) - \rho$. Figure 4.2 shows how $r_C = r(\tau_C)$ and $r_D = r(\tau_D)$ vary as $\sigma$ increases.

In the absence of uncertainty a decentralized government engages in Bertrand tax competition with the consequence of maximizing growth. The tax rate decreases as $\sigma$ increases and, since the growth rate is hump-shaped in the tax rate, growth is decreasing in $\sigma$. A centralized government sets a too high tax rate to be growth maximizing in the absence of uncertainty\textsuperscript{11} and lowers it as $\sigma$ rises. For sufficiently small values of $\sigma$ growth is rising. In fact, for $\sigma \approx 1.7$ the growth rate equals that under decentralization and for $\sigma \approx 2$ the centralized tax rate is growth maximizing. For larger values both a decentralized and centralized government operate on the upward sloping part of the growth-curve with centralization yielding higher growth. This is in contrast to the results of Hatfield (2006), who assumes a deterministic growth model.

\textsuperscript{11}This may imply a zero or even a negative net return to investors. The result is reminiscent of Alesina and Rodrick (1994).
5. Conclusions

This paper has considered the relationship between tax competition and growth in an endogenous growth model where there are stochastic shocks to productivity, and capital taxes fund a public good which may be for final consumption or an infrastructure input. Absent stochastic shocks, decentralized tax setting (two or more jurisdictions) maximizes the rate of growth, as the constant returns to scale present with endogenous growth implies Bertrand tax competition. Stochastic shocks imply that households face a portfolio choice problem. Shocks dampen down tax competition and may raise taxes above the centralized level when the government provides a public consumption good. Growth can be lower with decentralization. In the public infrastructure model shocks may increase the tax base elasticity and the equilibrium decentralized tax rate may be too low to yield higher growth with decentralization. Our results also predict a negative relationship between output volatility and growth, consistent with the empirical evidence.

One might ask how robust our results are. Two of our important simplifying assumptions are logarithmic utility of private consumption, and in the case of the infrastructure model, no taxes on labour. If logarithmic utility of private consumption is relaxed to iso-elastic utility, we can still solve the household savings and portfolio choice problem in closed form, but we cannot get a closed-form solution for the equilibrium tax, even in the case of a consumption public good. But the key externalities at work remain the same, and as a result, it is possible to get higher taxes and lower growth with decentralization in the public consumption good case\textsuperscript{12}. In the infrastructure model, we conjecture that our main conclusions would be unaffected, as long as the demand for the public good is high enough so that it is optimal to use a capital tax at the margin.

References


\textsuperscript{12}Details of these calculations are available on request.


A. Proofs of Propositions and Other Results

Proof of Proposition 1. First, using $s_{ij} = 1/n$ and (2.6) we rewrite the stochastic wealth equation (2.4) as

$$dw_i = w_i [(1 - \tau) - \rho] + \frac{w_i}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} dz_j.$$ 

Denoting $V(w)$ as the value function, the Bellman equation is

$$\rho V(w) = \max_{(\tau)} \left\{ (1 + \beta) \ln w + \beta \ln \tau + V(1 - \tau) - \rho \right\} + \frac{V_{ww} w^2}{2} \frac{\sigma^2}{n}.$$ 

Differentiating the RHS w.r.t. $\tau$ and setting the result equal to zero, and assuming $V(w) = A + \psi \ln w$, we have;

$$\frac{\beta}{\tau} = V_{ww} w = \psi. \quad \text{(A.1)}$$

To derive $\psi$ we rewrite the Bellman equation, using (A.1) and $V(w) = A + \psi \ln w$ as;

$$\rho (A + \psi \ln w) = (1 + \beta) \ln w + \beta \ln \tau + \xi [(1 - \tau) - \rho] - \frac{\xi \sigma^2}{2n}.$$ 

Thus, equating coefficients on $\ln w$, we see that $\psi = \frac{1 + \beta}{\rho}$. Combining with (A.1), the optimal tax rate is $\tau = \frac{\rho}{1 + \beta}$ which completes the proof. \(\square\)

Proof of Proposition 2. First rewrite the stochastic terms in the state equations as

$$d\hat{w} = (1 - (n - 1)s)dz_i + (n - 1)s dz^* \quad \text{(A.2)}$$

$$d\hat{w}^* = s^*dz_i + (1 - s^*)dz^* \quad \text{(A.3)}$$

Noting that

$$E[(dz_i)^2] = \sigma^2 dt, \quad E[(dz^*)^2] = \frac{\sigma^2}{n - 1} dt, \quad E[dz_i dz^*] = 0$$

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one can compute from (A.2) and (A.3) that
\[ E[(d\tilde{w})^2] = [(1 - (n - 1)s)^2 + (n - 1)s^2]\sigma^2 dt = \sigma^2_w dt \]
\[ E[(d\tilde{w}^*)^2] = [(1 - s^*)^2/(n - 1) + (s^*)^2]\sigma^2 dt = \sigma^2_w^* dt \]
\[ E[d\tilde{w} d\tilde{w}^*] = [(1 - (n - 1)s)s^* + (1 - s^*)s]\sigma^2 dt = \xi dt \]

So, assuming a value function \( V(w, w^*) \), the Bellman equation for the government problem can be written
\[ \rho V(w, w^*) = \max_{\{\tau\}} \left\{ \ln w + \beta \ln k + \beta \ln \tau + V_w w [1 - (1 - (n - 1)s)\tau - (n - 1)s\tau^* - \rho] \right\} \]
\[ + V_{w^*} w^* [1 - (1 - s^*)\tau^* - s^*\tau - \rho] + \frac{V_{ww} w^2}{2} \sigma^2_w + \frac{V_{w^* w^*} (w^*)^2}{2} \sigma^2_{w^*} + V_{w^* w} w^* \xi \]
where \( k = ((1 - (n - 1)s)w + (n - 1)s^* w^*) \). Taking into account the effect of \( \tau \) on \( s \) and \( s^* \) and, thus, on \( \sigma^2_w, \sigma^2_{w^*}, \) and \( \xi \), we have
\[ s_\tau = \frac{1}{n\sigma^2}, \quad s^*_\tau = -\frac{n - 1}{n\sigma^2} \] \hspace{1cm} (A.5)
\[ \frac{ds^2_w}{d\tau} = \frac{2(n - 1)}{n} [sn - 1], \quad \frac{ds^2_{w^*}}{d\tau} = \frac{2n}{n} [1 - ns^*] \] \hspace{1cm} (A.6)
\[ \frac{d\xi}{d\tau} = [(1 - ns^*) - (n - 1)(1 - ns)] \frac{1}{n} \] \hspace{1cm} (A.7)

So, using (A.5), the FOC for the tax is
\[ \frac{\beta}{\tau} + \frac{\beta}{k} \frac{\partial k}{\partial \tau} - V_w w(1 - (n - 1)s) - V_{w^*} w^* s^* + \]
\[ (V_w w + V_{w^*} w^*)(n - 1)(\tau - \tau^*) \frac{1}{n\sigma^2} + \frac{1}{2} V_{ww} w^2 \frac{d\sigma^2_w}{d\tau} + \frac{V_{w^* w^*} (w^*)^2}{2} \frac{d\sigma^2_{w^*}}{d\tau} + V_{w^* w} w^* \frac{d\xi}{d\tau} = 0 \] \hspace{1cm} (A.8)

where
\[ \frac{\partial k}{\partial \tau} = -(n - 1)ws_\tau + (n - 1)w^* s^*_\tau \] \hspace{1cm} (A.9)
\[ = -(n - 1)w \frac{1}{n\sigma^2} + (n - 1)^2 w^* \frac{1}{n\sigma^2} \]

At a symmetric equilibrium we have \( \tau^* = \tau \) and so \( w^* = w = k \) and \( s = s^* = \frac{1}{n} \). Thus, using (A.9), and also noting from (A.6),(A.7) that as \( \frac{d\sigma^2_w}{d\tau} = \frac{d\sigma^2_{w^*}}{d\tau} = \frac{d\xi}{d\tau} = 0 \), we can rewrite (A.8) as
\[ \frac{\beta}{\tau} = \frac{\beta(n - 1)}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{n} (V_w w + V_{w^*} w^*) \]
\[ = 0 \] \hspace{1cm} (A.10)
Next, note that in symmetric equilibrium, \( w = w^* \), and assume \( V(w, w) \equiv A + \psi \ln w \). Then, at symmetric equilibrium,

\[
V_w w + V_{ww} w^* = \psi \\
V_{ww} w^2 + V_{ww} (w^*)^2 + 2 V_{ww} w w^* = -\psi
\]

and consequently, (A.10) can be rewritten as

\[
\frac{\beta}{\tau} - \frac{\beta(n-1)}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{n} \psi = 0
\]  

(A.11)

It just remains to solve for \( \psi \). Note also at symmetric equilibrium that \( \sigma^2_w = \sigma_{w^*}^2 = \xi = \frac{\sigma^2}{n} \). Using all these facts, the Bellman equation (A.4) reduces to

\[
\rho (A + \psi \ln w) = \left\{ (1 + \beta) \ln w + \beta \ln \tau + \psi [1 - \tau - \rho] - \frac{1}{2n} \sigma^2 \psi \right\} 
\]

(A.12)

So, by inspection, \( \psi = (1 + \beta)/\rho \). So, from (A.11) and \( \psi = (1 + \beta)/\rho \), we obtain the expression for \( \tau_d \) in Proposition 2. □

**Derivation of the Solution to the Household Problem in the Public Infrastructure Good Case**

Using \( k = w \) in (4.5), the problem is to maximize (4.4) subject to

\[
dw = [(1 - s)r(\tau) + sr(\tau^*)]w dt + \theta w dt - c dt + (1 - s) w \tau^{1-\alpha} dz + sw(\tau^*)^{1-\alpha} dz^*. \]  

(A.13)

Assume the value function for this problem takes the form \( V(w) = A + B \ln w \). In this case the Bellman equation is

\[
\rho (A + B \ln w) = \max_{c,s} \left\{ \ln c + (w[(1 - s)r + sr^* + \theta]) - c) \frac{B}{w} - \frac{B}{2} \sigma^2 \right\}
\]

where

\[
\sigma^2_w = [(1 - s)^2 \tau^{2(1-\alpha)} + s^2(\tau^*)^{2(1-\alpha)}] \sigma^2.
\]

is the variance of wealth. The first-order conditions for \( c \) and \( s \) are

\[
\frac{1}{c} - \frac{B}{w} = 0 \]  

(A.14)

\[
B \left( r^* - r - \sigma^2 [s(\tau^{2(1-\alpha)} + (\tau^*)^{2(1-\alpha)}) - \tau^{2(1-\alpha)}] \right) = 0 \]

(A.15)

and the Bellman equation becomes

\[
\rho (A + B \ln w) = \max_{c,s} \left\{ \ln w - \ln B + [(1 - s)r + sr^* + \theta]B - 1 - \frac{B}{2} \sigma^2 \right\}.
\]

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So, $B = 1/\rho$; using this in (A.14), (A.15) gives (4.6). □

**Derivation of the FOC (4.10).** At a symmetric equilibrium, $w = w^*$. So, the Bellman is

$$
\rho V(w, w^*) = \max_{\tau} \left\{ \ln w + V_w[[(1 - s)r(\tau) + sr(\tau^*) - \rho]w + \theta(\tau)k] + V_{w^*}[[1 - s^*]r(\tau^*) + s^*r(\tau) - \rho]w^* dt + \theta(\tau^*)k^*] + \frac{V_{w^*w^*}w^2}{2} \sigma_w^2 + \frac{V_{w^*w^*}(w^*)^2}{2} \sigma_{w^*}^2 + V_{ww^*}ww^* \xi \right\}
$$

$$
\sigma_w^2 = [(1 - s)^2 \tau^{2(1-\alpha)} + s^2(\tau^*)^{2(1-\alpha)}] \sigma^2
$$

$$
\sigma_{w^*}^2 = [(1 - s^*)^2 (\tau^*)^{2(1-\alpha)} + (s^*)^2 \tau^{2(1-\alpha)}] \sigma^2
$$

$$
\xi = [(1 - s)s^*\tau^{2(1-\alpha)} + s(1 - s^*)(\tau^*)^{2(1-\alpha)}] \sigma^2
$$

Evaluated at $\tau = \tau^*$, the Bellman equation is

$$
V_w[0.5r'w + \theta'k + \theta k^*] + V_{w^*}[0.5r'w^* + \theta k^*] + \left( \frac{V_{ww}w^2}{2} + \frac{V_{w^*w^*}(w^*)^2}{2} + V_{ww^*}ww^* \right) \frac{\sigma^2(1 - \alpha)\tau^{1-2\alpha}}{2} = 0
$$

where we already used the fact that

$$
\frac{\partial \sigma_w^2}{\partial \tau} = \frac{\partial \sigma_{w^*}^2}{\partial \tau} = \frac{\partial \xi}{\partial \tau} = \frac{\sigma^2(1 - \alpha)\tau^{1-2\alpha}}{2}.
$$

Now, guess $V(w, w^*) = A + B \ln w$, i.e. the value function is independent of $w^*$. Then,

$$
\left( \frac{V_{ww}w^2}{2} + \frac{V_{w^*w^*}(w^*)^2}{2} + V_{ww^*}ww^* \right) = \frac{-B}{2}
$$

Thus, the FOC becomes, cancelling $B$ and using $k = w$ in symmetric equilibrium:

$$
0.5r' + \theta' + \theta \frac{k^*}{k} - \frac{\sigma^2(1 - \alpha)\tau^{1-2\alpha}}{4} = 0.
$$

as required. □