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[1] [The] most fundamental aim of the Aufbau [is] the articulation and defense of a radically new conception of objectivity. (Friedman 1999, 95)

[4] What is the nature of objectivity? First and foremost, objectivity is the suppression of some aspects of the self, the countering of subjectivity. Objectivity and subjectivity define each other, like left and right or up and down. (Daston & Galison 2007, 36f)

[3] […] structural relationships […] outlived the piled-up ruins of past scientific theories and the idiosyncracies of present scientists; these were “the only objective reality”.
[…]
Yet the preoccupations of late twentieth-century structural realists were not those of early twentieth-century structural objectivists: the former, like all realists, were primarily interested in the justification for the claim that science was true, that it correctly described real features of the world; the latter (including Poincaré) were chiefly concerned with the justification of the claim that science was objective, that it was „common to all thinking beings.‟ (Daston & Galison 2007, 260f)

[4] The causal nexus linking changes within the sensory organ to an independent external object as well as the motor impulses and voluntary movements of our own body is a product of logical processes. This nexus already presupposes the reality of the external world. All inductive processes of everyday life and of the science flesh out this causal nexus. Our actions can all be compared to experiments belonging to this inductive nexus. Thus life in its entirety, indeed the lives of all generation linked together, finally constitute a system of inductions that have the existence of external objects as their presupposition […] (Dilthey 2010, 33f)

[5] Action everywhere presupposes the understanding of other persons; much of our happiness as human beings derives from being able to feel the states of mind of others; the entire science of philology and of history is based on the presupposition that such reunderstanding of what is singular can be raised to objectivity. (Dilthey 1996, 235)

[6] [The] main purpose [of hermeneutics is] to preserve the universal validity of historical interpretation against the inroads of romantic caprice and skeptical subjectivity, and to give a theoretical justification for such validity, upon which all the certainty of historical knowledge is founded. (Dilthey 1996, 250)

[7] Das Ding an sich ist somit der Inbegriff der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse. Aber damit ist mehr gesagt. Die Erkenntnisse bilden nicht eine abgeschlossene Reihe, ein Kapitel toter Hand; sie sind nur, indem sie zeugen, dies ist der Charakter alles Idealen. Sie enthalten daher nicht nur das, was ermittelt ist, sondern in sich zugleich das, was fraglich bleibt. Dies ist der Charakter aller Begriffe: dass sie, indem sie Denkforderungen befriedigen, neue stellen. Es gibt hier keinen definitiven Abschluss. Jeder richtige Begriff ist eine neue Frage, keiner eine letzte Antwort. Das
Ding an sich muss daher zugleich der Ausdruck der Fragen sein, welche in jenen Antworten der Erkenntnisse eingeschlossen sind. Diese fernere Bedeutung des Dinges an sich bezeichnet ein anderer Ausdruck, durch welchen Kant das \( x \) als welches er wiederholentlich das transszendentale Objekt bezeichnet, bestimmt und vertieft hat. Das Ding an sich ist „Aufgabe“. (Cohen 1918, 660f)

[8] The objectivity of a concept lies in the fact that it is an independent and adequate means to secure and generate the object. (Cohen 1922, 131f, my translation)

[9] Even though the subjective origin of all knowledge lies in the contents of experience and their connections, it is still possible, as the constructional system will show, to advance to an intersubjective, objective world, which can be conceptually comprehended and which is identical for all observers. (Carnap 1967, § 2)

[10] [...] each scientific statement can in principle be so transformed that it is nothing but a structure statement. But this transformation is not only possible, it is imperative. For science wants to speak about what is objective, and whatever does not belong to the structure but to the material material (i.e., anything that can be pointed out in a concrete ostensive definition) is, in the final analysis, subjective. (Carnap 1967, §16)

[11] The requirement that knowledge may be objective can be understood in two senses. It could mean objectivity in contrast to arbitrariness: if a judgment is said to reflect knowledge, then this means that it does not depend on my whims. Objectivity in this sense can obviously be required and achieved even if the basis for knowledge is autopsychological. Secondly, by objectivity is sometimes meant independence from the judging subject, validity which holds also for other subjects. (Carnap 1967, § 66)

[12] [...] constitutional theory will have to ascertain whether the conceptual system which is based on this theory, namely the „constitutional system“, provides place for each of the object types which we have just mentioned. (Carnap 1967, §25, with some corrections)

[13] [...] the thesis of the present treatise [...] merely asserts the possibility, in general, of a constitutional system and especially of a constitutional system of the same form as we have used here; furthermore, the thesis asserts the applicability and fruitfulness of the indicated method. (Carnap 1967, §122, with some corrections)

[14] The realist orientation of the physicist shows itself primarily in the use of realistic language; this is practical and justifiable (cf. § 52). A more pronounced realism, as an explicit thesis, goes beyond this and is not permissible; it must be corrected so as to become (what we may call) „objectivism“: the regular connections (which in natural laws are formulated as implication statements) are objective and are independent of the will of the individual; on the other hand, the ascription of the property „real“ to any substance (be it matter, energy, electromagnetic field, or whatever) cannot be derived from any experience and hence would be metaphysical. (Carnap 1967, § 178, with some corrections)