

Christian Damböck: Carnap, Reichenbach, Freyer. The Social Adaptiveness of Ethics, in the Context of Logical Empiricism and the German Youth Movement

Workshop *Sociological Overtones in Logical Empiricism*. Budapest, April 2016

Gustav Mittelstraß / Christian Schneehagen (eds.): *Freideutscher Jugendtag*. Hamburg, 1919².

[1] The Free German Youth intends to model its life on its own purpose and responsibility, with inner authenticity. This inner freedom is jointly defended, under all circumstances. Free German Youth Days will be organized, with the objective of mutual understanding. All joint meetings of the Free German Youth are alcohol and nicotine free. (p.8)

Die Freideutsche Jugend will aus eigener Bestimmung, vor eigener Verantwortung, mit innerer Wahrhaftigkeit ihr Leben gestalten. Für diese innere Freiheit tritt sie unter allen Umständen geschlossen ein. Zur gegenseitigen Verständigung werden Freideutsche Jugendtage abgehalten. Alle gemeinsamen Veranstaltungen der Freideutschen Jugend sind alkohol- und nikotinfrei.

Hans Freyer: *Antäus. Grundlegung einer Ethik des Bewussten Lebens*. Jena, 1918.

Alfred Kurella: Zur Ethik der neuen Jugend (= review of Freyer 1918). *Die Tat* 10, 1918, 634-637.

[2] [...] here is the road toward the Meißner oath, inner authenticity and responsibility (p. 636)

[...] hier ist der Weg zum Meißnerschwur, zur inneren Wahrhaftigkeit und eignen Verantwortung.

Alfred Kurella: *Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft. Offener Brief an den Freideutschen Führerrat*. Adolf Saal Verlag, Hamburg, 1918

Meike G. Werner: Freideutsche Jugend und Politik. Rudolf Carnaps *Politische Rundbriefe*. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf et al. (eds.): *Geschichte intellektuell. Theoriegeschichtliche Perspektiven*. Mohr Siebeck 2015, 465-486.

Hans Freyer: Ethische Normen und Politik, *Kant Studien* 35, 1930, 99-114.

[3] The moral subject is set into the world, in order to decide in those concrete value constellations events bring on: an ultimate instance, a solitary judge, an organ that perceives the demands of the world, an energeia that forms the moral value from the matter of values. (p. 112)

Das moralische Subjekt ist in die Welt gestellt, um sich, mit freiem Blick über alle Werte hin, in den konkreten Wertlagen, die das Geschehen heranbranden lässt, zu entscheiden: eine letzte Instanz, ein einsamer Richter, ein Organ, das die Forderungen der Welt innerlich vernimmt, eine energeia, die aus der Wertmaterie den sittlichen Wert formt.

[4] the possibility exists that the moral world breaks apart on this line (p. 112)

Die Möglichkeit, daß die sittliche Welt auf dieser Linie auseinanderbricht, besteht allerdings.

[5] The political powers are set into the world, in order to realize a closed value conception that is potentially available in a *Volk* at a certain place of the world. They are mandataries of this possibility of the human and therefore its party. (p. 112)

Die politischen Mächte sind in die Welt gestellt, um eine geschlossene Wertgestalt, die an bestimmter Stelle der Erde in einem Volk angelegt ist, geschichtlich zu verwirklichen. Sie sind Mandatare dieser einen Möglichkeit des Menschlichen, und darum für sie Partei.

Hans Reichenbach: *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*. University of California Press, 1951.

[6] We may differ in many respects, perhaps about the question of whether the state should own the means of production, or whether the divorce laws should be made easier, or whether a world government should be set up that controls the atom bomb. But we can discuss such problems if we both agree about a democratic principle [...]:

Everybody is entitled to set up his own moral imperatives and to demand that everyone follow these imperatives. (p. 295)

[7] [This democratic] principle is not an ethical doctrine, answering all questions of what we should do. It is merely an invitation to take active part in the struggle of opinions. Volitional differences cannot be settled by the appeal to a system of ethics constructed by some learned man; they can be overcome only through the clash of opinions, through the friction between the individual and his environment, through controversy and the compulsion of the situation. (p. 296)

[8] This is not meant to imply that the empiricist is a man of easy compromise. Much as he is willing to learn from the group, he is also prepared to steer the group in the direction of his own volitions. He knows that social progress is often due to the persistence of individuals who were stronger than the group; and he will try, and try again, to modify the group as much as he can. The interplay of group and individual has effects both on the individual and on the group. (p. 300)

Paul Arthur Schilpp: *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*. La Salle: Open Court, 1963.

[9] It was and still is my conviction that the great problems of the organization of economy and the organization of the world at the present time, in the era of industrialization, cannot possibly be solved by „the free interplay of forces“, but require rational planning. For the organization of economy this means socialism in some form; for the organization of the world it means a gradual development toward a world government. (p. 83)

[10] However, neither socialism nor world government are regarded as absolute ends; they are only the organizational means which, according to our present knowledge, seem to give the best promise of leading to a realization of the ultimate aim. This aim is a form of life in which the well-being and the development of the individual is valued most highly, not the power of the state. [...] If we look at the problem from the point of view of this aim, we shall recognize **the dangers lying in the constant increase of the power of the state** [...] Thus one of the main problems [...] is the task of finding ways of organizing society which will reconcile the personal and cultural freedom of the individual with the development of an efficient organization of state and economy. (p. 83-84)