[1] [...] the task of a theory of meaning as I conceive it is not to change, to improve, or reform a language, but to describe and understand it. (Davidson 1984, p. 29)

[2] Our explication [...] will refer to semantical language-systems, not to natural languages. It shares this character with most of the explications of philosophically important concepts given in modern logic, e.g., Tarski’s explication of truth. It seems to me that the problems of explicating concepts of this kind for natural languages are of an entirely different nature. (Carnap 1952, p. 66)

[3] Why all this creative reconstruction, all this make-believe? (Quine 1969, p. 75, my emphases)

[4] It is no accident that mathematics and later logic had a stronger attraction for me than linguistics. A first rather obvious explanation is the fact that the nature of my thinking is not historical, but rather systematic and structural. The internal harmony and symmetry of mathematics and later of symbolic logic had also a stronger emotional and aesthetic appeal for me than the natural languages with their innumerable disturbing irregularities. (UCLA, Special Collection no. 1029, CM03, M-A5, N1-N2)

[5] Thinking about the design of a robot will help us finding rules of rationality. Once found, these rules can be applied not only in the construction of a robot but also in advising human beings in their effort to make their decisions as rational as their limited abilities permit. (Carnap 1962, p. 309)

[6] One does not proceed, therefore, from the objects to the mind, but from the latter to the objects, whereby the greatest stress is put in keeping the mental structure [geistiges Gefüge] clean and clear. This second world of objects exactly resembles the first, the existent but remains to be a purified, referring one [gereinigte, bezogene]. (Roh 1925, p. 37, my translation)

[7] It was and still is my conviction that the great problems of the organization of economy and the organization of the world at the present time, in the era of industrialization, cannot possibly be solved by „the free interplay of forces“, but require rational planning. For the organization of economy this means socialism of some form; for the organization of the world it means a gradual development toward a world government. However, neither socialism nor world government are regarded as absolute ends; they are only organizational means which, according to our present knowledge, seem to give the best promise of leading to a realization of the ultimate aim. This aim is a form of life in which the well-being and the development of the individual is valued most highly, not the power of the state. (Schilpp 1963, p. 83, my emphasis)

[8] The practical handling of philosophical problems and the discovery of their solutions does not have to be purely intellectual, but will always contain emotional elements and intuitive methods. The justification, however, has to take place before the forum of the understanding [vor dem Forum des Verstandes]; here we must not refer to our intuition or emotional needs. We too, have “emotional needs” [“Bedürfnisse des Gemüts”] in philosophy, but they are filled by clarity of concepts, precision of methods, responsible theses, achievement through cooperation in which each individual plays his part. (Carnap 1967, p. xvii)

[9] Only slowly did I recognize how large the divergence is between the views of the two wings of analytic philosophy in the question of natural versus constructed languages: the view which I shared with my friends in the Vienna Circle and later with many philosophers in the United States, and the view of those philosophers who are chiefly influenced by G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein. (Schilpp 1963, p. 68)