



# Geschichte der Philosophie III

## Neuzeit bis Kant X





**Zeittafel zur Philosophie der Neuzeit I**





Kolonien um 1790





## John Locke

(29. August 1632 – 28. Oktober 1704)

1632 geb. in Wrington bei Bristol

ab 1652 Studium Christ Church College/Oxford

ab 1660 Universitätslehrer (Lecturer für Griechisch, Rhetorik, Ethik)

ab 1667 Sekretär und Leibarzt von *Anthony Ashley-Cooper, dem 1. Earl of Shaftesbury* (seit 1672), 1661-72 *Schatzkanzler*, 1672-73 *Lordkanzler*

1668 Mitglied der Royal Society

1675-79 Aufenthalt in Frankreich


1683-88 in den Niederlanden

1704 gest. in Oates/Essex

### John Locke (1632-1704)

John Greenhill (um 1672-76), *National Portrait Gallery, London*





**John Locke (1632-1704)**

Sir Godfrey Kneller (1697), *Ermitage, St. Petersburg*

## **John Locke**

(29. August 1632 – 28. Oktober 1704)

1669 (gem. mit Shaftesbury) *The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina*

1689 *A Letter Concerning Toleration*

1690 ***An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding***


1690 *The Second Treatise of Civil Government*

1693 *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*

1695 *The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures*

*The Works of John Locke, A New Edition, Corrected,*  
10 vols., London 1823.

## John Locke (1632 – 1704)




### Bürgerliche Interessen und Toleranz

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests.

Civil interest I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like. [...]

**Now that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments;** and that all civil power, right, and dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that **it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls;** these following considerations seem unto me abundantly to demonstrate.

*A Letter Concerning Toleration, Works VI, 9f.*



**John Locke (1632 – 1704)**

***An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,***  
London 1690

***Book I: OF INNATE NOTIONS***

***Book II: OF IDEAS***

***Book III: OF WORDS***

***Book IV: OF KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION***

This, therefore, being my purpose; **to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent** – I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine, wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or no. These are speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. (*Essay I, 2*)

„Wie schön wäre es gewesen, Vellejus, lieber eingestehen, nicht zu wissen, was Du nicht weißt, als dergleichen herauszuschwatzen und sich selbst zu mißfallen“

Cicero, *De natura deorum* I, 84



## **John Locke (1632 – 1704)**

***An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding***, London 1690

### **Klärung der Sprache im Dienst der Wissenschaft**


The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs in advancing the sciences will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but every one must not hope to be a Boyle, or a Sydenham: and in an age that produces such masters, as the great Huygenius, and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain ; it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the sciences, and there made an art of, to that degree, that philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit, or incapable to be brought into well-bred company, and polite conversation.

*The Epistle to the Reader, Works I, L*



## John Locke (1632 – 1704)

*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*,  
London 1690



### ***Of Ideas in general, and their Original.***

§ 2. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas ; how comes it to be furnished ? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety ? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience: in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring. (*Essay* II, i, 2)

## **John Locke (1632 – 1704)**

***An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,***  
London 1690

### ***Book II: OF IDEAS***

#### **Simple Ideas of Sensation (II, iii-viii):**

Colours, sounds, smells, tastes; solidity, extension, figure, rest, motion

#### **Simple Ideas of Reflection (II, vi, ix-xi):**

Perception, or Thinking; Volition, or Willing

#### **Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection (II, vii):**

Pleasure-Pain, Existence, Unity, Power, Succession

#### **Complex Ideas (II, xii): Modes (II, xiii-xxii), Substances (II, xxiii-f.), Relations (II, xxv-xxviii)**



**John Locke (1632 – 1704)**

***An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding***, London 1690

### Simple ideas of Sensation

	Ideas which come into our minds by one sense only ( <i>Essay II, iii</i> )	Ideas which come into our minds by more than one sense ( <i>Essay II, v</i> )	
<b>secondary qualities</b> ( <i>Essay II, x</i> )	colours sounds smells tastes <b>solidity</b> ( <i>Essay II, iv</i> )	<b>extension</b> <b>figure</b> <b>rest</b> <b>motion</b>	<b>primary qualities</b> ( <i>Essay II, ix</i> )

## **John Locke (1632 – 1704)**

***An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,***  
London 1690

### **Primäre Qualitäten**

§ 9. Qualities thus considered in bodies are, first, such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate soever it be; such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses ; v.g. take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities, and so divide it on till the parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all those qualities : for division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any other body does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter of that which was but one before ; all which distinct masses, reckoned as so many distinct bodies, after division make a certain number. These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.  
(*Essay II, viii, 9*)



## **John Locke (1632 – 1704)**

***An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,***  
London 1690

### **Sekundäre Qualitäten**

§ 10. Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colour, sounds, tastes, &c. these I call secondary qualities. To these might be added a third sort, which are allowed to be barely powers, though they are as much real qualities in the subject as those which I, to comply with the common way of speaking, call qualities, but for distinction, secondary qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new colour, or consistency, in wax or clay, by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire as the power it has to produce in me a new idea or sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before, by the same primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its insensible parts. (*Essay II, viii, 10*)

## **John Locke (1632 – 1704)**

***An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,***  
London 1690

**Complex Ideas (II, xii): Modes (II, xiii-xxii), Substances (II, xxiiiif.), Relations (II, xxv-xxviii)**

But as the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the other are framed. The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these three: 1. Combining several simple ideas into one compound one, and thus all complex ideas are made. 2. The second is bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together, and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one ; by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. 3. The third is separating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence ; this is called abstraction: and thus all its general ideas are made. [...] Ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together, I call complex ; such as are beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe; which though complicated of various simple ideas, or complex ideas made up of simple ones, yet are, when the mind pleases, considered each by itself as one entire thing, and signified by one name.

*(Essay II, xii, 1)*



## **John Locke (1632 – 1704)**

*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*,  
London 1690

**Complex Ideas** (II, xii): **Modes** (II, xiii-xxii), **Substances** (II, xxiiif.), **Relations** (II, xxv-xxviii)

§ 3. Complex ideas, however compounded and decomposed, though their infinite, and the variety endless, wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men; yet, I think, they may be all reduced under these three heads : **1. Modes. 2. Substances. 3. Relations.**

§ 4. First, **Modes** I call such complex ideas, which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or of substances: such as are ideas signified by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, &c.

**Simple Modes:** Space, Duration, Number, Infinity, Power

**Mixed modes:** such are the complex ideas we mark by the names obligation, drunkenness, a lie, &c. which consisting of several combinations of simple ideas of different kinds, I have called mixed modes, to distinguish them from the more simple modes, which consist only of simple ideas of the same kind. These mixed modes being also such combinations of simple ideas as are not looked upon to be characteristical marks of any real beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent ideas put together by the mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances. (II, xxii, 1)

## John Locke (1632 – 1704)

*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*,  
London 1690

**Complex Ideas** (II, xii): **Modes** (II, xiii-xxii), **Substances** (II, xxiii-f.), **Relations** (II, xxv-xxviii)

Ch. XXIII. *Of our complex Ideas of Substances*

If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts : and if he were demanded, what is it that that solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before-mentioned, who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on ; to which his answer was, a great tortoise. But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children; who being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is something : which in truth signifies no more, when so used either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, “*sine re substantive,*” *without something* to support them, we call that support *substantia*; which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, standing under or upholding. (*Essay* II, xxiii, 2)



## **John Locke (1632 – 1704)**

***An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,***  
London 1690

**Complex Ideas (II, xii): Modes (II, xiii-xxii), Substances (II, xxiii-f.), Relations (II, xxv-xxviii)**

### **Relations**

Ch. XXVI. *Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations*

... the things thus made to exist, which were not there before, are effects ; and those things, which operated to the existence, causes. In which, and all other causes, we may observe, that the notion of cause and effect has its rise from ideas, received by sensation or reflection; and that this relation, how comprehensible soever, terminates at last in them. For to have the idea of cause and effect, it suffices to consider any simple idea, or substance, as beginning to exist by the operation of some other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

(*Essay II, xxvi, 2*)

## John Locke (1632 – 1704)

*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*,  
London 1690

**Complex Ideas (II, xii): Modes (II, xiii-xxii), Substances (II, xxiii-f.), Relations (II, xxv-xxviii)**

### Relations

#### Ch. XXVII. *Of Identity and Diversity*

We have the ideas but of three substances. sorts of substances : 1. God. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. Bodies. First, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and everywhere ; and therefore concerning his identity there can be no doubt. Secondly, finite spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity, as long as it exists. Thirdly, the same will hold of every particle of matter, to which no addition or subtraction of matter being made, it is the same. For though these three sorts of substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same place; yet we cannot conceive but that **they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place: or else the notions and names of identity and diversity would be in vain**, and there could be no such distinction of substances, or any thing else one from another.

(*Essay II, xxvii, 2*)

## **John Locke (1632 – 1704)**

***An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,***  
London 1690

### ***Book III: OF WORDS***

#### **Lockes sensualistische Abstraktionstheorie**

Words become general, by being made the signs of general ideas ; and ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas, that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort. (*Essay* III, iii, 6)

To conclude, this is that which short I would say, viz. that all the great business of genera and species, and their essences, amounts to no more but this, That men making abstract ideas, and settling them in their minds with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider things, and discourse of them as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge; which would advance but slowly were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars. (*Essay* III, iii, 20)



## John Locke (1632 – 1704)

*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*,  
London 1690

### ***Book IV: OF KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION***

Thus particular ideas are first received and distinguished, and so knowledge got about them; and next to them, the less general or specific, which are next to particular: for **abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones**. If they seem so to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find, that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. **For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult?) for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once**. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true, the mind, in this imperfect state, has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge; to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect **such ideas are marks of our imperfection**; at least this is enough to show, that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, not such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about. (*Essay IV, vii, 9*)

## John Locke (1632 – 1704)

*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*,  
London 1690

### **Book IV: OF KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION**

#### *Ch. II. Of the Degrees of our Knowledge*

All our knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the mind has **of** its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we, with our faculties, and in our way of knowledge, are capable of; it may not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence. The different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas. For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this, I think, we may call **intuitive knowledge**. [...] The next degree of knowledge is, where the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, but not immediately. [...] These two, viz. intuition and **demonstration**, are the degrees of our knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance soever embraced, is but faith, or opinion, but not knowledge, at least in all general truths. There is, indeed, another perception of the mind, employed about the particular existence of finite beings without us; which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of knowledge. [...] I think, we may add to the two former sorts of knowledge this also of the existence of particular external objects, by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these **three degrees of knowledge, viz. intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive**: in each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty. (*Essay IV, ii, 1,2, 14*)



**George Berkeley (1658-1753)**

## **George Berkeley (1658 – 1753)**

1653 geb. in Irland

Studiert Theologie am Trinity College in Dublin

Diakon in Dublin und London

1729-31 Missionar in Rhode Island

1734 Bischof von Cloyne in Irland

1653 gest. in Oxford

*A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, wherein the chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are inquired into (1710)*

*The Works of George Berkeley.* Ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser, 4 Vols., Oxford 1901



## George Berkeley (1658 – 1753)

*A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710)

### »Esse est percipi«

3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind is what everybody will allow. And to me it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the Sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists ; that is, I see and feel it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed ; meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelt ; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to **what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*; nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.**

(*Works* I, 258f.)

## George Berkeley (1658 – 1753)

*A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710)

### Berkeley's sensualistischer Spiritualismus

29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of *my* will. **There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.**

30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules, or established methods, wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called the *laws of nature*; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.

(*Works* I, 273)

## George Berkeley (1658 – 1753)

*A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710)

### Berkeleys sensualistischer Spiritualismus

33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called *real things*: and those excited in the imagination, being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed *ideas* or *images of things*, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas: that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. **The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them**, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit or thinking substance which perceives them, **in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful Spirit**: yet still they are *ideas*: and certainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.

(*Works* I, 273)