Carnap’s notion of analyticity and the two wings of analytic philosophy

[1] [...] the task of a theory of meaning as I conceive it is not to change, to improve, or reform a language, but to describe and understand it. (Davidson 1984, p. 29)

[2] Our explication [...] will refer to semantical language-systems, not to natural languages. It shares this character with most of the explications of philosophically important concepts given in modern logic, e.g., Tarski’s explication of truth. It seems to me that the problems of explicating concepts of this kind for natural languages are of an entirely different nature. (Carnap 1952, p. 66)

[3] Why all this creative reconstruction, all this make-believe? (Quine 1969, p. 75, my emphases)

[4] [Since] our goal is not the psychology of actual human behavior in the field of inductive reasoning, but rather inductive logic as a system of rules, we do not aim at realism. We make the further idealization that X is not only perfectly rational but has also an infallible memory. Our assumptions deviate from reality very much if the observer and agent is a natural human being, but not so much if we think of X as a robot with organs of perception, data processing, decision making, and acting. Thinking about the design of a robot will help us finding rules of rationality. Once found, these rules can be applied not only in the construction of a robot but also in advising human beings in their effort to make their decisions as rational as their limited abilities permit. (Carnap 1962, p. 309)

[5] It was and still is my conviction that the great problems of the organization of economy and the organization of the world at the present time, in the era of industrialization, cannot possibly be solved by „the free interplay of forces“, but require rational planning. For the organization of economy this means socialism of some form; for the organization of the world it means a gradual development toward a world government. However, neither socialism nor world government are regarded as absolute ends; they are only organizational means which, according to our present knowledge, seem to give the best promise of leading to a realization of the ultimate aim. This aim is a form of life in which the well-being and the development of the individual is valued most highly, not the power of the state. (Schilpp 1963, p. 83, my emphasis)

[6] Only slowly did I recognize how large the divergence is between the views of the two wings of analytic philosophy in the question of natural versus constructed languages: the view which I shared with my friends in the Vienna Circle and later with many philosophers in the United States, and the view of those philosophers who are chiefly influenced by G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein. (Schilpp 1963, p. 68)